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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Westfall, Aubrey L. (Ph.D., Political Science) 
 
Breaking the Bonds of Blood: The Politics of Family Migration in Europe 
 
Thesis directed by Associate Professors David S. Brown and Joseph Jupille 
 
 
 
 
Family migration accounts for the majority of migrant movement to the 
developed world. In response, European states change family migration policy provisions 
in an attempt to balance national interests with their human rights obligation to respect 
family life. This dissertation explains variation across European family migration polices 
and discovers politics is the primary policy determinant. The findings suggest public 
support for immigration control and radical anti-immigrant parties trumps humanitarian, 
economic, and demographic concerns when it comes to explaining variance in family 
migration policy. Indicators of political conservativism also describe variation in labor 
and family migrant policy, in family immigration and immigrant policies, and in the 
implementation of “integration from abroad” programs. The results have significant 
political implications on two fronts. First, immigration policies based on humanitarian 
principles are fragile to national political maneuvering, suggesting that international law 
has not obtained significant weight over national interests. Second, the importance of the 
radical right and anti-immigrant public opinion for family migration policy reveals the 
vulnerability of rights-based immigration policy to anti-democratic interests. In addition 
to providing robust findings and practical implications for domestic and international 
politics, this dissertation contributes to the existing literature in an additional four ways: it 
 
iv 
examines family migration (which has not been widely distinguished as a unique subject 
of study); it groups existing theories of immigration policy into an evaluative framework 
of humanitarian, economic, political, and demographic policy motivators; it uses 
multivariate analysis to examine general trends across cases; and it uses recent data to 
examine policy provisions in quantitative models. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
In the fall of 2008, a young man from Ghana entered the small office of his family 
reunification caseworker on the outskirts of Paris. Six months previously he had applied to bring 
his wife, his two-year-old son, and his eight-month-old daughter (whom he had never met) to 
France, where he had been working for two years. After approximately six months of waiting, he 
was told his application was rejected. The application failed because an inspection of his 
accommodation revealed insufficient square footage and poor ventilation (no fan) in the 
bathroom. He was invited to re-apply once he moved into appropriate accommodation, at which 
point the lengthy visa acquisition process would start over. On one hand, it seems unforgiving to 
deny a person the right to live with his family based on a few feet of space and a fan. On the 
other hand, under the guise of insuring liberté, égalité and fraternité for all individuals living 
within French borders, the French state has an interest in ensuring humanitarian living conditions 
for all residents.  
Why does France require immigrants to have appropriate accommodation for their 
families while other European states (i.e. Ireland) do not? This dissertation considers this 
question (among others) as it examines European variance in family migration policies. Family 
migration is defined as migration for the stated purpose of living with a family member. The 
term “family migration” is indistinguishable from “family reunification”, the term most often 
used by policy makers but avoided in this analysis due to the recent politicization of the 
difference between “family reunification” and “family formation” (see below).  
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Family migration is relatively neglected as a subject for academic study, a strange 
omission since family migration accounts for over half of all migration to the developed world. 
Because family migrants must follow a sponsor migrant, family migration is a consequence of 
labor or refugee migration, and since many scholars see family migration as a direct extension of 
more interesting facets of immigration, family migration is largely ignored as a topic worthy of 
distinct analysis (notable exceptions include legal academic Ryszard Cholewinski, social 
scientist Eleonore Kofman and political scientist Gallya Lahav), though several scholars include 
family migration as a subset of a larger study of the politics of migration (e.g. James Hollifield 
and Christian Joppke). Recent policy change challenges the academic neglect of family 
migration, as European states limit the relatives eligible for family reunification and add new 
requirements for family immigration. European policy makers recognize the dominance of 
family migration flows, they know family migrants generally come from less-developed 
countries, and they connect the immigrant family to problems associated with immigrant 
integration. These policy changes skirt the protection of family migration in human rights law to 
restrict family migration into EU countries. The current focus on family migration and the 
method of policy change suggest family migration policy deserves a careful academic analysis.  
This dissertation seeks to understand the variation in European family migration policy 
and to answer the following question: why do some states adopt restrictive family migration 
policies while others do not? Restrictive family migration policies either stop or slow the process 
of immigration, or limit the rights available to migrants. Inclusive policies open the borders or 
provide immigrants with increased rights and privileges in a host country. This study uses an 
evaluative framework of humanitarian, economic, political, and demographic concerns to explain 
variance in family migration policy. The results suggest politics trump all other policy 
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determinants to explain family migration policy variance: Anti-immigrant political parties and 
public support for immigration control consistently predict the implementation of restrictive 
family migration policies. The importance of politics for migration policy is exhibited across a 
wide range of policies: indicators of political conservativism explain variance in labor and family 
migrant policy, in policies governing family migrants before and after their entry into a host 
state, and in the implementation of “integration from abroad” programs. At the same time, the 
results suggest economic, demographic, or humanitarian explanations for immigration politics 
may provide a false rationale for a purely political outcome.  
The remainder of this chapter discusses general concepts and theories relating to 
European immigration, setting the scene for the empirical analysis. It begins with a brief 
overview of why people move and discusses the history of post-war migration to Europe. It then 
describes the phenomena behind the recent politicization of family migration. The last two 
sections review the methodological approach and outline the structure of the dissertation.  
1.1. WHY PEOPLE MOVE 
International migration involves movement across state borders with the intention to 
settle. Settlement makes migration a political issue for host states, because when migrants settle 
they become part of the host society. However, the real phenomenon of immigration is much 
more complex than the simple migration-settlement pattern. The intent behind migration can be 
temporary or permanent, migration can be long-term or short-term, migrants might live in one 
country and work in another, or they might move back and forth between a sending and host 
state on a regular basis. Further, migrants move for many different reasons. Generally there are 
four primary motives for migration: to work, to escape persecution, to join family members, or to 
study. However, even these categories are not clear-cut. Migrants may have several reasons for 
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moving, but choose to apply for the visa offering the path of least resistance. For example, a 
potential immigrant living in an impoverished failed state may migrate to improve his quality of 
life and get a well-paying job, but the easiest way to get into a European country is through the 
asylum system. Alternatively, a migrant might apply for family reunification when he really 
wants a better-paying job in France. Even when motivations match the category of migrant entry, 
immigrants overlap in purpose. A wife moving to join her husband may also eventually seek 
employment or go to school. A student studying at a university might look for a job in the same 
city after graduation. A laborer might marry his girlfriend from home while he is working in 
another state, and apply to bring her to the host country as a family migrant. The conflation of 
purposes blurs the categories of migrants. 
Nevertheless, the categories of migrant entry matter because categorizations lead to 
distinguishable bodies of policy: refugee policies, asylum policies, labor migrant policies, and 
family reunification policies. The categories also lead people to attribute particular social 
problems to a specific immigrant group. For example, temporary migrants are viewed as a 
positive solution to the aging European work force; temporary migrants work and contribute the 
system without planning to withdraw full benefits. On the other hand, asylum seekers and family 
migrants pull disproportionately from the welfare state (Borjas 1999; Allard and Danzinger 
2000; Geddes 2003; Bailey 2005). Policy makers react to generalizations and pursue policy 
encouraging beneficial migration and aiming to discourage or at least ameliorate the negative 
consequences of costly migration. This dissertation focuses on immigrant families, an extremely 
important immigrant group for modern European societies. The salience and significance of 
family migration is largely a product of the European experience with immigration throughout 
the post-war period. 
 5 
1.2. IMMIGRATION IN POST-WAR EUROPE 
In the European context, immigration is associated with a negative, costly and threatening 
vocabulary. Words like “flooding” and “invasion” are used in reference to growing foreign 
populations, and these words frame the immigration debate around threats to the welfare state, 
societal cohesion, and national security. However, Europe’s historical experience with 
immigration has not always been antagonistic. Immigration became a major issue for Europe at 
the end of World War I when most European nation states started to pass legislation meant to 
manage immigration flows and the naturalization process. This restrictive focus persisted until 
post-World War II, when the project of economic and structural recovery drew migrant workers 
into developed European countries. In fact, all highly industrialized West European countries 
used temporary labor recruitment at some point in the post war period (Messina 2007). In some 
cases, developed states took advantage of willing workers living in the less-developed European 
periphery, including many of the Mediterranean states, Southern Europe, Finland, and Ireland, 
while others (most notably Germany) expanded their “guest worker” programs to include 
Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia (Castles and Miller 2003). In addition to more formal 
guest worker programs, many bilateral agreements were used to negotiate labor migration 
(Geddes 2003). At the same time, the free movement of workers within the European 
Community entered into force in 1968 allowing Italians to access the labor markets of the north, 
and the Nordic Labour Market allowed Finnish laborers to easily migrate to Sweden (Castles and 
Miller 2003). Migration from colonial states also increased during this period, partly as the result 
of labor recruitment but largely due to the individual initiative of immigrants responding to labor 
shortages in developed states. The boom of labor migration was abruptly brought to an end with 
the oil crisis of 1973-74, when the recession motivated states to re-consider their role in the 
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world economy. New industrial areas became the target of investment, and technology changed 
the face of the working class. Low-skilled migrant labor was no longer in demand. In response, 
most European states halted labor programs and closed access to visas for all economic migrants. 
The labor stop had serious consequences. Thousands of foreign workers reacted to the 
change in policy by settling more deeply into their host societies and workers who initially 
intended to return to their country of origin quickly began the process of permanent settlement 
and family reunification (de Wenden 1994). This reaction to the change in labor policy caused a 
dramatic increase in family migration. By putting a quick stop to labor migration, West European 
governments created a “movement of workers, many who intended to stay temporarily, into a 
permanent immigration of families” (Castles and Kosak 1973, 31). This shift is evident in the 
data on immigration flows. Figure 1.1 illustrates the British and French flows of immigrant 
laborers and dependents over the period of policy change (Britain passed legislation to reduce the 
number of immigrant workers in 1962 and France curbed labor migration in 1974).  
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Figure 1.1. Labor and Family Migration to the United Kingdom and France 
 
 
Note: The data for Britain only includes immigration from the Commonwealth 
Source: Messina 2007: 36 
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The data in Figure 1.1 illustrates the effectiveness of the labor stoppage, but also shows 
the trade-off between labor and family migration. Labor migration declined around the time of 
policy change in both Britain and France. In the British case, smaller labor migration flows 
corresponded with a steady increase family migration. In France, both labor and family 
migration dropped off, but the proportion of migrants seeking to join family members grew 
dramatically to the point where three out of five foreigners who migrated to France between 
1974 and 1978 were family members of French citizens or settled workers (Messina 2007). 
Even as European states passed restrictive policy intended to slow immigration, a steady 
stream of colonial immigration continued under the guise of family reunification (Geddes 2003). 
In the Belgian, British, Dutch, and French cases, colonial migrants automatically enjoyed many 
rights comparable to those of citizens, including reduced barriers of family reunification 
(Messina 2007). It is impossible to cite precise figures about the size of colonial immigration, but 
evidence from the UK suggests a dramatic peak in Commonwealth migration. Between 1955 and 
1962, about 500,000 citizens from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the West Indies settled in 
Britain (Layton Henry et al. 1985). Figure 1.2 illustrates how a large majority of all individuals 
admitted into Britain between 1967 and 1979 were citizens of a Commonwealth country, and 
almost all of them were families intending to settle in the UK.  
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Figure 1.2. Settlement in Britain, 1967-1979 
 
Source: Messina 2007: 35 
 
While European governments did not seem to be aware that curbing labor migration 
would have such a dramatic effect in motivating family migration, permanent migration was 
sometimes encouraged. In fact, many European societies like France, Germany and Belgium 
included family migration in their strategy for immigration closure: family migration was hoped 
to stabilize the immigrant population, causing the total rate of immigration to eventually fall 
(Freeman 1979; Messina 2007). Also, many governments tolerated family migration in order to 
assist with the social integration of settled foreign workers (Castles and Kosak 1973). In sum, the 
settlement flows of immigrants have been historically promoted (at most) or tolerated (at least) 
by the governments of European states, at least until recently.  
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Today’s immigration flows and the size of the immigrant populations reflect the 
historical story of immigration. Figure 1.3 illustrates the size of the immigrant populations 
residing in select West European countries from 1985-2008 (additional figures for the full 
sample of European states are presented in appendix A).  
Figure 1.3. Size of Foreign Population in Select European Countries, 1985, 1990, 1995, 
2000-2008 (percent of total population) 
 
Source: OECD.Stat, stats.oecd.org 
 
In most countries the size of the migrant population has grown despite efforts to control it 
over the years. The growth is a consequence of the institutionalized nature of human movement; 
migrants quickly establish networks, which help determine ease of entry and integration for 
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future migrants. Further, when economic workers become permanent residents they seek to 
reunite with their family in their new host country, resulting in exponential growth of the 
immigrant population.  
The arrival of immigrant families is a part of the normal dynamics of every historical 
mass migration, and family migration continues to dominate European immigration flows to this 
day (Castles and Miller 1973). Figure 1.4 illustrates the robust size of family immigration in 
comparison to the other major categories of entry in 2006. 
Figure 1.4. Migration Flows by Category of Entry, 2006 
 
Source: OECD Stat, stats.oecd.org 
 
In response to growing immigration flows dominated by family migrants, states are 
passing immigration and immigrant policies to encourage beneficial migration, discourage costly 
migration, and better integrate resident immigrants. Immigration policies control the entry of 
migrants into a host state, and immigrant policies manage resident migrants. In recent years, both 
immigration and immigrant policies especially focus on immigrant families. 
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1.3 FAMILY MIGRATION 
Modern European societies are obligated to accommodate family movement due to the 
international obligation for nation states to recognize the human right to private and family life 
and a 2003 EU Directive on “the right of a family reunification for third-country nationals” 
(Council Directive 2003/86/EC). However, the right to family was not always recognized by 
European states. After initial hopes that family migration would eventually slow the total flow of 
migration and better integrate labor migrants (Freeman 1979), both France and Germany tried to 
restrict resident foreigners from reuniting with family members or prevent the family members 
from working in the host state. They also experimented with restrictions based on 
accommodation standards and requirements. The policies changed often, presumably due to 
lively opposition from human rights organizations. In the end, constitutional courts struck down 
regulations explicitly restricting family migration (Hollifield 1992). Ever since then, European 
states have been obligated to accept family migrants as a consequence of the state’s humanitarian 
obligation to respect the right to family. 
 States do not always accept the flows of family migrants willingly. Even with the backing 
of the EU Directive and the widespread acceptance of court decisions upholding family 
migration, states interpret obligations to family migrants differently. For example, political 
challenges to family migration are the result of an increased attention to “family formation” 
within immigrant groups. Family formation refers to when an unmarried resident third country 
national chooses to marry another third country national and uses the family reunification system 
to bring the new spouse into the host country. This situation has become more prevalent recently 
as the children of immigrants (i.e. second generation migrants) choose to seek a marriage 
partnership in their parent’s country of origin.  
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 Opponents of family formation argue the state’s obligation to respect the right to family 
life should not be subordinate to an individual’s educated choice and the right to family life only 
obligates states to accommodate existing family relationships, not those occurring after the initial 
migration. However, the Directive on the right to family reunification allows for family 
migration “whether the family relationship arose before of after the resident’s entry” (Council 
Directive 2003/86/EC, Article 2d). The EU Directive does not distinguish between family 
reunification and family formation within the principle of respect for private and family life. 
Nevertheless, policy makers highlight “family formation” as specific element of family 
migration that deserves additional attention due to its particular relevance for immigrant 
integration.  
In recent years many European states have become very concerned with the integration of 
immigrant groups into host societies. The Parisian riots of 2005, the discovery of homegrown 
terrorist cells in Germany and the UK, and several high profile murders served as a wake up call 
to many West European governments with poorly integrated immigrants. Resident immigrant 
groups quickly became the focus of several pro-integration policy initiatives. Intermarriage is 
regarded as a positive sign of integration, and allowing family formation with spouses from 
foreign countries is assumed to encourage anti-integrationist behavior. In response, many 
politicians have started to reform family migration policies to include an integration component, 
a policy change permitted by the EU directive. 
 Other non-conventional marriage behavior has provoked political responses in European 
states. Muslim immigration into West European states sparks intense cultural debate, particularly 
over the occurrence of forced marriages, arranged marriages, polygamy and honor killings. 
Many members of western society do not want to recognize abusive relationships or support a 
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family environment contradicting ideals of gender equality and freedom. Western policy makers 
seek restrictions or added legal measures for marriages suspected of being non-consensual 
(typically polygamous marriages or arranged marriages), hoping to discourage the incidence of 
forced marriage on European soil. As a result, European states increase requirements for family 
immigration. In addition, states may withhold legal protections from resident third country 
nationals in order to maintain the state right to deport individuals suspected of engaging in forced 
marriage. 
 Finally, the use of marriage to illegitimately gain access to legal residency in Europe is 
well-documented, and states are therefore very suspicious of any partnerships that do not 
conform to the usual boy-meets-girl dynamic. Long-distance relationships and arranged 
marriages are especially suspected of being “marriages of convenience” where a non-resident 
marries a resident with the sole motivation of obtaining a visa. Policy makers restrict unusual 
relationships hoping to reduce the occurrence of fake marriages and technically illegal 
immigration.  
Family migration is important because family flows constitute the majority of 
immigration. It is also important theoretically, as the policies relating to family migration are 
questioning pre-conceived notions about human rights, family life, integration, and illegality. Up 
to this point, the literature has largely neglected family migration as a unique subject of study 
(with a few important exceptions), and therefore has not benefited from the unique insights 
provided by the challenges associated with welcoming and incorporating family migrants. This 
research seeks to fill that gap by illustrating the variance in politics surrounding family migration 
policies. 
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1.4. METHODOLOGY 
 This dissertation employs quantitative and qualitative evidence as it seeks to explain 
cross-national variance in family migration policy. This analysis is limited to family migration 
connected to third-country nationals (non-European citizens), because the range of policy options 
relating to third-country nationals is more expansive than those applied to European citizens, 
which are constrained by national and European constitutions. The dissertation is structured 
around several cross-national quantitative models. The data for the analysis are primarily drawn 
from the 2006 rendition of the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) published by the 
Migration Policy Group and the British Council. The MIPEX quantifies cross-national European 
policies relating to minorities, making the MIPEX one of the first and largest datasets allowing 
national policy comparisons. The dissertation primarily considers policies relating to family 
reunification, but also examines the policies relating to labor market status in chapter two. 
 The dissertation includes case research and elite-level interview evidence in four 
countries of interest: France, Germany, Sweden, and the UK. The four cases are selected based 
on their recent or ongoing debates over family migration policy provisions, and the importance 
of the four states in the decision-making structure of European immigration policy. France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom are indisputably the most powerful countries within Europe 
and they also receive the largest number of immigrants (See figure 1.3). Further, at the time of 
the interviews, France held the rotating presidency of the European Council and was actively 
pursuing immigration restrictions at the European level. The United Kingdom opts out of many 
of the European policies relating to immigration, and is not party to the directive establishing the 
acceptable policies for family reunification within Europe. Therefore, the immigration politics of 
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the UK are separated from those of Europe, and allow for the consideration of whether and how 
the EU directive influences national policy for countries within Europe. Sweden is included as a 
case for special consideration due to its reputation as the defender of human rights within 
Europe. Because family migration is protected by human rights, the policy debate in Sweden is 
of special interest. In sum, the four countries selected for detailed research and interview analysis 
represent cases of high political interest when it comes to the decision-making process over 
policies of immigration, and family migration especially. Case analysis confirming the 
quantitative results often involves evidence from these four countries. 
 Ninety-seven interviews were conducted with the political elites of France, Germany, 
Sweden, the UK and the European Union. Interview subjects include policy makers, NGOs, 
lawyers, and prominent academics. Evidence from the interviews is included throughout the 
dissertation as supportive evidence, but the primary purpose of the interviews aimed at 
generating hypotheses on family migration policy formation to be tested through quantitative 
analysis. An anonymous list of the interviews is included in appendix B. The names of the 
interview subjects are excluded to protect them from any negative repercussions resulting from 
their participation in interviews. An assigned number identifies interviews when they are 
included in the analysis. 
1.5. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION  
This dissertation consists of five empirical chapters. The chapters are organized around a 
deductive logic, starting with the most general research question examining variance in family 
migration policies, and progressing into more nuanced investigations of specific areas of family 
migration policy. The chapters yield the same finding: politics explain cross-national variance in 
family migration policy. 
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Chapter two uses a cumulative index of family migration policies to compare prevailing 
theories for different migration policies with a humanitarian explanation for policy variance. 
Family flows are justified by the individual right to respect for family life and recognition of the 
family as the foundation of a healthy society. Given the standardizing influence of European 
human rights law, why do European states enforce different family migration policies? While 
most immigration policy is explained by domestic economic, political and demographic 
concerns, family immigration has a normative graft binding policy makers. The relevance of 
human rights should produce distinct policy outcomes associated with national-level 
humanitarianism. The data suggest humanitarianism does not consistently describe family 
migration policy outcomes. Instead, populist political pressures from the radical right and public 
opinion matter most for explaining variance in family migration policies.  
When the models in chapter two show little magnitude in the relationship between 
humanitarianism and family migration policy, the results provoke the question of whether family 
migration policy is different from any other type of migration policy. Chapter three uses data on 
immigrant rights to explore whether family migration policy varies differently than labor 
migration policy. It finds little distinction between the two bodies of policy; contexts where there 
is a public preference for closed immigration policies are more likely to have restrictive labor 
and family migrant rights. However, it is too soon to conclude the same things describe variance 
in all labor and family migration policies because the dependent variables of chapter two only 
measure rights. Policies governing immigrants after they enter the country (immigrant policies) 
may be subject to different politics and domestic determinants than policies governing immigrant 
entry (immigration policies).  
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Chapter four tests the difference in determinants of immigrant and immigration policies 
using data on family migration policy. It finds party politics describes variance in both 
immigration and immigrant migration policies, but differently. Countries with anti-immigrant 
radical right parties are more likely to have restrictive family migration policies, as the radical 
right uses the unknown nature of the “imagined” immigrant to lay a foundation of public 
pessimism and fear towards immigrants attempting to enter the country. Immigrant family 
migration policies are associated with mainstream politics of public opinion. In order to pass 
restrictive immigrant policy, political parties need a strong electoral mandate to overcome the 
difficulty of withdrawing rights from a visible and “real” population with defined needs. 
Fieldwork experience suggests not all immigration policies are similarly politicized. In 
the last five years, pre-entry civic integration policies for family migrants have been the most 
publicly debated. Chapter five explores variance in the application of pre-entry integration 
policies to understand why some states implement the policies while others do not. Because the 
policies are intended to improve immigrant integration, they should be implemented in contexts 
where immigrants are poorly integrated. Instead, the results of statistical analysis suggest 
variance in pre-entry integration policies is described by politics and ideology, and function 
much like the other immigration policies.  
In sum, politics explain variance across all migration policies considered in this 
dissertation. While providing robust findings relevant for domestic and international politics, this 
dissertation contributes to the existing literature in four ways: it examines family migration 
(which has not been widely distinguished as a unique subject of study); it groups existing 
theories of immigration policy into an evaluative framework of humanitarian, economic, 
political, and demographic policy motivators; it uses multivariate analysis to examine general 
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trends across cases (a unique approach compared to the heavy reliance on case analysis and 
narrative in the immigration policy literature); and it uses fresh data to examine policy provisions 
in quantitative models. Chapter six highlights these contributions by summarizing the findings 
and discussing the implications of the research. The fact that politics explain the variance in 
family migration policy tells an important truth about the concerns of policy makers. Attributing 
immigration policy to the economy, demography, or to external human rights law may be a 
misrepresentation of the political reality. Instead, immigration is vulnerable to the much more 
strategic concerns of party politics and public opinion.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Ties That Bind? 
Humanitarian Norms, Domestic Politics and Immigration 
 
Family migration comprises over sixty-five percent of legal migration to the developed 
world (OECD 2006). Family migrants are different from the young worker migrating in search 
of better economic opportunity. Instead, they are people moving in order to live with a family 
member. Family migrants might be spouses who have been in a long-distance relationship, 
children growing up without one or both of their parents, and aging parents who can no longer 
live alone and must rely on the support of children living abroad. The basic motivation of family 
migration distinguish it from any other type of human movement, and universal belief in the 
importance of family living together translates into international human rights law protecting the 
right to family life. The European Union goes further and declares violating the right to family 
life as punishable in court. Despite efforts to coordinate immigration policies and the protection 
of family movement by human rights, European states exhibit wide differences in family 
migration policy. Why does this difference exist? Given the universal sympathy for familial 
bonds and the interference of human rights in family migration policy making, do humanitarian 
ties bind policy makers when legislating family migration policy? 
Family migration policy should be subject to different pressures than other forms of 
migration policy because of the humanitarian motive of family migration and its protection in 
international law. Since human rights and family migration are intertwined, state-level respect 
for humanitarian principles might explain variation in the extent to which nations respect the 
human right to family life. Alternatively, many domestic economic, political, and demographic 
 21 
conditions may influence immigration policy. Where immigration is costly to a society, policy 
may be restrictive, and where the effects are beneficial or neutral, policies might be more open. 
In other words, it remains an open question whether considerations of human rights matter for 
national policymaking, or whether domestic considerations overwhelm humanitarian concern for 
the family. 
This chapter examines the relationship between a society’s respect for human rights and 
its family migration policy. The results convey bad news to idealists: societal respect for human 
rights has no correlation with permissive family migration policy, nor do economic or 
demographic conditions. The political climate explains all cross-national variance in family 
migration policy. In particular, the strength of public support for immigration controls and the 
electoral presence of an anti-immigrant party explain restrictive family migration policies in 
cross-national perspective.  
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section derives hypotheses by discussing 
the humanitarian nature of family migration and the domestic costs of inclusive migration policy. 
The subsequent section describes the data and estimation procedure. The third section discusses 
findings, highlighting the insignificant relationship between humanitarianism and family 
migration policy and discussing the more important roles of public opinion and the radical right. 
The final section concludes.  
2.1 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
The human right to family life 
 Family migration and asylum are the only two forms of human movement explicitly 
included in human rights law. Family reunification is protected by the individual right to family 
life based on the reality that human beings live in social family units, which make up the 
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fundamental building blocks of society (Cranston 1973; Lahav 1997; Cholewinski 2002; Kofman 
2004). The right to family is enshrined in international law and many national constitutions.
i
 As 
Article 10 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explains “The 
widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural 
and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is 
responsible for the care and education of dependent children.” The European Union codifies the 
right to respect for private and family life in Article 8 of the European Convention for Human 
Rights, and the Council of the European Union passed a 2003 directive protecting the right to 
family reunification for third-country nationals (Directive 2003/86/EC). Unlike other 
international conventions or declarations, the directive is legally binding for the member states of 
the European Union. However, universal recognition of human rights does not make rights-based 
policies immune from negotiation; the right to family life is widely interpreted as a “qualified” 
right. With qualified rights, individual rights are balanced against the legitimate aims of the state 
and the needs of a democratic society. Within the parameters allowed by qualified rights, 
European countries interpret their obligation to protect the right to family life differently.  
The EU directive on the right to family reunification lays down a minimum legal standard 
for policy and outlines the policy areas left to state discretion. For example, the application of the 
right to family depends on national definitions of “family life”, where states decide which family 
members are protected by international law. States have the right to choose the conditions a 
sponsor must meet before they can apply to bring family members into the host state, and can 
choose whether to require evidence of integration from the family migrant. The directive also 
permits flexibility in providing access to education, employment and welfare to resident family 
migrants. States are obligated to provide family members with a right to autonomous residency 
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no later than five years after providing a initial residency visa, but European states vary widely 
on this provision: some states grant the right to autonomous residence in three years or fewer (i.e. 
Belgium) and others give the right to autonomous residence after five years or only under certain 
conditions (i.e. Austria) (Niessen et al 2007).  
The qualified nature of the right to family life allows for variable application of the right 
in policy. Nevertheless, the relevance of human rights law subjects family migration policy to 
different ethical and legal pressures than those pushing other forms of migration policy 
governing movement based on economic or demographic need. When dealing with family, 
policy makers are bound by international law, and the degree of national sympathy for the 
general concepts and practices of human rights should indicate limits to their acceptance of 
permissive family migration policies.  
Interviews with policy makers support the idea that human rights matter for policy. As a 
member of Sarkozy’s cabinet explains: “Our [immigration law] is extremely intricate, including 
many international agreements or treaties…it gives the people a lot of rights. We have to follow 
the [international law] by the book, and it makes it very hard to implement policies. It’s easy to 
say we have to be tough [with migration].  In fact, in the real world, you have hardly any room 
for policy change” (18, personal communication, 10/20/08). The head of the French office 
managing family migration legislation explains how human rights restrain policy in more detail: 
“[Human rights] are important because we are obligated to respect human rights. We also know 
we have to respect the right to a private family life, because our constitution protects a “normal” 
life. Private family life and normal life are the same thing. Evidently we take this into account 
for the right to residency for foreigners. In our policies, even though they are a bit restrictive, we 
can’t just say that we want to take away family reunion. For all [policy] decisions made by the 
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Prefecture, there is always a specific examination [of the policy] relative to the European 
Convention for Human Rights. If the policy doesn’t pass the examination, the judge will stop the 
policy …or annul a decision because it doesn’t qualify according to the article 8 of the 
convention (protecting family reunification)” (10, personal communication, 10/7/08) France is 
not alone in being constrained by human rights law. A member of the German Ministry of the 
Interior responsible for writing residency law explains “Human rights are always on our minds. 
In Germany, there are many human rights groups, national NGOs and also [groups] from the 
European Union who do reports on policy. We are legally obligated to answer their 
questions…when we are in the process of writing the law, we have to hear from experts on 
constitutional law and the law of the United Nations, and these experts write reports to make sure 
we are on track with international law. So, when there is a conflict between international law and 
national interests, the international law wins” (39, personal communication, 11/21/08). Even in 
Britain, where the government opts out of many binding EU provisions, a senior policy advisor 
at the UK Border Agency admits “It’s quite important to find out whether [the immigration law 
is] going to stand up to legal scrutiny, whether there are any issues relating to for example, the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and so the legal advice is something that we’ll take into 
account as well in terms of the future development of the policy” (91, personal communication, 
6/10/09). Even elected politicians often consider human rights in formulating policy opinions. As 
the Swedish MP for the Left party explains: “The right to family reunification should not be 
debated. It is in several international conventions…arguing that we should give in and take on 
international conventions is wrong. They exist because you are already supposed to fulfill them” 
(80, personal communication, 4/20/09). 
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Human rights do enter into the policy decision-making process. However, if all European 
states apply human rights in the same way, the family migration policies should be similar across 
European cases. Perhaps levels of respect for human rights explain the observed variance in 
family migration policies across European countries. This logic leads to the primary hypothesis 
of this chapter: In environments where governmental and individual respect for human rights is 
high, family migration policies will be more inclusive. 
Domestic conditions 
As a qualified right, the right to family for immigrant groups is balanced against the 
legitimate needs of society. The qualified nature of the law allows room for domestic economic, 
demographic, and political conditions to overwhelm the obligation to the right for family life and 
influence family migration politics. Unemployment, slow economic growth, and high social 
spending communicate potential economic costs connected with welcoming a new population 
into society (Borjas 1994). A healthy economy allows policy makers to be optimistic about 
employment and lifestyle prospects for migrants and provides a context for a discussion about 
the potential economic benefits of migration (Borjas 1995). Immigration increases the flexibility 
of the labor market, slows wage growth, and provides economic opportunities (Zimmerman 
1995). The impact of immigration on native wages and employment is the subject of particular 
debate (Smith & Edmonston 1997; Coppel, Dumont & Visco 2002). Immigration increases the 
supply of labor, leading to competition for employment. At the same time, the presence of 
immigrants in the work force drives down wages, especially in sectors where natives compete 
with immigrants for jobs. Though the effect of slowing wage growth and providing competition 
for jobs might be positive from a macroeconomic perspective as it benefits employers, lower 
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wages and unemployment will negatively affect the individual worker/voter. Policy makers 
hesitate to promote policies that contribute to economic difficulty.  
Even though family migrants move for the purpose of living with family and not to gain 
employment, the public only sees a growing immigrant population of potential competitors 
without considering the reason for migration. Further, though family migrants do not migrate to 
work, evidence suggests that they do eventually take up employment in the host state (2, 
personal communication, 9/9/08). The competition presented by low-wage family migrants in the 
labor market may result in reduced wages or unemployment for native workers. The policy 
response is to tighten all immigration controls in times of economic difficulty, and in 
environments where unemployment is high, family migration policy should be more restrictive. 
The size of the welfare state also matters when it comes to projecting the costs of 
migration. Gary Freeman (1986) claims a welfare state cannot coexist with free movement due to 
fundamental tensions between a closed welfare system and an open labor market. Welfare states 
must be closed to insulate themselves from outside economic pressures and to restrict benefits to 
members. As globalization brings more foreigners into a welfare state, migrants draw 
disproportionately from the welfare system (Borjas 1999; Allard & Danzinger 2000; Geddes 
2003; Bailey 2005). Migrant families especially require social spending in education, health, and 
government benefits. With heavy migrant reliance on public funds, the universal right to welfare 
becomes associated with one ethnic group, which changes the political debate around welfare. 
With these altered conditions, the traditionally conceived welfare state cannot exist. The 
incompatibility between welfare and open movement motivates restrictive family migration 
policy in welfare states. 
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Demography also impacts the extent of migration control. Europe is facing stagnant 
population growth and an aging workforce, a lethal combination for the expansive welfare states 
of most European member states. Where fertility among nationals is low or where there is a 
disproportionately large elderly population, immigration policies might be more inclusive in 
order to balance the population through “replacement migration” (UN Population Division 2002; 
Zimmerman 1995). Of all the types of immigration, family migration is the best weapon to 
counter aging populations. When families migrate, the clear intention is the settlement of future 
generations of immigrants who will uphold the economy. Further, immigrant groups typically 
have higher fertility rates than most Europeans, and large immigrant families could compensate 
for the declining population of native Europeans. Though some research suggests that 
replacement migration is unnecessary or unsustainable (Feld 2000; UN Population Division 
2002), others suggest certain immigration policies could help solve future fiscal problems 
(Zimmerman 1995; Storesletten 1999). Despite some negative evidence, replacement migration 
remains in the forefront in many policy makers’ minds. During the elite interviews carried out in 
France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, policy makers in all four countries 
acknowledged the argument for replacement migration and listed it as a policy priority. For 
example, one policy maker in Germany argues “It is pretty clear that we do not get enough 
migrants to constitute replacement migration. But it should also be clear that we will need all 
kinds of instruments to rectify these [demographic] challenges. If migration is one small part of 
the solution, it should be used. We are finding more and more support for this idea” (52, personal 
communication, 12/17/08). Growing support for the concept of replacement migration suggests 
that family migration policy will be more inclusive in countries with low fertility rates. 
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Even though a large immigrant population improves the chances for replacement 
migration, the size of the immigrant population could also have a restrictive effect on 
immigration policy. The size of the immigrant population determines the extent of societal costs 
imposed by immigrants; survey analysis suggests public perception of negative costs to society 
and demand for tighter immigration control increases when there is a large or a rapidly growing 
immigrant population (Money 2007). The exacerbating effects of a large resident migrant 
population or high immigration flows into a country should motivate more restrictive family 
migration policies. 
The political determinants of immigration control are tied to political ideology and party 
politics. Historically, parties on the right of the ideological continuum hold the most consistent 
positions on immigration. Conservative parties generally promote restrictive or closed 
immigration policies based on platforms of cultural conservativism and nationalism. Further, 
conservative parties have successfully used xenophobia to bring themselves into power, using 
immigrants as scapegoats, elaborating on the domestic costs of migration, or projecting a future 
“flood” of immigrants (Thränhardt 1995). They do this for two reasons: 1) immigration provides 
an opportunity to avoid the politics of the economy and seize votes from the left; 2) they fear loss 
of support to the radical right (Pettigrew 1998). For example, during elections in Britain, 
Germany, and France in the 1990s, the three Conservative parties created the expectation that 
once in government, the conservatives would implement dramatic changes that would cut the 
numbers of settled migrants sharply (Thränhardt 1995). In fact, policies typically remain 
unchanged after conservatives gain power, which partially accounts for the rise in support for the 
radical anti-immigrant right in the late 1990s. As the radical right wins seats in the legislature, 
centrist conservative parties become more decisive in issuing immigration policies consistent 
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with campaign promises (Williams 2006). Family migration policy will be more restrictive in 
contexts where conservative parties capture a large vote share. 
Governments usually do not enter office with binding commitments on immigration 
because general party preferences are often disturbed by dynamics of consensus building among 
the major centrist parties (Messina 1989; Freeman 1979; Katznelson 1973). Further, immigration 
policies of centrist parties are often inconsistent: “Conservative parties actively pursue 
immigration to pursue cheap labor for industry, now they stigmatize and scapegoat the foreigners 
they had earlier invited” (Pettigrew 1998, p. 97). As a result, the immigration policies of the 
centrist conservative parties might be vague or watered down, especially when compared to 
immigration policy preferences expressed by radical right parties. 
Europe is experiencing an unprecedented rise in the number of national radical right 
parties. These radical right parties do not garner enough support to gain substantial seats in the 
national parliament, which should make their policy influence minimal (Messina 1989; Freeman 
1995). However, under the right circumstances, the radical right influences immigration and 
immigrant policy through deliberate strategies used by the radical right and through the political 
response to the radical right by the major centrist parties (Schain 2006; Williams 2006; Norris 
2005; Pettigrew 1998). Family migration policy should be restrictive if there is a radical right 
party winning electoral support. 
The European population has reacted negatively to the new minorities of Europe 
(Pettigrew 1998). Negative public opinion influences immigration policy indirectly through 
communicating a preference to elected representatives in the legislature. Politicians will directly 
react to public opinion by adjusting their voting position on issues important to the public or they 
will use knowledge of public preference to shape the public agenda (Downs 1957). However, 
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this relationship cannot be taken for granted. No liberal state directly consults the public on 
issues of immigration policy and public influence on policy must occur indirectly at elections 
(Hoffman-Nowonty 1985). Unfortunately, elections are a clumsy mechanism for predicting 
policy choice. Based on evidence from the United Kingdom between 1955 and 1981, Jeannette 
Money (2007) suggests that national politicians ignore changes in the demand for immigration 
control unless “these constituencies are able to swing a national election from one party to 
another”(p. 685). Freeman (1995) also points out the relative openness of immigration politics in 
liberal democratic states when compared to typically restrictive public opinion.  He attributes this 
difference to an information gap between the public and the politicians, and also credits 
institutional constraints to making policy responsive to public opinion. Freeman also notes that 
organized public opinion more favorably influences policy, especially at times when immigration 
is politically salient (i.e. times of economic or demographic vulnerability). Regardless, where a 
public expresses strong preferences for immigration control, the national decision-makers will be 
more likely to pass restrictive immigration policies.  
2.2 ESTIMATION 
Family migration policies should be more inclusive in contexts where respect for human 
rights is high, despite any domestic economic, demographic and political conditions. In order to 
predict the policy impact of human rights against other explanations for family migration policy, 
a statistical model must control for all possible immigration policy determinants. The hypotheses 
suggest a model with the following specification:  
Family migration policy = ! + "1humanitarianism +"2gdp + "3unemployment + "4social 
spending + ! "5fertility + "6immigrant population + "7immigration "flows +"8center right vote 
share+ "9legislative presence of anti-immigrant party+ "10public support for immigration control 
+ e  
 
The measurement of the dependent and independent variables are described below. 
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Measuring family migration policy 
The multivariate model uses data from the 2006 Migrant Integration Policy Index 
(MIPEX) in a series of ordinary least squares regression models (Niessen et al 2007). The 
MIPEX data quantify cross-national European policies relating to minorities, making the MIPEX 
one of the first and largest datasets allowing national policy comparisons. This chapter draws 
data from the family reunification policy area to create a score measuring family migration 
policy for the 25 EU member states, Norway, and Switzerland in 2006.
ii
 The index for family 
reunification is composed of 26 policy indicators along four dimensions: 1) eligibility, indicating 
when a legal resident is entitled to apply for family reunification and a definition of which family 
members are eligible to apply for reunification; 2) conditions for acquisition of family 
reunification privileges, indicating whether there are integration requirements for family 
members and economic or accommodation standards the sponsor must meet; 3) security of the 
family status, considering the duration of the visa, rights of appeal, and grounds for rejection or 
deportation, and; 4) rights associated with family immigrant status, demonstrating access to 
education, employment, social services, etc. Table 2.1 illustrates list the policies included in the 
index 
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Table 2.1 Family Migration Policies 
 Eligibility for status  
  Of sponsor/legal resident 
  Of spouse/partner 
  Of minor children 
  Of dependent relations 
  In ascending line 
  Adult children 
 Conditions for acquisition of status  
  Passing integration test 
  Imposition of integration course 
  Language assessment 
  Accommodation requirement 
  Economic resources requirement 
  Length of application procedure 
  Cost of application 
 Security of status  
  Duration of validity of permit 
  Ground for withdrawing, rejecting, refusing to renew status 
  Before refusal, due account given to family circumstance (by law) 
  Legal guarantees or redress in instance of refusal or withdrawal 
 Rights associated with status  
  Right to autonomous residence for spouse/partner and children 
  Right to autonomous residence for other relatives 
  Access to education and training for adult family members 
  Access to employment and self-employment 
  Access to social security, social assistance, healthcare, and housing 
 
The norms for the MIPEX policy indicators are based on the vision for coordinated 
family reunification programs outlined in the EU Tampere presidency conclusions in 1999 which 
advocate comparable rights and obligations for resident third-country nationals and EU citizens 
(Niessen et al 2007). On each indicator, a country receives one of three possible scores; a 3 
corresponds with policies meeting the most inclusive standards, while lower scores indicate 
restrictiveness, unequal access for third country nationals and citizens, or merely meeting the 
minimum requirements of the EU family reunification directive. A detailed description of the 
coding is provided in appendix C. 
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Table 2.2 presents the MIPEX family migration scores for the sample of European cases 
standardized on a scale from 0 to 100 (and rounded to the nearest whole number). Thirty-three 
represents the lowest possible policy score and 100 the highest or most inclusive. The relatively 
normal distribution of the data signal a good fit between the data and an OLS model.  
Table 2.2 MIPEX Family Migration Policy Scores  
Sweden 95 Netherlands 73 
Portugal 90 Norway 73 
Italy 87 Hungary 70 
Slovenia 83 Ireland 70 
Lithuania 81 Luxembourg 70 
Malta 79 Greece 65 
Poland 79 France 62 
Spain 79 Switzerland 62 
Finland 78 Slovak Rep 60 
Belgium 76 Latvia 59 
Estonia 76 Cyprus 59 
Germany 76 Denmark 54 
UK 76 Austria 54 
Czech Rep 75   
Obs. Mean S.D. Range 
27 72.66 10.70 54 - 95 
 
 
 The validity of the index is tested through correlations, factor analysis, and a Chow test.
iii
 
Appendix D provides a correlation table of smaller indices representing the four theoretical 
groups of family migration policies that make up the family migration policy index: eligibility, 
 34 
conditions, security and rights. All four indices are positively correlated with each other, though 
the conditions for acquisition for status are not strongly correlated with the two indices 
measuring the security of status and the rights associated with status. The positive correlations 
suggest the policy groups may in fact represent a cohesive body of policy that can be represented 
with an index. 
 Principal component factor analysis confirms the relationship suggested by the 
correlations between the policy groups. Principle component factor analysis is used to discover 
simple patterns in relationships among variables. In particular, it tests whether variables can be 
grouped together and explained by a much smaller number of variables called factors. In this 
instance, factor analysis is used to test whether there are significant subgroups among the policy 
variables, or whether they all load on the same factor. If they do load on a single factor, all the 
policy variables approach the same theoretical concept and can be combined in a policy index. 
Appendix E illustrates the factor eigenvalues and the factor loadings for each independent 
variable. The eigenvalues indicate the number of relevant factors, and the factor loadings 
illustrate how strongly each variable loads on a factor.
iv
 The policy variables load on two factors, 
but most elements of the index load on the first factor. These results affirm the validity of the 
index as a single measure of family migration policy liberality. Factor analysis within each of the 
four theoretical groups of the dependent variable is illustrated in appendix F. Within each group, 
only one factor should be retained, which signals that all indicators within each group approach 
the same theoretical concept. The factor loadings do suggest variance in the strength of the 
relationship between some of the indicators and the first factor, but the eigenvalues maintain the 
relevance of a single factor.  
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In addition, an insignificant Chow test of the difference in error terms between an 
equation estimating pre-entry policies and the same equation estimating post-entry policies 
suggests that the difference is not statistically meaningful, further confirming the validity of 
using the family migration policy index as a single measure (see appendix G).  
Measuring independent variables 
Humanitarianism or respect for human rights is the primary independent variable of 
interest. Respect for human rights is measured through several indicators illustrating public and 
governmental respect for human rights. The percentage of a state’s World Values Survey 
population that are members of human rights organizations measures public support for 
humanitarianism, while indicators of national humanitarian donations and the size of the refugee 
population demonstrate governmental levels of humanitarianism. The governmental 
humanitarian indicators assume governments giving more money to international humanitarian 
causes and accepting more refugees might interpret human rights broadly and will have less 
trouble applying those rights to a foreign population. This support for international human rights 
should translate in to a general support for policies protecting domestic human rights, like the 
right to family. 
Unemployment and high social spending are expected to restrict family migration policy. 
The national unemployment rate as a percentage of the working population captures employment 
conditions, and national social spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) 
captures the size of a welfare state. The total GDP is included in the models as a control variable. 
Demographic conditions of low fertility and large immigrant populations should also play a part 
in motivating restrictive family migration policy. The average number of children per woman 
indicates fertility levels. The number of foreign citizens per capita measures the size of the 
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resident immigrant population, and immigration flows per capita captures the size of the 
incoming immigrant population. 
High levels of support for parties on the right of the ideological spectrum should 
correspond with more restrictive policies. The vote share won by parties of the center right and 
the presence of an anti-immigrant radical right party in the national legislature measure 
conservative political pressures. An anti-immigrant party is identified through the party 
classification by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and by news sources detailing the party’s use of 
anti-immigrant or ethno-national slogans, advertisements, or leadership. Public support for 
immigration control will provide a democratic mandate for restrictive policy. The measure for 
public support is a national percentage of survey respondents who indicate they would like to 
heavily restrict or completely stop immigration to their country. 
Table 2.3 reports the sample characteristics of all the independent variables included in 
the model. Where possible, measures of the independent variables have been lagged one year to 
allow the effect of the policy determinant to filter through the policymaking process and 
influence the outcome. The models were also run with the independent variables most proximate 
to 2006, with no noticeable difference in the findings. 
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Table 2.3 Independent Variable Sources and Summary Statistics 
Variable Source and definition 
Obs. 
(year) 
Mean S.D. Range 
GDP Eurostat 
27 
(2005) 
105.03 43.62 48.6 – 254.1 
Unemployment Eurostat 
26 
(2005) 
3.51 2.61 0.8 – 11.7 
Social Spending Eurostat; % of GDP 
27 
(2005) 
23.25 5.81 12.4 - 35.5 
Center right party 
vote share  
Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 
vote share of all parties 
aligning with the ideological 
right 
27 
(2006) 
31.79 13.62 5.3 - 64 
Legislative 
presence of anti-
immigrant right 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
Seat share>0 = 1 
27 
(2006) 
0.41 0.50 0 - 1 
Public support for 
immigration 
control 
European values survey; % 
responding “strict limits” or 
“prohibit people from coming” 
26 
(1999) 
54.71 15.03 24 – 84.7 
Immigrant 
population  
Eurostat; foreign citizens per 
capita 
27 
(2005) 
0.07 0.09 0.001 - 0.385 
Immigration flows 
Eurostat; immigration flows 
per capita 
27 
(2005) 
0.009 0.008 0 – 0.033 
Fertility  
Eurostat; number of children 
per woman 
27 
(2005) 
1.50 0.24 1.24 – 1.94 
Member of human 
rights organization 
European values survey; % of 
respondents w/ membership 
26 
(1999) 
5.13 8.02 0.1 – 33.3 
Humanitarian 
donations 
Financial Tracking Service; 
donations as % of GDP 
27 
(2005) 
13.85 19.65 0.14 – 75.66 
Refugees per 
capita 
UNHCR 
27 
(2005) 
3 3 0.005 – 9.3 
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2.3 RESULTS 
Table 2.4 provides the OLS coefficient estimates with robust standard errors in the model 
intended to test whether humanitarianism influences family migration policy. Robust regression 
allows moderate outliers to violate the assumptions of OLS regression and be included in the 
analysis. It does this by first fitting an OLS regression model and identifying the cases that have 
a Cook's distance greater than one (Cook’s distance is a metric for determining whether a single 
observation unduly affects the regression estimates). A regression is run in which cases with 
Cook's distance greater than one are given zero weight. From this model, weights are assigned to 
records according to the absolute difference between the predicted and actual values (the 
absolute residual). The records with small absolute residuals are weighted more heavily than the 
records with large absolute residuals. Then, another regression is run using the new weights, and 
again weights are generated from this regression. This process of regressing and re-weighting is 
repeated until the differences in weights before and after a regression is sufficiently close to 
zero.v With such a small number of cases (26), it is important to reduce the effect of outliers 
while keeping as many observations as possible.
vi
 Of course, there are limitations with having 
only 26 observations in the empirical model: The precision of the statistical results is weakened 
significantly, and degrees of freedom limit the number of indicators that can be included in the 
model. To compensate, each model is subjected to extensive sensitivity analysis beyond robust 
regression, and the results with the greatest magnitude are explained with case study. There are 
five models in table 2.4. The first contains the full model, while the other four models omit GDP 
(which is highly correlated with all the indicators of economic and demographic conditions, see 
appendix H) and immigrant flows (highly correlated with immigrant population).
vii
 Models two 
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through four each include a different humanitarian indicator (all of which are highly correlated, 
see appendix H). 
 
Given the basis of family migration policy in international law and the relevance of a 
state’s interpretation of human rights for the policy making process, the low magnitude in the 
relationship between human rights and family migration policy is unexpected. However, some 
interview subjects are not surprised by the inability of human rights to explain family migration 
Table 2.4 OLS Models of Family Migration Policies 
DV: Family migration 
policy 
1 2 3 4 
Human rights organization 
membership 
0.150 
(0.183) 
0.103 
(0.310) 
  
Humanitarian donations 
per capita 
  
0.144 
(0.097) 
 
Refugees per capita    
19.846 
(619.825) 
GDP 
0.261** 
(0.089) 
   
Unemployment 
1.047 
(1.305) 
0.596 
(1.259) 
0.902 
(1.378) 
0.584 
(1.329) 
Social spending 
-0.195 
(0.325) 
-0.032 
(0.256) 
0.063 
(0.221) 
0.015 
(0.289) 
Fertility 
-9.394 
(9.629) 
1.805 
(11.072) 
-2.090 
(9.701) 
1.719 
(10.806) 
Immigrant population 
-32.530 
(22.565) 
-29.461 
(26.041) 
-38.215* 
(20.680) 
-27.003 
(26.018) 
Immigration flows 
-1486.915** 
(455.749) 
   
Center right party vote 
share 
-0.095 
(0.113) 
-0.191 
(0.125) 
-0.192 
(0.124) 
-0.194 
(0.123) 
Legislative presence of 
anti-immigrant party 
-14.76** 
(3.909) 
-12.433** 
(5.369) 
-13.079** 
(5.002) 
-12.150** 
(4.827) 
Public support for 
immigration control 
-0.386** 
(0.117) 
-0.258* 
(0.132) 
-0.257* 
(0.130) 
-0.266** 
(0.126) 
Constant 
105.852** 
(18.983) 
97.609** 
(19.629) 
99.687** 
(18.402) 
97.410** 
(19.636) 
Observations 26 26 26 26 
R
2
 0.72 0.524 0.557 0.520 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1  
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policy variance, and suggest the attention given to human rights by policy makers may be 
superficial, especially when it comes to formulating policy. As a French human rights lawyer for 
GISTI (Groupe d’information et de soutien des imigrés) explains: “The goal of France’s family 
migration policy is to have less migrants. The real goal is to have quotas, but it is plainly 
incompatible with the European Convention of Human Rights and the right to live with one’s 
family…Instead, they will say that the immigrant needs a certain level of income, or that they 
need to be resident for two years and need to get a bigger apartment. The idea is to make the 
migration more and more complicated. This gets around the human rights requirement. It 
happens the same way with asylum, where we say ‘yes, we respect the human rights’ but then we 
make it harder and harder for people to come legally” (2, personal communication, 9/9/08). In 
this scenario, policy makers ultimately want to control the flow of family immigrants and pass 
restrictive policy designed to discourage migration without legislating an immigration stop like 
those overturned by the German and French courts in the 1970s. In other words, the range of 
available family migration policies provides a way to legislate around human rights. When asked 
why the policy makers follow restrictive logic, the same lawyer replies “It’s politics…there is a 
crisis and you need a scapegoat, and it’s always the migrants.  That’s noting new – you blame 
migrants every time you feel that there are problems beyond your control” (2, personal 
communication, 9/9/08).  
The relationships in table 2.4 support the GISTI lawyer’s theory. Only political 
conditions consistently describe variance in family migration policy. More specifically, the 
presence of an anti-immigrant party in the legislature shares a negative relationship with family 
migration policy across all the models, suggesting that contexts with successful anti-immigrant 
parties are associated with restrictive policy. Interestingly, the vote share of the center right is not 
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associated with a restrictive family migration policy platform. The non-finding confirms the 
theory that immigration policies of the center right are watered-down by the dynamics of 
consensus building, which prevent the electoral size of the centrist party from correlating with 
immigration policy (Messina 1989; Freeman 1979; Katznelson 1973). The purity and 
consistency of the anti-immigrant preference among the radical right perhaps allows them to 
make a bigger splash in policy outcomes. The policy importance of the anti-immigrant right is 
surprising considering the body of literature arguing anti-immigrant parties can not exert 
significant policy influence (Messina 1989; Freeman 1995; Rydgren 2004) Why are anti-
immigrant parties associated with restrictive policy?  
The most obvious mechanism for how a party influences politics relates to whether the 
party enters a governing coalition. However, Michael Minkenberg (2001) illustrates right-wing 
influence on policy and agenda setting regardless of whether the radical right captures legislative 
power. Radical right parties achieve policy importance through parliamentary participation, 
influencing the executive, and through interactions with established political parties. The results 
presented in model five confirm Minkenberg’s findings by suggesting that the presence of an 
anti-immigrant party matters, regardless of whether the party enters into governing coalition. 
The French case demonstrates the way an anti-immigrant party can influence 
immigration policy without being included in government (Minkenberg 2001; Messina 2007; 
Schain 2002). Over the past decade the National Front has grown to capture fifteen percent of the 
French electorate and has become “the third largest political force in France after the Socialists 
and the Gaullists” (DeClair 1999, p. 183). The visibility of the anti-immigrant National Front 
reached its peak in 2002 when the French electorate infamously voted the National Front leader 
Jean Marie Le Pen into the second round of French presidential elections with 17% of the 
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national vote. Though Le Pen was trounced in the second round with 82% of votes supporting 
Jacques Chirac, the internationally publicized success of a radical and anti-democratic party 
shocked and embarrassed the French population. The next presidential election in 2007 carried 
the two leading candidates, Nicholas Sarkozy of the center right Gaullist Union for a Popular 
Movement (UMP) and Ségolène Royale of the center left Socialist Party (PS), to the second 
round of elections. In the run up to the election, the UMP strategists realized that guaranteeing a 
decisive win required pulling voters away from Le Pen’s National Front. Just before the climax 
of the election, Sarkozy’s UMP adopted a platform of immigration restrictiveness corresponding 
closely with Le Pen’s immigration platform, minus some of the xenophobic rhetoric. The 
strategy of borrowing Le Pen’s position on immigration, identity, law and order to win votes was 
recognized in the media at the time, and even acknowledged by Le Pen, who claimed to be 
flattered by Sarkozy’s co-optation of his ideas (Bremner 2007; The Economist 2008). 
Subsequently, Sarkozy has worked to reform the immigration system in France, particularly 
through expanding pre-entry integration requirements to include acquisition of the French 
language before entry, and requiring immigrants to sign a legally-binding “contract of 
integration”. The reforms would probably not have been so expansive without the political 
motivation provided by the National Front. As explained by minister at the Ministry of 
Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-development “It is necessary to remember 
that in 2002, Le Pen came in second in the presidential elections.  The vote expressed the fears of 
certain French people who see uncontrolled immigration as a threat to the values and the health 
of the Republic” (10, personal communication 10/7/08). The French administration appeals to 
the qualified nature of the right to family and imposes policies intended to neutralize the negative 
political effects of immigration. 
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Another minister explains the administration’s reaction to the radical right: “Of course 
they (the radical right) stress a problem (immigration), they point out something about that side 
of our community but it’s not to say that we have to follow them, it’s to say that we have to 
counter them and that the political debate can happen with the government” (29, personal 
communication, 10/31/08). During Sarkozy’s administration, the center right has countered the 
radical right with a comprehensive set of restrictive immigration policies. In fact, the UMP 
consistently passes restrictive immigration, immigrant or minority policies after signs of electoral 
or political distress for the party. The most recent example is Sarkozy’s decision to expel Roma, 
following on the heels of regional elections where the UMP suffered an electoral blow and the 
National Front had a “surprisingly strong showing” (Samuel 2010).  
 The French are not the only people to grapple with the consequences of radical and anti-
immigrant political parties. Even in Sweden where the political discourse is generally very 
inclusive and human rights oriented, the radical right is gaining a foothold through the Swedish 
Democrats. As a MP of the Conservative Party explains: “The Swedish Democrats are not a 
right-wing party. They are a fascist party…We are trying not to give them too much attention. 
We are giving this political area (immigration) a lot of attention instead…to change the picture 
presented to the people” (81, personal communication, 4/21/09). An MP of the Swedish Left 
Party thinks the influence of the radical right is more direct: “If we look fifteen years back, we 
had another right wing populist party in the parliament called New Democracy. That party 
proposed several things that at the time were considered xenophobic, even racist. But afterwards 
we made investigations on how many of their proposals have really been implemented into 
policy. Almost everything they proposed at the time has now been inserted in government 
policies.” In the same interview, the Left Party MP told a story where she “sat down with a state 
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secretary from the Social Democratic Party and I asked her ‘Why are you passing these harsh 
policies?’…She said, ‘Well you see, if we don’t then the right wing populist parties will enter 
parliament.’ So that, I would say, is the main argument. It is not often put like that out in the 
open. This was a closed meeting, so she would not say that openly, but I believe that [logic] 
would be the background for arguing for a harsh position [towards immigrants]” (80, personal 
communication, 4/20/09). The radical right is an increasingly European phenomenon: The 
British are confronted with the unprecedented success of the radical right British National Party, 
and even in Germany where radical right parties are not tolerated at the national level, radical 
right political movements are popping up at the local level and confronting established political 
authority.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the magnitude of the relationship between the presence of an anti-
immigrant party and family migration policy outcomes. The figure shows the predicted mean 
values of family migration policy when there is no radical right party winning a seat in the 
legislative elections (MIPEX score of 77.55) and when there is at least one radical right party 
winning a seat in the legislative elections (MIPEX score of 68.17). The dark squares and the 
whiskers represent the distribution of the data. 
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Figure 2.1 Family Reunification Policy Score by the Presence of 
an Anti-Immigrant Party in the Legislature 
 
No anti-immigrant party Anti-immigrant party 
 
The policy difference between a country with a radical right party winning a seat in the 
legislature and one without is equivalent to the policy difference between Spain and Ireland (see 
table 2.2 for policy scores). In Spain, migrants are eligible to sponsor a spouse or partner, minor 
children and sometimes other dependents after a year of residency. The applicants do not have to 
fulfill integration conditions, though the sponsor must provide sufficient income and 
accommodation for the family. If Spain granted legal redress in the case of application refusal, 
Spain would achieve best practice (defined as rights equal to those of nationals) in granting 
security of status, and they would enjoy best practice for the rights associated with status if they 
moved the wait for an autonomous residency permit from five to three years (Niessen et al 
2007).  
By comparison, Ireland’s family reunification policy score falls slightly below the mean 
of the family migration policy score within the European sample. Within Ireland, migrants’ 
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rights to and conditions for family reunification are heavily dependent on the nature of the 
sponsor’s work permit, and are highly vulnerable to discretionary practice. In terms of the policy 
provisions of security and rights for reunited families, Ireland ranks the worst of all the 28 
countries evaluated in the MIPEX study. The state can reject applicants without being legally 
obligated to consider their individual circumstances, and in the case of a negative ruling, there 
are few options for appeal. Also, no matter how long a family member lives in Ireland, they are 
never automatically entitled to autonomous residence permits, and can only reside as the family 
of a worker. Equal access to education, training, employment, and benefits is also contingent on 
the sponsor’s work permit (Niessen et al 2007). Looking at the comparison between Spain, well 
known for its pro-immigrant stance, and Ireland, one of the most restrictive countries in the 
European sample, we can see the policy impact of a radical right party is potentially dramatic, 
even when the radical right only wins a single seat.  
Table 2.4 portrays one more consistent relationship with high magnitude: Public support 
for immigration control shares a negative relationship with inclusive family migration policy. 
The finding that public opinion independently describes policy variance is surprising because 
democratic theory suggests that public opinion exerts policy pressure via elected representatives 
who desire reelection and must pacify public demand (Downs 1957). If parties and politicians 
are the only mechanism by which public opinion influences policy, the relationship between 
public opinion and policy should wash out when party variables are included in the model. 
However, public opinion’s explanatory value remains even after controlling for the vote share 
won by conservative parties. This is probably because centrist parties typically do not enter 
office with binding commitments on immigration, and voters cannot align their votes with their 
specific desired policy agenda (Messina 1989; Freeman 1979; Katznelson 1973). Representatives 
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formulate clear preferences on immigration after being elected, possibly in response to public 
preference or because immigration is anticipated to be a politically salient topic for the next 
round of elections. 
In sum, the results of the OLS models refute the primary hypothesis predicting respect for 
human rights should explain variance in family migration policies. Politics appear to be the 
strongest explanation for family migration policy variance, overwhelming humanitarian claims 
and most other domestic pressures. In particular, the electoral presence of an anti-immigrant 
party and public support for immigration control are associated with restrictive family migration 
policy. Based on these results, politics appear to be manipulating family rights in modern 
European societies. 
In the full specification illustrated in model one, GDP and flows per capita illustrate the 
expected relationships of high magnitude with the dependent variable. However, these two 
variables are highly correlated with each other, and when they are included in the model 
independently, neither exhibits an important relationship with the dependent variable (with the 
exception of model three, where higher immigration flows are associated with more restrictive 
family migration policies. Due to the high correlations between the independent variables and the 
unreliable results for GDP and immigration flows, model two from table 2.4 is the base model 
for the remainder of the sensitivity analysis. 
Sensitivity analysis   
The results hold under extensive sensitivity analysis. The specification of the models in 
table 2.4 is limited due to constraints imposed by the degrees of freedom in a model with twenty-
six observations, and only one or two indicators are used as representatives of humanitarian, 
economic, political, and demographic policy determinants. Fortunately, additional models with 
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different specifications confirm the strength of the findings in table 2.4. These models are 
described below. 
Humanitarianism could describe policy variance through public behaviors or belief 
systems outside those included in the statistical analysis of table 2.4. For example, a large 
population of religious individuals may feel a greater responsibility to care for underprivileged 
human beings. In some countries, the church has an acknowledged policy role, especially when it 
comes to family-related policies. In Germany both official and non-official organizations 
represent the interests of the church to the government. They assert the importance of the family 
as the building block of human society and affirm the right to family for both nationals and non-
nationals (51, personal communication, 12/16/08). Further, church organizations view the 
protection of human rights as a religious mandate: “It’s not only about human rights, it’s about 
the inner perspective of the society…it’s not only their [the immigrant’s] human rights, it’s our 
human rights. This is what we are now thinking in churches… we are here to prove what’s going 
on with human rights. Human rights are the worth of the human being; something [that] comes 
from God. This is why we are involved in such cases and we want to be involved“ (53, personal 
communication, 12/17/08). Where a large population adheres to religion and trusts the church to 
act as their representatives in a policymaking process, family migration policies might be more 
liberal. Indicators of religiosity (survey responses of frequency of prayer, attending religious 
service, and considering oneself a religious person) are included in a model with the 
humanitarian indicators and theoretical controls in appendix I. The level of religiosity in the 
population does not explain variance in family migration policy, not does its inclusion affect the 
significance of other relationships in the model.  
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 Immigration control is associated with several economic phenomena beyond GDP, 
unemployment rates and levels of social spending. Models including economic growth and 
industrial productivity are examined in appendix J, and none of additional economic indicators 
explain policy variance. Aggregate public assessments of the economic climate drawn from the 
Eurobarometer 65.2 are examined as a possible economic determinant of family migration policy 
to no effect. It is safe to conclude that economic factors to not explain variance in family 
migration policies in 2006.  
Table 2.4 includes indicators of national electoral results along the right side of the 
ideological spectrum, focusing on the center and anti-immigrant radical right. Appendix K tests 
additional models including electoral results along the left side of the ideological spectrum (i.e. 
center-left party vote shares and green party vote shares), and none of the additional party 
variables explain variance in family migration policy. Appendix K also includes a model 
replacing the indicator of the electoral viability of an anti-immigrant party with a measure of the 
vote share going to the anti-immigrant parties. The size of the anti-immigrant party does not 
explain cumulative policy variance after outliers are removed from the analysis (i.e. Austria), 
while the presence of a party in the legislature does, no matter how big the party is.  
The results of the sensitivity analysis suggest the findings of table 2.4 are not a feature of 
any single indicator used to represent a group of policy pressures in the base model. They also 
instill confidence in the findings that the electoral presence of the anti-immigrant party and 
public support for immigration control share a negative relationship with inclusive family 
migration policy. Policies relating to family migrants are primarily motivated by politics. 
 50 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
 This chapter examines the sources of family migration policy divergence to explore 
whether humanitarianism binds policy makers drawing up human rights-based family migration 
policy or whether the more traditional domestic costs better explain policy variance. It concludes 
that political parties and public opinion best explain policy variance. This finding contributes to 
the literature on immigration policy in three distinct ways: 1) it illustrates that humanitarianism 
does not consistently explain family migration policy variance, 2) it concludes that economics do 
not explain family migration policy in the same way they are purported to describe other forms 
of migration, and 3) it reveals politics play an important role in explaining policy variance. 
Family migration is set apart from other forms of migration. Family migrants move to 
fulfill a fundamental human impulse: the desire to live within a family unit. The universal 
recognition of the innate need for family has motivated the protection of family life in 
international law. Logically, countries showing great sympathy for concepts of humanitarianism 
should more readily accept the sanctity of the right to family life, and will protect that right 
through policy. However, the link between humanitarianism and liberal family migration policy 
is not consistently supported in the cross-national data.  
Since variance in family migration policy is not described by humanitarianism, domestic 
costs are most likely to explain the restrictiveness of policy. Unemployment and welfare are 
particularly assumed to explain the degrees of restrictiveness in immigration policy (Borjas 
1994; Borjas 1995; Smith & Edmonston 1997; Coppel, Dumont & Visco 2002; Freeman 1986; 
Geddes 2003; Borjas 1999; Bailey 2005; Allard & Danzinger 2000; Money 2007). However, the 
data does not support any theoretical link between the economic conditions of a country and the 
degree of inclusiveness in family migration policy outcomes. Therefore, while family migration 
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policy does not distinguish itself through an association with humanitarianism, it still distances 
itself from the economic focus of labor migration policies.  
Instead, politics serve as the primary explanation for policy variance in cross-national 
perspective. More specifically, the presence of a radical right party in the legislature results in 
more restrictive policies, as do high levels of public support for increased immigration controls. 
This finding is disappointing to idealists hoping for evidence of humanitarian constraints on 
policy making; the humanitarian foundation of family migration does not exempt it from 
political wrangling above the minimum policy standard required by international law. However, 
the ideological nature of the significant policy determinants can offer an element of hope to those 
who would like to see the human right to family universally respected. Because family migration 
policy does not appear to require proof of economic benefit to society, the shift to a more 
progressive policy need only change public perception, which is then filtered through public 
opinion and party choice. The public consciousness is more easily manipulated than economic 
institutions, suggesting hope for a more humanitarian outcome where the public is mobilized 
around ideas of humanitarianism. Family migration can eventually reflect the prioritization of the 
human right to family life if the public can be won over in support of inclusiveness. 
 The insignificance of respect for human rights in family migration policy formation 
coupled with the exclusive importance of politics raises the question of whether family migration 
policy is different from other forms of migration policy. If the foundation of human rights 
theoretically distinguishes family migration from labor migration, but the human rights make no 
difference in policy, perhaps all forms of immigration are vulnerable to the same political 
considerations. The next chapter compares the determinants of labor and family migrant rights to 
discover whether there is a difference in policy formation. If there is no difference between the 
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two, the value of performing an exclusive study on the distinguishing features of family 
migration is in jeopardy. 
                                                
i
 see Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 17 of the 1966 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and Article 10 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These three declarations present the most general form 
of family rights. There rights of the family are also affirmed in multiple international 
declarations and conventions pertaining to marriages. For example, Article 16 of the Universal 
Declaration allows for men and women “without any limitation due to race, nationality of 
religion have the right to marry and found a family”, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights reiterates the right of people of marriageable age to marry, and the 1966 
International Convention on All Forms of Racial Discrimination guarantees the right to marriage 
and choice of a spouse. 
 
ii
 MIPEX also published data for family reunification policies in 2004. However, the 2004 data 
only covers 15 EU countries, and the family reunification policy dimensions under investigation 
are limited. The investigation here is limited to the 2006 data, because it provides many more 
cases and more expansive data. The 2004 data will be considered in future extensions of the 
project. 
 
iii
 A Chow test is a statistical test of whether the error terms in two linear regressions are 
normally distributed with equal variance, and are independently distributed. See Gujarati, 
Damodar N. 2003. Basic Econometrics. Boston: McGraw Hill, p. 276-278. In this instance, I use 
the Chow test to verify that the division along the lines of pre- and post-entry policy witnessed in 
the factor analysis does not represent two subsets in the data with statistically distinct error 
terms.  
 
iv
 The Kaiser criterion maintains that any factor with an eigenvalue over one has statistical 
meaning, though in this case keeping all six statistically relevant factors muddies the analysis 
without adding any explanatory value. I limit my analysis to the four factors exhibited in 
appendix C. 
 
v
 See http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/stata_robust.htm for further information. 
 
vi
 There are 27 European countries included in the MIPEX data. Ideally the models would 
include 27 cases. Unfortunately, Cyprus is excluded from the models due to missing data for 
Cyprus in the European Values Survey. 
 
vii
 When included in a bivariate regression with the dependent variable or in a multivariate model 
with the humanitarian and political indicators, GDP has no explanatory power. Likewise, when 
immigrant population is substituted with immigration flows, there is not difference in the results 
with the exception of model three, where both flows and humanitarian donations per capita gains 
significance. Similarly, when fertility (which is highly correlated with the economic indicators) 
is excluded from the model, no results are affected. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Bread vs. Blood:  
The Rights of Labor and Family Migrants 
 
Chapter two examines the determinants of family migration policy. It finds only party 
politics and public opinion explain policy variance from a cross-national perspective. This result 
contradicts the primary hypothesis of the chapter, which expects humanitarianism to predict 
inclusive policy because of family migration’s foundation in human rights law. The exclusive 
significance of political determinants raises the question of whether family migration policy 
functions differently than other forms of migration policy. After all, conservative politics should 
have a restrictive impact on all immigration policies based on the prioritization of nationalism, 
citizenship, and cultural conservativism within conservative parties. This chapter compares 
family and labor immigrant policies (i.e. policies managing immigrants after entry into a host 
state) by examining explanations for cross-national variance in policies conferring rights to 
family and labor migrants. The results suggest the descriptions of policy variance are not 
distinguishable; anti-immigrant public opinion explains variance in both labor and family 
migrant policies. This contradicts the principles of universal human rights, which argue certain 
social and economic rights should be granted under all conditions, without exception. The results 
of this chapter suggest universally applied rights do not exist as a political reality in immigration 
policy. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section derives several hypotheses through 
a discussion of the expected differences between labor and family immigrant policies covering 
migrant rights. The subsequent section describes the economic determinants of labor immigrant 
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policy. The third section describes the data and estimation procedure. The fourth section 
discusses results, first examining public opinion as an explanation for differences in labor 
migrant rights across Europe, and comparing it to the importance of public opinion in conferring 
family migrant rights. The French case illustrates the power of public opinion for migrant rights 
conferral. The final section concludes by discussing implications, and suggests additional 
research on the difference between immigrant and immigration policies for both labor and family 
migration policies.  
3.1 BREAD VS. BLOOD – LABOR VS. FAMILY 
 Labor and family migration are intrinsically linked; family migrants must follow an 
initial migrant who is often a laborer. Therefore, the factors leading to labor migration also 
indirectly lead to family migration. Given the dependence of family migration on labor 
migration, why would labor and family migration be expected to function differently?  
 The difference between labor and family migration reveals itself in historic political 
responses to immigration flows. Though family migration has always been part of the immigrant 
experience, it was only politically considered as a distinguishable form of migration in the 
aftermath of the oil crisis of 1973-74. Before the 1970s, the mass movement of workers from the 
less developed countries of the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, and colonial states dominated 
post-war migration to Europe. The oil crisis of 1973 shook the European economies and the role 
of immigrants became uncertain during the following recession. Governments felt an urgency to 
protect the jobs of citizen workers and promote labor market equilibrium. The most politically 
expedient action for European nations was to stop migration, and especially migration from 
Turkey and North Africa. For example, Germany decreed a halt to immigration in November of 
1973, and France reacted similarly in July of 1974. In both instances, immigration stops were 
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comprehensive, including labor and family migration. In 1978 the French Council of State 
overturned the suspension of family migration and the German Constitutional Court reduced the 
state’s capacity to control family migration because it violated the constitutional right to family 
life. After these landmark decisions, family migration was distinguished as separable from labor 
migration, uniquely protected under international law and national constitutions.  
Family migration is a humanitarian issue, and labor migration is economically 
determined by demand for workers. Because labor migrants are connected with the economic 
environment in the host country, policy makers place emphasis on the economic costs and 
benefits of migration when passing labor migration policy. Therefore, throughout the hard 
economic times of the 1970s and 80s European states were obligated to maintain open policies of 
family migration while labor migration was heavily restricted. 
 The open family and controlled labor migration dramatically changed the demography of 
immigrant groups in Europe from 1970 onward. Before the 1970s, the main reason for migration 
was the post-war economic boom, which created rapid economic opportunity and major labor 
shortages. During this time, private employers and governments actively recruited foreign 
workers, most of whom were young and male. Both migrants and policy makers assumed the 
migration was temporary. Once the economic climate changed and the 1973 oil crisis affected 
European economies, the freeze on the recruitment of new workers and voluntary immigrant 
repatriation schemes led to a gradual reduction of foreigners in the workforce. However, the 
immigration stop had the unintended consequence of stimulating the settlement of migrant 
laborers, and the settled immigrants started to bring their families into the host country. The 
migration of families changed the composition of immigrant communities to include more 
women and more younger and older people. These groups were less likely to participate in the 
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economic marketplace, but they increased immigrant engagement with the welfare system, 
making the politics of immigrant welfare and integration a national policy priority for the first 
time (Geddes 2003). The history of post-war immigration in Europe reveals the political and 
demographic importance of the difference between labor and family migration. Labor migrants 
stimulate concerns about the national economy, while family migrants motivate discussions over 
welfare and integration. 
In today’s European nation, the difference between labor and family migration is made 
abundantly clear in the distinction between migrants defined as “wanted” and those described as 
“unwanted”. Desirable migration benefits the economy and is usually identified as high-skilled 
labor migration. Undesirable migration operates outside market pressures and is relatively 
uncontrolled by the state. Undesirable migrants are asylum seekers and family migrants. The 
policy distinction between labor and family migrants as wanted and unwanted was made most 
clearly by Nicolas Sarkozy in 2006, when he encouraged “immigration choisie” (chosen 
immigration) deliberately selected to meet the economic needs of France. At the same time, he 
called for retrenchment of “immigration subie” (suffered or imposed immigration), which is 
immigration perceived as taxing the resources of the French state. Family migration is a form of 
“immigration subie” (Lochak and Fouteau 2008). As explained by an individual working at 
CIMADE, a non-governmental organization heavily involved with immigrant interests, “France 
doesn’t want to endure immigration. We want to choose immigration. We don’t want to have to 
accept the family of a working immigrant. We want to make the decisions about the family” (14, 
personal communication, 10/9/08). The message of wanted and unwanted immigration clearly 
translates into policy agendas where “wanted” labor migration is encouraged with open and 
inclusive policies, while at the same time, “unwanted” migration is discouraged with policies 
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intending to either slow the flow of family migrants or to reduce costs imposed by family 
migrants.  
3.2 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
The European post-war experience with migration illustrates the historical distinction 
between family and labor migration. Once the courts made family migration uncontrollable, they 
removed it from the policy sphere occupied by labor migration. As a consequence, policy-
makers must take courts and international law into consideration when passing family migration 
policy, while labor migration remains vulnerable to market pressures or other domestic 
conditions. This difference justifies conceptual clarity around immigrant category of entry.  
The theoretical distinction between labor and family migration policy is largely based on 
immigration policies governing immigration flows, i.e. policies determining who can enter a 
country. An examination of the difference between labor and family migration policies would 
ideally consider a more comprehensive package of policies covering immigration and immigrant 
policies. Unfortunately, the lack of comparable data on labor and family immigration policy, 
limits this inquiry to immigrant rights. The focus on rights does change the expectations over 
which determinants will distinguish family migrant policy from labor immigrant policy. 
Because labor and family migrant rights are included in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Cultural and Social Rights, humanitarianism should similarly influence both family 
and labor migrant rights. In contexts where respect for human rights is high, family and labor 
migrant rights should be more inclusive. Likewise, the effect of politics should be similar for 
labor and family migrant rights. Political conservatives are hesitant to endorse the universality of 
human rights due to their focus on the preservation of nationalism and cultural conservativism. 
For most conservatives, the responsibility of the nation state lies only with the citizenry, a 
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perspective making conservative governments less likely to support internationalism and 
concepts of human rights as a state responsibility (Thérien and Noel 2000). Therefore, where 
conservativism dominates the political environment, family and labor immigrant rights should be 
more restrictive. 
Labor migrant rights should differ from family migrant rights through the direct 
relevance of the economy for labor migration. Though most research on economic migration 
concentrates on flows instead of rights, many of the assumptions about the economic 
determinants of labor immigration policy hold in the context of immigrant rights. Immigrants 
choose the migration scenario most beneficial to themselves and their families. The immigrant’s 
cost benefit analysis extends beyond employment opportunity or wages to include health care, 
social welfare and social and political rights given to immigrants within the host country. Even if 
wages are high, an immigrant will question moving somewhere they will fall victim to economic 
uncertainty, exploitation or heavy persecution. Politicians understand the draw of inclusive rights 
for labor migrants and react accordingly: if policy makers want to discourage immigration, they 
will pass policies with less liberal rights. For example, French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua 
used restricting rights as a form of immigration control when he passed the second Pasqua 
reforms in 1993. In this instance, equal protection and due process were denied to foreigners by 
cutting off the right to appeal and giving the police increased power to detain and deport 
foreigners. Foreigners also were denied access to the benefits of the social security system, 
particularly health care. The stated objective of these reforms was “zero immigration” 
(Hollifield, 1999).  The French case illustrates the use of restricting immigrant rights to 
discourage migration even to the point of trying to stop it altogether, and the explicit use of 
restricting rights as a mechanism of control leads to the primary hypothesis of this chapter: In 
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countries where the national economic situation is better, labor migrant rights should be more 
inclusive. Economic conditions should matter very little for family migrant rights. The aspects of 
the economy most relevant for labor migration are discussed below. 
The economics of labor migration 
Labor migrant rights should be more inclusive in times of economic health, and more 
restrictive in times of economic uncertainty. Signals of poor economic health include 
unemployment, low economic growth, and high social spending. These conditions communicate 
the potential economic costs of welcoming a new population into society (Borjas, 1994). 
Alternatively, signals of a healthy economy allow policy makers to be optimistic about 
employment and lifestyle prospects for migrants, and provide a context for discussion about the 
potential economic benefits of migration (Borjas, 1995). For example, immigration increases the 
flexibility of the labor market, slows wage growth, and provides greater economic opportunities 
(Zimmerman 1995). The task of labor migration policy is to balance the costs and benefits of 
migration to draw up legislation attracting beneficial labor migrants into the host society. The 
cost-benefit analysis focuses on wages, unemployment, economic growth, social spending, 
sectoral needs, and the skill level of immigrant laborers. 
The impact of immigration on native wages is the subject of extensive debate, but 
immigration is generally assumed to increase the supply of labor and drive down wages (Smith 
& Edmonston 1997; Coppel, Dumond & Visco 2002). Slow wage growth and competition for 
jobs might be positive from a macroeconomic perspective because it benefits employers, but the 
benefit of migration is not spread equally across the population: some win while others lose. The 
wage-reducing effect of migration is strongest for high school dropouts, and moderately 
influences the wages for high school equivalent workers (Borjas 1996). If groups of low-wage 
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earners are important politically, policy makers will be hesitant to pass policy perceived as 
contributing to economic difficulty. Therefore, in countries where the population earns higher 
wages on average, labor immigrant rights should be more inclusive. 
That immigrants compete with and price natives out of the job market is one of the most 
common economic complaints about international immigration. Though the evidence of 
immigrants displacing native workers suggests that the effect is small to non-existent (Winter-
Ebmer and Zweimüller 1999; Simon et al 1993; Dustmann et al 2005), popular discourse picks 
up on perceived economic threat from migration and uses it to foment domestic discontent. For 
example, the “British jobs for British workers” movement in the United Kingdom gained 
substantial support when local oil refinery workers went on strike in 2009 to protest the 
employment of foreign laborers (BBC 2009). The slogan was initially promoted by the radical 
right British National Party (Parkinson 2007), but was picked up by the then-prime minister 
Gordon Brown. Where nationals fear that their jobs are at risk by immigrants, politicians will try 
to appear unsupportive of labor migration. Therefore, in countries with high unemployment, 
labor migrant rights should be more restrictive. 
 When an economy is healthy, policy makers can be optimistic about the economic future. 
With economic growth, there is more opportunity for local industry to expand and for 
employment opportunities to develop. As demand for workers increases, the consequences of 
competition between workers becomes less severe because there are enough jobs for full 
employment. Immigrants can contribute to overall growth; in many industries, immigrants are as 
effective as native workers, but cost substantially less. They also reduce the costs of native 
workers as they slow wage growth, allowing employers to be more flexible and produce at lower 
costs (Zimmerman 1995). Where an economy is growing, the benefits from immigration are 
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more obvious and the threat to native workers is less apparent, suggesting policy makers will 
make efforts to attract immigrant labor under circumstances of economic growth. Therefore, in 
countries with high economic growth, labor migrant rights should be more inclusive. 
A welfare state has difficulty coexisting with free movement due to contradictions 
between a closed welfare system and an open labor market (Freeman 1986). Welfare states must 
insulate themselves from external pressures and clearly identify the members eligible for 
benefits. As globalization brings more foreigners into a welfare state, migrants draw 
disproportionately from public funds and tax the sustainability of the system (Freeman 1986; 
Geddes, 2003; Borjas, 1999; Bailey, 2005; Allard & Danzinger, 2000). With these altered 
conditions, the traditionally conceived welfare state cannot exist, and where welfare spending is 
high, labor migrant rights should be more restrictive. 
 Economic benefits of migration come from the migrant’s contribution to specific 
economic sectors requiring work that natives either will not or cannot do. In times of labor 
shortage, many sectors seek immigrant labor, and the demand for labor migration is sometimes 
translated into policy. For example, in 2008 the United Kingdom adopted a tier-based system 
where a potential laborer is assigned points based on skill level and the ability to “fill a gap in the 
workforce that cannot be filed by a settled worker” (Home office 2010). In most European 
economies, immigrants are readily employed in industry (especially construction and 
manufacturing), in service positions, and in the information and communication technology 
sector (Katseli 2004). Where these sectors dominate a country’s economy, policy makers will 
use inclusive immigrant policy to encourage labor migration and fulfill employer demand. 
In order to calculate the possible surplus gained from admitting a group of migrants, the 
skill level of the immigrants must be considered. Unskilled migrants impose the highest fiscal 
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costs because they are more likely to require government services and pay lower taxes into the 
economy (Borjas 1995). “The immigration surplus is maximized when the immigrant flow is 
exclusively skilled,” because skilled migrants complement factors of production in the native 
economy (Borjas 1999, 1707). This provides a rationale for drawing up policies explicitly 
designed to attract skilled migrants. On the other hand, if the domestic workforce is 
predominately skilled, the benefit of immigration is greatest if the country admits unskilled 
migrants. Research on the economic effects of immigration suggests that the host country can 
benefit from immigration “as long as immigrants and natives differ in their productive 
endowments” (Borjas 1999, p. 1700). The recently adopted points system in the UK provides an 
example of immigration policy taking skills into account and prioritizing high-skilled labor. In 
particular, Investors, entrepreneurs, lawyers and artists all fall in the highest tier in the points-
based system (Home Office 2010). Similar evaluative points-based systems are used in Canada, 
Denmark, Australia, and New Zealand. In general, European societies advocate highly skilled 
migrants as the best complement to native economies, to the point where the EU is debating 
policy to make the whole continent more accessible to skilled labor through the creation of an 
EU Blue Card (Europa 2007). Countries experiencing skilled migration flows should pass more 
inclusive labor migrant rights to encourage the desirable immigrants to stay. Further, countries 
with a positive historical experience with skilled immigration flows might also be more inclined 
to welcome new immigrants to society, and to entice them with a comprehensive package of 
immigrant policies.  
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3.3 ESTIMATION 
Measuring family and labor migrant rights 
Economic determinants should uniquely describe variance in cross national labor 
immigrant policy. To test the influence of economic determinants against the humanitarian and 
political controls for both labor and family migrant rights, I use 2006 data from the Migrant 
Integration Policy Index published by the Migration Policy Group and British Council as the 
dependent variable in the series of ordinary least squares regression models.
1
 This project draws 
data from the labor market status and family reunion policy area to create two indexes: the labor 
migrant rights index and the family migrant rights index. Both indexes measure migrant rights 
for the 25 EU member states, Norway, and Switzerland in 2006. The policies governing labor 
migrant rights are detailed in table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 Labor Immigrant Rights 
Immigrants able to accept employment 
Immigrants able to take up self-employment 
Recognition of qualifications 
Measures taken to integrate immigrants into labor market 
State facilitation of recognition of extra-EU skills and qualifications 
Equality of access to vocational training and study grants 
Renewal of work permits 
Termination of work permit leads to revocation of work/residence permit 
Right to become and member and participate in unions and work-related bodies 
Changes in working status/permit 
 
The resulting index measures the rights available to labor migrants after gaining entry to 
the host state. For each of the index components, countries receive one of three possible scores. 
A three corresponds with policies meeting the most inclusive standards equal to the rights of 
national citizens, while lower scores indicate restrictiveness or high levels of inequality when 
                                                
1
 Niessen, Jan, Thomas Huddleston, Laura Citron, in cooperation with Andrew Geddes and Dirk Jacobs. 2007. 
Migrant Integration Policy Index. Brussels, Belgium: British Council Brussels, Foreign Policy Centre, Migration 
Policy Group 
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compared to the rights of nationals. The scores are standardized on a scale of 0 to 100 with 30 
representing the lowest possible policy score and 100 the highest, or most inclusive. The rounded 
scores for labor migrant rights range from 47 to 100 and are illustrated in table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Labor Immigrant Rights Policy Scores 
Sweden 100 Germany 67 
Portugal 93 France 67 
Spain 93 Czech Republic 67 
Italy 90 Ireland 67 
Estonia 83 Luxembourg 63 
Belgium 83 Austria 63 
Switzerland 83 Greece 60 
Norway 80 Denmark 60 
Netherlands 80 Cyprus 60 
Finland 80 Malta 53 
Slovenia 73 Poland 50 
UK 73 Latvia 47 
Lithuania 70 Hungary 47 
Slovak Republic 70   
Obs. Mean S.D. Range 
27 71.19 14.31 47-100 
 
 
The policies governing family migrant rights are listed in table 3.3. Family migrant rights 
are scored in the same way as the labor migrant rights.  
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Table 3.3 Family Immigrant Rights 
Duration of validity of permit 
Ground for withdrawing, rejecting, refusing to renew status 
Before refusal, due account given to family circumstance (by law) 
Legal guarantees or redress in instance of refusal or withdrawal 
Right to autonomous residence for spouse/partner and children 
Right to autonomous residence for other relatives 
Access to education and training for adult family members 
Access to employment and self-employment 
Access to social security, social assistance, healthcare, and housing 
 
Table 3.4 illustrates the standardized range of 52 to 100 for family migrant rights scores 
across European states. Thirty-three is the lowest possible policy score, and 100 is the most 
inclusive score. 
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Table 3.4 Family Immigrant Rights Policy Scores 
Italy 100 France 81 
Sweden 96 Malta 78 
Portugal 96 Greece 78 
Slovenia 85 Czech Republic 74 
Spain 85 Switzerland 67 
Norway 85 Denmark 67 
Netherlands 85 Luxembourg 63 
Finland 81 Austria 63 
Lithuania 81 Cyprus 63 
Poland 81 Slovak Republic 59 
Belgium 81 Latvia 59 
Estonia 81 Hungary 56 
Germany 81 Ireland 52 
UK 81   
Obs. Mean S.D. Range 
27 76.41 12.75 52-100 
 
 
The more specific coding breakdown of each individual policy indicator of labor migrant rights 
is detailed in appendix L and the coding for family migrant rights is detailed in appendix M. The 
scatter plot in Figure 3.1 shows that the two measures are clearly related, with a Pearson’s R 
coefficient of 0.676.  
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Figure 3.1 Correlation of Labor and Family Immigrant Rights 
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Pearson’s R coefficient: 0.676 
 
The high correlation is somewhat surprising, since labor and family migration are 
motivated by different concerns and because family migration incurs different costs than labor 
migration. Either the similarity exists due to the mutual focus on rights, or the same domestic 
conditions result in restrictive policies across all forms of migration. However, even with a high 
correlation, the determinants of labor and family policy may be different. For example, Poland 
has relatively inclusive family migrant rights, but restrictive labor migrant rights. Immigrants in 
Poland receive no help in getting their qualifications recognized, and are given no information 
about opportunities for additional education or training. Labor migrants’ status is insecure 
because migrants lose the right to reside when they lose their job, no matter how long they have 
been in the country. Polish family migrants are more secure because they have a right to 
autonomous residence within three years and there are relatively few reasons for family members 
to loose their ride to reside. Access to educational and training opportunities is limited for both 
labor and family migrants.  
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 Switzerland grants inclusive labor migrant rights but is restrictive when dealing with 
family migrants. Out of the full European sample, Switzerland achieves the second highest score 
for inclusive access to employment and self-employment, and also provides labor market 
integration programs designed to improve language skills. Switzerland is also one of the best 
European countries at providing access to education and training. The status of labor migrants is 
secure, and migrants are allowed to change their job within the first working year.  Family 
migrants in Switzerland are not very secure and the government can expel them if they become 
dependent on welfare. Family migrants have access to social security and social assistance, but 
they face additional barriers to education, employment, and autonomous residency.  This chapter 
seeks to address situations like those in Poland and Switzerland where policies deal differently 
with labor and family migrant rights. 
Measuring economic policy determinants 
 
Economic conditions are hypothesized to be the only policy domestic factors that 
describe labor migrant rights differently than family migrant rights. There are several economic 
conditions that are theoretically relevant for labor migration policy, including the wage-earning 
potential of the domestic worker, national unemployment, and economic growth. The effect of 
immigration on wages matters for the average worker. Education is very closely related to the 
wage an individual can earn, and because the level of education most accurately conveys 
employment potential and vulnerability to the negative effects of migration (Borjas 1996), the 
percentage of natives with post-high school education measures potential economic threat of 
immigration for native workers. 
Countries with higher levels of unemployment will be less likely to encourage labor 
migration with liberal labor migrant rights. The unemployment rate captures costs associated 
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with unemployment. Economic growth signals increased economic opportunity, and the 
consequences of immigration for wages and unemployment will be less obvious where growth is 
high. As a result, labor migrant rights should be more liberal in these contexts. Growth is 
measured with a simple national level statistic of the percent of economic growth in 2005. Labor 
migrant rights and social spending should share a negative relationship due to the incompatibility 
between open migration policies and social spending. Levels of social spending are captured 
with the percent of GDP spent on health, education, pensions, etc. 
 The sectoral structure of the state economy will determine the inclusiveness of 
immigrant rights. Where the sectors using migrant laborers dominate, the rights should be more 
liberal. Industry draws on migrant labor, and the standardized size of the labor force working in 
industry and construction is used to estimate the demand for migrant laborers in society.  
Positive experiences with migrant labor will influence the package of rights given to 
labor migrants. Where the migrant population is skilled, national policy makers should entice the 
migrants to stay in the country with a comprehensive package of rights. They might also favor 
welcoming new labor migrants based on positive experiences. The skill level of immigrants is 
measured by the percentage of legal immigrants residing in the host state who have achieved 
above a high school education.  
The empirical model 
 
The hypothesis that economic conditions uniquely influence labor migrant rights suggests 
a model with the following specification:  
Labor immigrant rights = ! + "1native education + "2unemployment + "3economic growth 
+"4social spending + "5GDP + "6industry labor + "7construction labor+ "8immigrant education + 
"9humanitarianism + "10vote share of center right + "11vote share of anti-immigrant party+ 
"12public support for immigration control + "13immigrant population + "14immigration flows+ e  
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Because humanitarianism and political considerations should influence labor and family migrant 
policy similarly, they are included in the model as controls along with the size of the immigrant 
population, immigration flows and GDP. Humanitarianism is measured with three indicators. 
The first captures public approval of humanitarianism with the percentage of a national survey 
population claiming membership in a human rights organization. The second and third indicators 
measure governmental humanitarian behavior with the state funds dedicated to humanitarian aid 
and the size of the refugee population.). The size of the vote share won by the center right and 
radical anti-immigrant parties in the last national election is used to measure the dominance of 
conservativism along with the percentage of survey respondents indicating they would prefer to 
completely stop or heavily restrict immigration to their native country. 
Table 3.5 reports the sample characteristics of all the independent variables necessary for 
implementing the model above. Where possible, measures of the independent variables have 
been lagged one year to allow the effect of the policy determinants to filter through the 
policymaking process and influence the outcome, though when independent variable values most 
proximate to 2006 are included in the analysis, there is no noticeable difference in the results.  
 71 
 
Table 3.5 Independent Variable Sources and Summary Statistics 
Variable Source and definition 
Obs. 
(year) 
Mean S.D. Range 
GDP Eurostat 
27 
(2005) 
105.03 43.62 48.6 – 254.1 
Native education 
OECD stat: percentage of 
natives with an education level 
exceeding high-school 
equivalency 
21 
(2005) 
0.413 0.152 0.122 – 0.67 
Unemployment Eurostat 
26 
(2005) 
3.51 2.61 0.8 – 11.7 
Economic growth Eurostat 
27 
(2005) 
3.88 2.5 0.7 - 10.6 
Social Spending Eurostat; % of GDP 
27 
(2005) 
23.25 5.81 12.4 - 35.5 
Industry labor 
Eurostat - Industry Labor input 
index (mining and quarantine, 
manufacturing, Electricity, gas 
and water supply) 
26 
(2004) 
100.85 2.20 96.4 – 106.4 
Construction labor 
Eurostat - Construction Labor 
input index 
26 
(2004) 
96.14 6.88 71.8 – 109.9 
Immigrant 
education 
OECD stat: percentage of 
natives with an education level 
exceeding high-school 
equivalency 
21 
(2005) 
0.338 0.088 
0.194 – 
0.546 
Vote share of 
center right party 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
27 
(2006) 
31.79 13.62 5.3 - 64 
Vote share of anti-
immigrant party 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
27 
(2006) 
6.20 7.82 0 – 26.7 
Public support for 
immigration 
control 
European values survey; % 
responding “strict limits” or 
“prohibit people from coming” 
26 
(1999) 
54.71 15.03 24 – 84.7 
Immigrant 
population  
Eurostat; foreign citizens per 
capita 
27 
(2005) 
0.07 0.09 
0.001 - 
0.385 
Immigration flows 
Eurostat; immigration flows per 
capita 
27 
(2005) 
0.009 0.008 0 – 0.033 
Member of human 
rights organization 
European values survey; % of 
respondents w/ membership 
26 
(1999) 
5.13 8.02 0.1 – 33.3 
Humanitarian 
donations 
Financial Tracking Service; 
donations as % of GDP 
27 
(2005) 
13.85 19.65 0.14 – 75.66 
Refugees per capita UNHCR 
27 
(2005) 
3 3 0.005 – 9.3 
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3.4 RESULTS 
 
Labor migrant rights 
 
 This chapter considers the predictors of labor immigrant policy, assuming that an 
economic cost benefit analysis uniquely enters into the labor policy decision-making process. 
Table 3.6 presents the ordinary least squares model for labor migrant rights with robust standard 
errors. Several different model specifications are considered because many independent variables 
are correlated (See appendix N for a correlation table). Model five omits several of the economic 
variables with missing data to increase the sample size. 
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According to table 3.6, economic indicators do not explain variance in labor migrant 
rights. The exception is GDP, which experiences sporadic significance (likely due to its high 
correlation with other variable included in the model). The results in table 3.6 reveal three 
Table 3.6 OLS Models of Labor Immigrant Rights with Robust Standard Errors 
DV: Labor migrant 
rights 
1 2 3 4 
GDP 
0.189 
(0.180) 
0.185 
(0.136) 
0.089 
(0.111) 
0.153** 
(0.062) 
Native education  
18.603 
(68.417) 
   
Unemployment 
0.985 
(2.132) 
1.349 
(1.769) 
-0.089 
(1.676) 
0.681 
(0.894) 
GDP growth 
0.797 
(2.924) 
0.338 
(2.145) 
1.702 
(2.949) 
0.839 
(1.467) 
Social spending 
0.355 
(1.725) 
0.549 
(1.393) 
0.049 
(1.576) 
0.134 
(0.563) 
Construction labor 
-0.424 
(0.574) 
-0.407 
(0.526) 
-0.253 
(0.555) 
 
Industry labor 
-0.384 
(4.699) 
-0.247 
(4.436) 
-0.010 
(4.523) 
 
Immigrant education  
-42.888 
(105.73) 
-7.550 
(40.868) 
-30.508 
(44.764) 
 
Center right party vote 
share 
-0.162 
(0.427) 
-0.242 
(0.413) 
-0.164 
(0.431) 
-0.202 
(0.128) 
Vote share of anti-
immigrant party 
-0.548 
(0.540) 
-0.524 
(0.446) 
-0.216 
(0.497) 
-0.253 
(0.247) 
Public support for 
immigration control 
-0.760 
(0.471) 
-0.639 
(0.381) 
-0.786* 
(0.402) 
-0.842** 
(0.131) 
Human rights organization 
membership 
0.325 
(0.392) 
0.383 
(0.336) 
0.356 
(0.408) 
0.459** 
(0.168) 
Immigrant population 
-85.248 
(67.022) 
-119.488** 
(51.803) 
 
-57.058* 
(32.030) 
Immigration flows 
-787.473 
(807.235) 
 
-1454.13* 
(739.306) 
-985.625* 
(539.644) 
Constant 
-183.177 
(449.022) 
149.936 
(434.554) 
151.885 
(440.185) 
110.310** 
(22.600) 
Observations 20 20 20 26 
R
2
 0.848 0.830 0.814 0.784 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1  
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explanations for labor migrant rights with consistently high magnitude: public support for 
immigration control, the size of the immigrant population, and immigration flows. The direction 
of all relationships corresponds with theoretical expectations. The relationship between public 
support for immigration control and labor migrant rights is negative, suggesting that as the 
population advocates increasingly restrictive controls, labor migrant rights will be less 
comprehensive. This significant relationship is interesting because the aggregate survey question 
relates directly to immigrant flows while the dependent policy variable in this analysis deals with 
granting migrant rights after the migrant becomes a resident. However, it is possible the 
sentiment driving the public preference on flows is a more general concern related to 
ethnocentrism, xenophobia or other social considerations rather than a rational individual 
consideration of the costs and benefits of migration (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). If non-
economic concerns are the driving force behind the policy preference, it is natural that the 
preference for immigration control would be negatively associated with any policies benefiting 
immigrants.  
 The relationship between public support for immigration control and labor migrant rights 
is illustrated in figure 3.2. The image on the left is the added variable plot from table 3.6 model 
three with twenty cases. The image on the left is from model four with twenty-six cases. The 
model with a more restricted model and additional cases illustrates a stronger relationship 
between support for immigration control and labor immigrant rights.  
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Figure 3.2. Added Variable Plots – Public Support for Immigration Control 
Table 3.6, model three Table 3.6, model four 
  
 
The role of public opinion for describing variance in immigrant rights is nicely illustrated 
by the French case. After President Jacques Chirac’s Interior Minister Charles Pasqua attempted 
his first set of reforms aimed at restricting the civil liberties of foreigners in 1986, the policies 
provoked a firestorm of protest from the public, organized by civil and immigrant rights 
associations. In particular, organizations such as the La Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, GISTI, 
SOS-racisme, and MRAP rallied against the reform and succeeded in pressuring Pasqua and 
Chirac to withdraw the bill from consideration. “The withdrawal of the Bill constituted a 
political failure for the Chirac government, which had unwittingly provided the increasingly 
active French civil rights movement with a new rallying cry: ‘Ne touch pas à mon pote!’ (‘Don’t 
touch my buddy!’). Thousands marched in Paris under this banner” (Hollifield 1999, p. 69).    
Both public opinion and the work of civil associations represented the public to the policy 
makers, who were forced to react. However, the evidence suggests that organized civil society 
with the support of a segment of the population is not always enough to motivate a policy 
difference, especially if there are equally strong anti-immigrant feelings at work. For example, in 
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1993 Pasqua introduced a bill that was very similar to the 1986 bill. GISTI and other 
organizations again defended the rights of immigrants, but by this time, public attitudes around 
migration had changed. The political clout of the left was significantly weakened, and Jean 
Marie Le Pen of the radical right-wing National Front had appeared on the political scene with a 
platform almost completely based on anti-immigrant and nativist sentiment. Despite the 
continual presence of civil society supporting immigrant rights, the general tide of politics 
allowed for the passage of a policy package severely restricting the rights of immigrants across 
France. The French example clearly illustrates the way political maneuvering with respect to 
public opinion drives the provision of migrant rights 
The negative relationships between the size of the immigrant population and immigration 
flows and labor migrant rights are the only other consistent explanations of variance, suggesting 
as the immigrant population grows or more immigrants arrive, states endorse fewer rights for 
resident migrants. These finding is vulnerable to outliers. A calculation of Cook’s Distance 
recognizes Poland, Ireland, Greece, and Germany as significant outliers in models one through 
four, and in model five Estonia, Norway, Poland and the Slovak Republic are also outliers. When 
outliers are excluded, the relationships between the immigrant population and immigration flows 
and policy lose magnitude. The relationships are not reliable enough to be considered a 
determinant of labor migrant rights in cross-national perspective. 
In model four, the human rights indicator illustrates a relationship of high magnitude with 
the dependent variable. The relationship is positive, which suggests that as the population 
expresses support for human rights through membership in human rights institutions, labor 
migrant rights will be more liberal. This finding corresponds with theoretical expectations. 
However, when other variables of humanitarianism are substituted into the model, none of them 
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exhibit relationships with magnitude. Further, sensitivity to outliers ultimately destroys 
confidence in the humanitarian finding. In sum, the results of table 3.6 refute the primary 
hypothesis that economics explain variance in labor migrant rights. Instead, public support for 
migration control is the only indicator consistently associated with the provision of fewer 
immigrant rights. 
The non-findings of table 3.6 are very interesting. Economics do not explain cross-
national variance in labor immigrant rights. This non-finding is very counterintuitive, since the 
residency of the labor migrants is based on economic conditions and the ability of the migrant to 
find employment. Because theory so strongly suggests economics should matter for the 
inclusiveness of labor migrant rights, the relationship between the economy and labor migrant 
rights requires additional investigation. The small sample size in table 3.6 possibly prevents 
weaker relationships from revealing themselves. When all variables are included in the model the 
political variables may be explaining all the variance in labor migrant rights across the 25 cases, 
especially since the strength of politically conservative ideology is determined in reference to the 
economy. To be sure the power of economic factors is not being overwhelmed by other variables 
in the analysis, a model including only the economic determinants is considered in table 3.7.  
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When political variables are not included in the model, the size of the labor force 
employed in industry and construction shares a consistently negative relationship with labor 
migrant rights. This contradicts the hypothesized relationship where the prevalence of 
immigrant-friendly industry creates an environment where rights for immigrants are endorsed by 
business. Most likely the relationship is negative because the large number of native workers 
employed in these industries feel threatened by the immigrant labor, and push for restrictive 
policies either independently or through their unions. The “British jobs for British workers” 
movement illustrates this scenario. This theory would make sense with the finding that public 
opinion is the most significant policy determinant. Further, the relationship between the 
prevalence of industry/construction workers and labor migrant rights could signal a spurious 
Table 3.7. OLS Models of Labor Migrant Rights with Robust Standard Errors 
DV: Labor migrant 
rights 
5 6 7 8 
GDP 
-0.034 
(0.074) 
-0.055 
(0.057) 
  
Native higher 
education 
-18.837 
(45.248) 
  
-30.935 
(14.070) 
Unemployment 
-1.605 
(1.231) 
-1.809 
(1.172) 
-1.230 
(0.884) 
-1.307 
(0.801) 
GDP growth 
1.519 
(3.154) 
1.425 
(3.116) 
1.041 
(2.904) 
1.303 
(2.887) 
Social spending 
1.776 
(1.589) 
1.726 
(1.554) 
1.655 
(1.511) 
1.755 
(1.444) 
Construction labor 
-0.638* 
(0.353) 
-0.706* 
(0.372) 
-0.689* 
(0.332) 
-0.587* 
(0.296) 
Industry labor 
-4.745** 
(1.536) 
-5.098** 
(1.524) 
-4.891** 
(1.398) 
-4.426** 
(1.397) 
Immigrant education 
-22.992 
(83.138) 
-51.380* 
(27.683) 
-49.895* 
(27.144) 
 
Constant 
586.77** 
(163.090) 
635.386** 
(148.593) 
607.130** 
(133.865) 
543.186** 
(136.558) 
Observations 20 20 20 20 
R
2
 0.568 0.561 0.545 0.563 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1 
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relationship between socioeconomic status and support for immigrant rights even though 
educational attainment is controlled for. Supporters of nationalism and radical conservatives are 
typically blue-collar males, the same demographic working in construction or industry (Norris 
2005). Despite the significant and potentially confusing results when the economic variables are 
considered in their own model, the policy decisions are not made in a political vacuum, and the 
fact that the economic relationships wash out when party and ideological variables are included 
in the model suggests that politics are the most important cross-national explanation for policy 
variance in migrant rights provision. 
Family migrant rights 
 
 This chapter questions if variance in labor and family migrant rights are explained by the 
same considerations. To make an accurate and complete comparison between the determinants of 
labor and family migrant rights, the model from Table 3.6 is run against family migrant rights as 
the dependent variable. The inconclusive results are presented in Table 3.8, where significant 
relationships vary widely depending on the specification of the model. 
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 As with labor migrant rights, a consistent relationship with high magnitude is the one 
between public support for immigration control and family migrant rights. This relationship only 
loses significance in model ten. At the same time, immigration flows explain variance in family 
migrant rights through a negative relationship, where countries receiving high numbers of 
Table 3.8. OLS Models of Family Immigrant Rights with Robust Standard Errors 
DV: Family migrant 
rights 
9 10 11 12 
GDP 
0.089 
(0.158) 
0.116 
(0.200) 
0.178* 
(0.081) 
0.177** 
(0.064) 
Native education  
74.364 
(39.376) 
   
Unemployment 
0.700 
(1.417) 
1.614 
(2.339) 
0.950 
(1.560) 
0.291 
(1.072) 
GDP growth 
-4.456** 
(1.036) 
-5.032* 
(2.465) 
-3.363 
(1.978) 
-2.797* 
(1.537) 
Social spending 
-0.773 
(0.689) 
-0.325 
(1.011) 
-0.751 
(0.782) 
-0.630 
(0.532) 
Construction labor 
-0.649 
(0.487) 
-0.421 
(0.346) 
-0.206 
(0.263) 
 
Industry labor 
0.209 
(2.223) 
1.018 
(2.363) 
1.368 
(1.991) 
 
Immigrant education  
-94.425 
(56.509) 
28.188 
(32.662) 
3.632 
(27.198) 
 
Center right party vote 
share 
-0.035 
(0.209) 
-0.253 
(0.241) 
-0.114 
(0.184) 
-0.027 
(0.135) 
Vote share of anti-
immigrant party 
-0.787 
(0.604) 
-0.561 
(0.545) 
-0.398 
(0.302) 
-0.336* 
(0.189) 
Public support for 
immigration control 
-0.743** 
(0.233) 
-0.432 
(0.269) 
-0.665** 
(0.223) 
-0.639** 
(0.129) 
Human rights organization 
membership 
0.208 
(0.138) 
0.300 
(0.269) 
0.113 
(0.199) 
0.058 
(0.123) 
Immigrant population 
15.463 
(48.283) 
-67.598 
(72.946) 
 
0.692 
(25.417) 
Immigration flows 
-1746.329* 
(825.677) 
 
-1862.582** 
(501.535) 
-2143.953** 
(358.155) 
Constant 
200.940 
(257.366) 
48.773 
(237.176) 
21.790 
(195.641) 
136.895** 
(26.469) 
Observations 20 20 20 26 
R
2
 0.93 0.774 0.862 0.818 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1  
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immigrants give fewer rights to those immigrants. This finding corresponds with theoretical 
expectations, and is not vulnerable to outliers. However, immigration flows are highly collinear 
with other indicators in the model, notably GDP. When GDP is not included in the model, the 
importance of immigration flows loses magnitude. The fragility of the finding prevents 
immigration flows from being seriously considered as a determinant of family migrant rights 
It is interesting to note the sporadic significance of economic indicators in models eleven, 
thirteen and fourteen. GDP is significant in models eleven and twelve. However, this relationship 
declines in magnitude when Luxembourg (an outlier according to its Cook’s Distance statistic) is 
removed from the analysis, and the relationship cannot reliably explain variance in family 
migrant policy. Economic growth is significant in models nine, ten, and twelve. The relationship 
holds up after outlier analysis. However, the negative relationship goes against theoretical 
expectations, suggesting that in contexts with high growth, family migrant rights are more 
restrictive. This could be explained by the relatively high correlations between economic growth 
and social spending, immigrant higher education, and center right party vote share (see Appendix 
N). More likely, economic growth signals a spurious relationship. The countries with the highest 
growth in Europe in 2005 are the developing economies, largely the countries of central and 
eastern Europe (See Table 3.9). The correlation between economic growth and being one for the 
first fifteen members of the European Union is -0.57. Central/east European countries have a 
special relationship with immigration and immigrant rights for a variety of economic, social and 
political reasons. An exploration of the difference between west and central/eastern European 
countries is beyond the scope of this project at present, but the correlation between growth and 
central/eastern European countries prevents economic growth from being seriously considered as 
a determinant of family migrant rights across Europe. 
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Table 3.9. Economic growth and EU15 membership (2005) 
 
Economic 
growth EU 15  
Economic 
growth EU 15 
Italy 0.7 X Poland 3.6  
Germany 0.8 X Spain 3.6 X 
Portugal 0.9 X Cyprus 3.9  
Belgium 1.8 X Hungary 3.9  
France 1.9 X Malta 4  
Netherlands 2 X Slovenia 4.3  
UK 2.2 X Luxembourg 5.2 X 
Denmark 2.4 X Czech Rep 6.3  
Austria 2.5 X Ireland 6.4 X 
Switzerland 2.6  Slovak Rep 6.5  
Norway 2.7  Lithuania 7.8  
Finland 2.8 X Estonia 9.2  
Greece 2.9 X Latvia 10.6  
Sweden 3.3 X    
Source: Eurostat 
 
In sum, there is very little to distinguish the explanations for variance in family migrant 
rights from those of labor migration rights. Public support for immigration control explains 
variance in both cases, and is the only finding not vulnerable to outliers or high collinearity. The 
unexpected similarity in variance of labor and family migrant rights confirms the suspicion 
planted by the high correlation between the indicators of labor and family rights and the lack of 
difference is underlined by a Chow Test demonstrating the absence of any statistical difference 
in the way the model works to describe labor vs. family migrant rights (See appendix O). This 
similarity is surprising due to the different justifications for family and labor for migration and 
the diverse reactions to the different types of migration: public responses to labor migration have 
historically focused on economics, while the focus of family migration policy is integration.  
Even with the strong theoretical argument for the difference between labor and family 
migration policy, it is possible to rationalize the lack of difference in three ways. First, once 
labor and family migrants are resident in a host state, it is very difficult to distinguish between 
them. Often the political right will have no desire to distinguish between immigrant groups, 
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especially if they want to use immigrant groups as a scapegoat for poor economic or social 
conditions. When using immigrants as a scapegoat, little attention is paid to whether the migrants 
in question are laborers or family members. When a politician or a voter sees an immigrant, they 
will not know whether that immigrant is a family or a labor migrant, and any negative opinions 
developed about either labor or family migrants could be applied to any migrant (or minority). 
For resident migrants, the negative opinion about either immigrant group could have negative 
political consequences for all immigrant groups. 
Second, once immigrants are resident in a European host country, the category of entry 
looses significance for all practical purposes. The right to reside typically includes the right to 
work, and family migrants will work alongside labor migrants. As an interview subject working 
at a French legal NGO explains, “The family are all people who are going to get involved in the 
labor market.  If it’s children they will get involved later on, if it’s wives and husbands right 
now” (2, personal communication, 9/9/08). Since the policies under investigation in this chapter 
all concern rights given to migrants after they have entered the country (at which point all 
migrants have the same working privileges), it makes sense that the distinction between the 
policies would be blurred.  
Third, the dependent variables under consideration are measuring rights-based policies 
for both family and labor migrants. As already mentioned, the focus on rights slightly weakens 
the weight of the theoretical distinction between labor and family, which is primarily based on 
the differences in policies governing flows (immigration policies). Perhaps it is not surprising to 
find that the same political policy pressures determine social and economic rights regardless of 
whether the rights apply to labor or family migrants. Once the migrant is inside the host country, 
 84 
the importance of the labor/family category of entry becomes less relevant, and rights are equally 
applied.  
Even with reasons for finding similarity between labor and family migrant rights 
provision, there is a minor difference between the public opinion policy determinants. Public 
opinion has greater magnitude in describing labor migrant rights variance than it does for family 
migrant rights. Perhaps labor migration is more firmly in the hands of the public because labor is 
domestically managed phenomenon, and is less associated supranational human rights law. 
Therefore, at the policy-making stage is easier to justify an anti-immigrant policy in terms of 
public sentiment and protecting native workers from foreigners. It is far more difficult to frame 
the same kind of debate around family members, especially with the moral weight carried by the 
family and with the heavily institutionalized right to private and family life. Slight differences 
aside, the results of the analysis conducted here suggest cross-national variance in labor and 
family migrant rights are directly and almost exclusively associated with public support for 
immigration control.   
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has two objectives: explain variance in labor migrant rights, and to compare 
the difference in determinants to those for family migrant rights. It has three primary findings: 1) 
the economic conditions of a country do not determine labor migrant rights in cross-national 
perspective; 2) Public support for immigration control is the only significant policy determinant 
of both labor and family migrant rights; 3) there is very little difference in the determinants of 
labor and family migrant rights. 
Perhaps the most surprising finding of the analysis here is the low magnitude in the 
relationship between the economic variables and the outcome of labor migrant rights. Because 
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refugee and family flows are technically governed by human rights, labor migration is the only 
real avenue of entry for which the state can brazenly consult national interests. For example, a lot 
of publicity has surrounded point-based systems that allow states to allow migrants only with 
explicit reference to economic needs. Labor migrant rights are an extension of labor immigration 
policies governing flows, and should therefore fall privy to the same economic calculations. In 
fact, none of the economic indicators reliably predict labor migrant rights. Of course, the focus 
on rights as the dependent variables of the analysis could account for this surprising result. Most 
literature discussing the relevance of the economy for labor migration policy is focused on 
policies governing entry. Because the dependent variable analyzed here only measures the rights 
provided to immigrants after they are already resident within the country, the statistical results 
cannot take account of the possible difference between the labor and family immigration policies 
governing entry. Once comparable data on policies governing the entrance of labor and family 
migrants is available, economic calculations may gain statistical significance.  
Politics are the driving force behind both labor and family migrant rights. Public support 
for closed immigration is the most consistent explanation for policy variance across the 
European continent in 2005-2006. Countries with a high percentage of the population expressing 
support for immigration controls are more likely to have a less comprehensive package of rights. 
Clearly there is more to the story of restricting immigrant rights than the simple public opinion 
explanation suggested by the quantitative data. The cross-national data examined in tables 3.6 
and 3.8 cannot speak to the political maneuverings that take place within the context of each 
policy proposal. The French case provides an example for how policy makers use the political 
context to achieve restrictive policies. These findings suggest democratic responsiveness to 
public desires. However, this responsiveness raises the question of whether governments should 
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be negotiating with public sentiment over universal human rights. By definition, human rights 
should be universally applied. The politicization of granting political, social and economic rights 
raises a big question about the sustainability of human rights law in democratic contexts.  
The similarity of variance in labor and family migrant rights is theoretically surprising for 
several reasons. First, labor and family migrants move for very different reasons. Labor migrants 
move to seek employment and an improved standard of living, while family migrants move to 
join loved ones. Second, the costs incurred by labor and family migrants are dissimilar. Labor 
migration is largely a feature of supply and demand, and therefore has macroeconomic 
consequences. Migrant laborers must work in order to maintain their visa, and workers compete 
with natives for local employment and fill gaps in the economy. In other words, the costs and 
benefits of labor migration are economic. The logic of family migration does not work in the 
same way. Family migrants may work, but are not required to do so. They carry some economic 
threat (usually in the form of increased social spending on migrant families), but in general, the 
costs and benefits of family migration are social: family migrants make a cohesive family unit 
out of a singe migrant, the family settles and becomes part of a community. Some individuals 
view community membership as a positive development (like those who view migration as a way 
to compensate for population decline within Europe) while others feel threatened by culturally 
different migrant families. The clear societal implications should make family migration 
vulnerable to concerns separate from those driving labor migration. Third, states have varying 
degrees of autonomy over labor and family migration. Family migration is governed by human 
rights. Within the European Union, member states are required to tolerate family migration 
pertaining of legally resident third country nationals. Labor migration carries no such 
requirement, and allows nation states to consider national interest. All three of these reasons 
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suggest labor and family migration should be vulnerable to different policy constraints. 
However, in cross-national statistical analysis of variance across labor and family migrant rights, 
the appeals of bread and blood matter little: economic and humanitarian concerns are 
overwhelmed by politics.  
Possibly a vast difference between labor and family immigration policy variance does 
exist, but the difference could not be captured in the available data. The data used here suggest 
that there is very little difference in the politics of rights provision, but cannot comment on the 
difference between immigration policies. This presents a fascinating new research question: 
Perhaps there is a difference between policies governing migrants before they enter the country 
(immigration policies) and those granting them rights after they are already residents (immigrant 
policies). This question is explored through a consideration of immigration and immigrant 
policies in chapter four. The difference between immigration and immigrant policy could be 
crosscutting, meaning that it may manifest itself in both labor and family migration policies. 
Once more data on labor immigration policy is collected, the crosscutting nature of the 
immigration/immigrant policy divide can be tested. In the mean time, it is too soon to give up on 
the theory that labor and family migration policies are determined by different concerns. So far, 
we know variance in labor and family migrant rights are explained by the politics of public 
opinion. The theory of difference maintains its relevance for immigration policies, and is only 
waiting for comparable data on the labor and family immigration policies to make a statistical 
test appropriate. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Imagined vs. Real People: 
Family Migration Policies Before and After Entry 
 
The previous chapter finds little difference in the determinants of labor and family 
migrant rights. The similarity in the results from the statistical models could be the product of the 
policies considered in the data, which are limited to migrant rights (immigrant policies). Migrant 
rights concern resident immigrants under the protection of the nation state. In the meantime, a 
difference may exist between labor and family migration policies governing immigrant entry 
(immigration policies). While the data required to test the difference between labor and family 
immigration policies does not yet exist, the logic that immigration and immigrant policies are 
vulnerable to different concerns can be tested with empirical data on family migration policies. 
The purpose of this chapter is to uncover differences between the determinants of policies 
granting the right to migrate (immigration policies) and those governing resident migrants 
(immigrant policies). 
States clearly maintain distinct immigration and immigrant policies. Immigration policies 
involve the rules governing migrant entry into a territory and include all residency requirements. 
Immigrant policies govern the legal rights, social opportunities, and the political and cultural 
participation of immigrant groups in wider society. Typically the two realms of policy are 
written by different legislative bodies and managed by separate ministries in the government. 
However, a question remains over whether these two realms of policy are motivated by distinct 
concerns. Theoretically, mechanisms of immigration control limit themselves to short-term cost-
benefit calculations, while immigrant policies are motivated by long-term societal concerns. 
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However, as suggested in the previous chapter, rights provision is related to immigration control 
because a more comprehensive package of immigrant rights attracts migrants to a host state. 
Concerns over immigration control can therefore influence both immigration and immigrant. 
This chapter seeks to explain immigration and immigrant policy variance through asking the 
following: What explains variance in policies targeting migrants before their immigration into a 
host state, and those addressing immigrant groups after they have achieved a right to reside?  
Immigration policies are implemented in reference to “imaginary people” where 
immigrant groups exist hypothetically. Policy decisions are made on the basis of conjecture, 
prediction, estimation, or generalization and may not involve concrete knowledge about specific 
attributes or challenges brought by an immigrant group. The absence of specifics from the 
decision-making process allows policymakers to be politically extreme, and to assume a worst-
case scenario about the flood of immigrants invading national borders. For family migrants, the 
result of this negative conjecture is a more restrictive set of policies. 
“Real” migrant residents are addressed by immigrant policies. In this scenario, family 
migrants have been through an initial screening process and have gained an initial right to reside 
in the host country. The immigrant policies govern the migrant’s rights and privileges within 
society. These immigrants are “real” because their physical presence in the host state allows 
policy makers to identify the migrant, their demographics, socioeconomic status, and location. 
The social and economic impact of “real” migrant populations is relevant for domestic politics: 
the population is physically confronted with the migrant family, the local media publicizes 
immigrant human-interest stories, and migrants might have a right to vote in local elections.  
The theory that a physically present population motivates restrictive political impulses 
finds its roots in intergroup contact theory. Allport (1954) theorizes that under certain conditions 
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(equal group status, common goals, intergroup cooperation and support of authorities, law, or 
custom), bringing together diverse groups should lead to a reduction in prejudice. Subsequent 
research suggests the conditions are less stringent than Allport hypothesizes, and that intergroup 
contact appears to have a prejudice-reducing effect nearly all the time (Pettigrew 1998b; 
Pettigrew and Tropp 2005). However, the opportunity for members in the different groups to 
form friendships is an important factor in reducing discrimination: “Such opportunity implies 
close interaction that would make self-disclosure and other friendship development mechanisms 
possible” (Pettigrew 1998b, p. 76; Allport 1954; Cook 1962). This study adds an additional 
assumption: any positive effects of intergroup contact require the two groups to be in the same 
physical space, which makes the out-group real and relevant for the in-group. If the minority 
groups are not “real” the necessary relationships cannot be formed between groups. As the 
contact occurs, people and their political representatives express more tolerant views toward the 
out-group. For family migrants, the result of favorable contact should be a more comprehensive 
package of immigrant policies granting additional rights to family migrants.  
The theoretical difference between immigration vs. immigrant policy formation is based 
on the effect of immigrant residency and contact with the native population. For policies 
governing “imaginary” migrants, determinants associated with controlling the flows of 
immigrants into the host state should be the most important. Domestic conditions informing 
decisions of immigration control relate to the economy, demography, and the politics of the 
radical right. These conditions should determine immigration policy through defining the 
parameters of a cost-benefit analysis of the benefits of migration. Because resident immigrants 
interact with the native population, the politics of immigrant policy are not the exclusive product 
of a cost-benefit analysis. Instead, contact should make the humanity of the migrants evident to 
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policy-makers and voters, allowing humanitarian and more moderate or left-leaning politics to 
dominate the policy making process concerning “real” migrants.  
The difference between immigration and immigrant policies highlight an important 
conceptual distinction within immigration policy. A failure to consider immigration policy 
separately from immigrant policy results in the misspecification of the policy decision-making 
process and causes misleading results. This chapter explores determinants of immigration 
policies for “imaginary people” versus immigrant policies applied to “real people”. The chapter 
is organized as follows. The next section discusses the distinction between family immigration 
and immigrant policies and derives hypotheses. The subsequent section describes the data and 
estimation procedure. The third section explains the results finding the most important 
explanations of policy variance are political, where the radical anti-immigrant right has the 
biggest magnitude for describing family immigration policy variance and mainstream politics of 
the center right and public opinion explain variance in family immigrant policy. The final section 
concludes.  
4.1 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND  
Immigration policies  
 Thomas Hammar (1985) distinguishes between immigration policies governing 
immigration control and immigrant policies, which are integration policies or rights provisions 
applied after migrant entry. Immigration policies for family migrants traditionally include 
provisions determining which family members are eligible for a family visa, and what conditions 
must be reached by the sponsor migrant before being eligible to bring their family into the host 
state (i.e. accommodation and financial requirements). European states have recently expanded 
the arsenal of immigration conditions to include integration policies requiring family migrants to 
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demonstrate linguistic proficiency and civic knowledge before entering the host country (Joppke 
2007). The new use of integration measures (also called “integration from abroad”) for family 
migrants takes integration out of Hammar’s “immigrant policy” category and associates it with 
immigration policy: “the novelty of civic integration policy is its obligatory character, which has 
notably increased over time, and this notional ‘integration’ policy has transmuted into a tool of 
migration control, helping states to restrict especially the entry of unskilled and non-adaptable 
family migrants” (Joppke 2007, p. 5). The emphasis on control as the objective for immigration 
policies corresponds with the theoretical expectations for policies dealing with “imaginary” 
people. Where the threat from immigrants in unknown and hypothetical, the automatic impulse is 
to control immigrant flows. Determinants concerned with immigration control focus on the 
domestic economic, demographic, and political costs of immigration. The theory surrounding 
policies of immigration control is largely covered in previous chapters, but is briefly revisited 
here. 
The negative effects of migration will be felt less severely and policy makers are allowed 
to be more optimistic about potential benefits of migration if the economy is healthy (Borjas 
1995). Alternatively, if the economy is doing poorly, immigration might lead to fears that 
immigrants are out-competing natives for jobs (Smith & Edmonston 1997; Coppel, Dumond & 
Visco 2002). Since the unemployment rate often signals economic health, where unemployment 
his high, family immigration policy should be more restrictive. 
Because welfare states must protect themselves from outside economic pressures and 
restrict benefits to members, welfare states or countries with high social spending are considered 
to be incompatible with open movement of people. Further, the economic and social 
characteristics of many migrant groups lead them to draw disproportionately from the welfare 
 93 
system (Freeman 1986; Geddes, 2003; Borjas, 1999; Bailey, 2005; Allard & Danzinger, 2000). 
The incompatibility between the welfare state and open labor suggests a negative relationship 
between high welfare spending and inclusive family immigration policy. 
Immigration policy is also affected by demography. The European workforce is aging 
and fertility is low among EU nationals. The reduced number of taxpayers translates into bad 
news for the expansive welfare states of most EU member states. Governments might wish to 
encourage “replacement migration” in order to compensate for demographic change (UN 
Population Division, 2002; Zimmerman 1995)). Because families migrate with the clear 
intention to settle in the host state, family migration guarantees generations of second and third 
generation immigrants to support the economy, making family migration a weapon to tackle the 
declining work force. In countries with low fertility, family immigration policy should be more 
inclusive, allowing settled immigrant families to compensate for an aging population. 
The size of the immigrant population determines the extent of economic and social 
damage caused by immigration; a large resident immigrant population is associated with 
perceived negative costs to society. Further, public demand for tighter immigration control 
increases when there is a large or a rapidly growing immigrant population (Money 2007). In 
countries with a large migrant population, family migration policy should be more restrictive. 
The political determinants of immigration control connect to party politics. Conservative 
parties hold the most consistent positions on immigration and endorse restrictive policies based 
on of cultural conservativism, nationalism, and sometimes xenophobia (Thränhardt 1995). 
Conservative parties focus on immigration and xenophobia because issues of immigration 
obscure economic politics, seize votes from the left, and diminish support for the radical right 
 94 
(Pettigrew 1998). In countries with large electoral support for conservative or right-leaning 
political parties, family migration policy should be more restrictive. 
However, conservative parties have difficulty establishing party preference on 
immigration policy because of the rigors of coalition building among the major centrist parties. 
Political negotiations prevent governments from entering office with binding policy 
commitments on immigration, and parties often break campaign promises on immigration policy  
(Messina 1989; Freeman 1979; Katznelson 1973). As a result, the proposed immigration policies 
of centrist conservative parties are vague, especially when compared with the clear anti-
immigrant priorities of parties on the radical right. 
Anti-immigrant parties do not gain enough support to accumulate significant seats in the 
national parliament, which should make their policy influence minimal (Messina 1989; Freeman 
1995). However, under the right circumstances, the radical right influences immigration policy 
directly and through provoking a policy response from other parties (Schain, 2006; Williams 
2006; Norris 2005; Pettigrew 1998; Messina 1989). The radical right shifts the political discourse 
surrounding immigration, and support for an anti-immigrant party should correspond with 
restrictive family immigration policy. 
Public opinion influences immigration policy through communicating a preference to 
elected representatives. However, the public is not usually consulted on issues of immigration 
policy, and any public policy influence occurs during elections, especially when immigration is a 
salient political issue (Hoffman-Nowotny, 1985). Lately, the European populace has responded 
negatively to the presence of immigrant groups in their societies (Pettigrew 1998). Where the 
public articulates strong preferences for immigration control, national decision-makers will be 
more likely to pass restrictive policies than in contexts where the public is favorable to 
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migration. In countries with hight public support for immigration control, family immigration 
policy should be more restrictive. 
Immigrant policies 
Immigrant policies deal with “real” individuals who already contribute to society. The 
migrants are in plain sight of politicians, the domestic population and the media: The 
consequences of an ineffective or unjust immigrant policy will be felt within the host state where 
the policy target is local. In large part, immigrant policies are limited to securing rights and 
privileges of the migrant population. For example, immigrant policies grant protection against 
deportation or access to certain social services like education, health care, and employment 
assistance. Due to the rights-focused nature of immigrant policy and the domestic constraints 
incurred when legislating against a local population of “real” migrants, immigrant policy should 
be exempt from most concerns of immigration control, and should be most susceptible to 
humanitarian and ideological arguments. 
Ideological perspectives related to family migration policy include domestic respect for 
human rights and the dominant political discourse deciding the state’s responsibility to human 
rights. Human rights protect the right to family migration. When dealing with family, politicians 
are bound by international law. The degree to which a state and its public are sympathetic to the 
general concepts and practices in human rights law should indicate their acceptance of liberal 
family migration principles. The principles of human rights and humanitarianism argue human 
beings are deserving of a certain fundamental standard of life regardless of nationality or 
location: the economic, social, and cultural rights included in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights apply 
directly to the rights and privileges covered in immigrant family migration policies (the rights to 
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legal redress, employment, education, and social services, for example). In contexts with high 
levels of socio-political respect for human rights increase, family immigrant policy should be 
more inclusive. 
Politics inform immigrant politics by deciding the state’s responsibilities towards non-
citizens. As already mentioned, conservative or right leaning parties typically endorse more 
restrictive concepts of citizenship or belonging and are less sympathetic to international claims 
on national resources. Likewise, radical right parties promote restrictive citizenship policies 
founded in an ethnonational concept of national identity, and are very opposed to globalization 
and internationalization (Howard, 2006; Kitschelt, 1995). Despite the liberalizing influence of 
human rights, in contexts with high support for conservative political parties, family immigrant 
policy should be more restrictive. 
On the other side of the ideological spectrum, left-leaning parties are more likely to 
endorse policies of inclusion, multiculturalism, and internationalism, and to support domestic 
and international application of human rights (Risse Kappen 1991; Thérien and Noel 2000). 
Though consensus building often bogs down left parties when it comes to immigration policy, 
they are generally more open to considerations outside strict national interest. Countries with 
high support for leftist political parties should also endorse more inclusive family migration 
policies. 
Hypotheses 
 
Family immigration policies should function as policies of immigration control, and 
variance in policy is most likely explained by a cost-benefit analysis based on domestic 
economic, demographic, and political conditions. Alternatively, immigrant policies are more 
likely to be explained by humanitarian and ideological factors. These arguments, coupled with 
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the literature on the determinants of immigration policy lead to the following hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis 1: Unemployment, welfare spending, fertility rates, the size of the immigrant 
population, and support for the radical anti-immigrant right are all conditions associated 
with immigration control, and should describe cross-national variance in immigration but 
not immigrant policies. 
• Hypothesis 2: Support for conservative political parties should explain cross-national 
variance in immigration and immigrant policies. 
• Hypothesis 3: Support for leftist parties and respect for human rights should describe 
cross-national variance in immigrant but not immigration policies. 
4.2 ESTIMATION 
 
Measuring immigration and immigrant policies 
 
The multivariate models specified below are implemented using data from the Migrant 
Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) published by the Migration Policy Group and British Council 
(Niessen et al., 2007). The data is described in detail in chapter 2. The MIPEX indicators align 
with the two dimensions of family immigration and immigrant policies. The family immigration 
policies are detailed in table 4.1, and include indicators measuring the requirements and 
conditions for gaining a family reunification visa. 
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Table 4.1 Family Immigration Policies 
 Eligibility for status  
  Of sponsor/legal resident 
  Of spouse/partner 
  Of minor children 
  Of dependent relations 
   In ascending line 
   Adult children 
 Conditions for acquisition of status  
  Passing integration test 
  Imposition of integration course 
  Language assessment 
  Accommodation requirement 
  Economic resources requirement 
  Length of application procedure 
  Cost of application 
 
The indicators measuring eligibility cover how long the sponsor must be legally resident within 
the country, if age or integration conditions apply to the spouse, if age or marriage conditions 
determine the entry of a minor child, and whether dependent relations are allowed. The 
conditions for the acquisition of status include the integration measures required of family 
migrants before they can migrate (integration tests, integration courses, and language 
assessments), the conditions the sponsor migrant must fulfill before becoming eligible to bring 
family members over (accommodation and economic requirements), and the length and cost of 
the family application procedure. The resulting index measures all requirements and conditions 
applying to immigrants before they can obtain a family migration visa for a EU country. The 
scores are standardized on a scale of 0 to 100 with 33 representing the lowest possible policy 
score and 100 the highest, or most inclusive. The scores for family immigration policy range 
from 44 to 94 and are illustrated in table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 Family Immigration Policy Scores 
Sweden 94 Belgium 72 
Portugal 86 Estonia 72 
Ireland 83 Germany 72 
Hungary 81 UK 72 
Lithuania 81 Norway 64 
Malta 81 Netherlands 64 
Slovenia 81 Slovak Republic 61 
Italy 78 Latvia 68 
Poland 78 Switzerland 68 
Czech Republic 75 Cyprus 56 
Luxembourg 75 Greece 56 
Spain 75 Austria 47 
Finland 75 France 47 
  Denmark 44 
Obs. Mean S.D. Range 
27 69.86 12.79 44 -94 
 
   
Family immigrant policies are detailed in table 4.3, and include indicators of how secure 
the family reunification visa is and which rights are given to resident family migrants.  
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Table 4.3 Family Immigrant Policies 
 Security of status  
  Duration of validity of permit 
  Ground for withdrawing, rejecting, refusing to renew status 
  Before refusal, due account given to family circumstance (by law) 
  Legal guarantees or redress in instance of refusal or withdrawal 
 Rights associated with status  
  Right to autonomous residence for spouse/partner and children 
  Right to autonomous residence for other relatives 
  Access to education and training for adult family members 
  Access to employment and self-employment 
  Access to social security, social assistance, healthcare, and housing 
 
The indicators of security measure how often a family reunification visa must be renewed, the 
grounds for refusing a visa to a family member, whether the state is legally required to consider 
the immigrant’s special family circumstance, and the provision of legal redress if a family 
migrant is denied status. The indicators of rights associated with immigrant status cover two 
main areas: the right for family members to eventually seek autonomous residence, and the 
access of the family migrants to education, employment, and social welfare. The scores have 
been standardized on a scale of 0 to 100 with 33 representing the lowest possible policy score 
and 100 the highest or most inclusive. Table 4.4 illustrates the standardized range of 52 to 100 
for family immigrant policy scores across European states. The specific coding breakdown of 
each individual policy indicator for both family immigration and immigrant policies is detailed 
in appendix P and Q.  
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Table 4.4 Family Immigrant Policy Scores 
Italy 100 France 81 
Sweden 96 Malta 78 
Portugal 96 Greece 78 
Slovenia 85 Czech Republic 74 
Spain 85 Switzerland 67 
Norway 85 Denmark 67 
Netherlands 85 Luxembourg 63 
Finland 81 Austria 63 
Lithuania 81 Cyprus 63 
Poland 81 Slovak Republic 59 
Belgium 81 Latvia 59 
Estonia 81 Hungary 56 
Germany 81 Ireland 52 
UK 81   
Obs. Mean S.D. Range 
27 76.41 12.75 52-100 
 
 
As discussed in chapter two, principal factor analysis tests whether variables can be 
grouped together and explained by a smaller number of variables called factors. Though most of 
the variables making up the family migration policy index do load on a single factor, a closer 
investigation of the loadings allows for a slight nuance supporting the idea that family 
immigration and immigrant policies are theoretically distinct. Table 4.5 illustrates the 
eigenvalues of the factors and the factor loadings for each component of the dependent variable 
indices. The policy components primarily load on two factors. Most of the immigration policy 
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indicators load on factor one, and most of the immigrant policies load on factor two. The only 
immigration policy to load on factor two is the policy measure of the conditions the sponsor 
needs to meet before becoming eligible to bring family members into the host state. It makes 
sense that this indicator would group with immigrant policies, because for the sponsor migrant, it 
is an immigrant policy. However, because this policy fits theory predicting family migration 
policies as a mechanism of control, it is grouped with immigration policies in the dependent 
variable. A few immigrant policies also load on factor one. The indicator of the duration of the 
validity of the permit and the grounds for rejecting family status load on the first factor, and the 
two indicators of the right to autonomous residence load on both the first and second factor. The 
correlation between these variables and the first factor of immigration policies makes sense, 
because they relate to providing the right to reside, just like the other immigration policies do. 
However, because these policies relate to legal rights for “real” immigrants already identified by 
natives of the host country they are included in the immigrant policy index. Though the factor 
analysis presents slight changes to the theoretical concepts of immigration and immigrant 
policies, it confirms the potential importance of theoretically distinguishing between the different 
bodies of policy. 
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Table 4.5 Factor analysis of family migration policies 
Factor Eigenvalue Factor Eigenvalue   
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
4.84103 
2.87560 
1.69117 
1.45833 
5 
6 
7 
8 
1.39306 
1.17188 
0.83452 
0.63082 
  
Factor (eigenvalue) Factor 1 
(4.841) 
Factor 2 
(2.876) 
Factor 3 
(1.691) 
Factor 4 
(1.458) 
Eligibility of sponsor/legal resident -0.0107 0.4773 0.1293 0.2201 
Eligibility of spouse/partner 0.3681 -0.1317 0.3129 0.1451 
Eligibility of minor children 0.4303 -0.1043 -0.1237 0.2862 
Eligibility of dependent relations in 
ascending line 
0.8150 -0.1269 0.2100 0.3005 
E
li
g
ib
il
it
y
 f
o
r 
st
a
tu
s 
Eligibility of adult children 0.7856 0.1756 0.0474 0.1787 
Passing integration test 0.7110 0.2384 0.2955 0.3015 
Imposition of integration course 0.6693 -0.1956 -0.2075 -0.3975 
Language assessment 0.7135 -0.2313 -0.4136 -0.1137 
Accommodation requirement 0.4351 0.0564 0.1209 0.3117 
Economic resources requirement 0.2702 0.2697 -0.1923 0.0479 
Length of application procedure 0.3811 -0.3810 0.5263 -0.0251 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
fo
r 
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
 
o
f 
st
a
tu
s 
Cost of application -0.0343 -0.3611 0.4777 -0.2232 
Duration of validity of permit 0.6430 -0.0726 -0.2381 -0.0924 
Ground for withdrawing, rejecting, 
refusing to renew status 
0.4941 -0.2914the  0.2680 -0.2281 
Before refusal, due account given 
to family circumstance (by law) 
-0.1620 0.6100 -0.1931 -0.2154 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 o
f 
S
ta
tu
s 
Legal guarantees or redress in 
instance of refusal or withdrawal 
0.2320 0.2906 -0.4399 0.4503 
Right to autonomous residence for 
spouse/partner and children 
0.5333 0.6237 0.1511 -0.0292 
Right to autonomous residence for 
other relatives 
0.5405 0.4741 0.2357 0.0629 
Access to education and training 
for adult family members 
0.1412 0.6285 -0.0449 -0.5800 
Access to employment and self-
employment 
0.1619 0.3396 0.3098 -0.3403 
R
ig
h
ts
 a
ss
o
ci
a
te
d
 w
it
h
 s
ta
tu
s 
Access to social security, social 
assistance, healthcare, and housing 0.0857 0.6339 0.3471 0.0788 
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Figure 4.1 illustrates the correlation between the immigration and immigrant policy 
indices.  
Figure 4.1 Correlation of Family Immigration and Immigrant Policy 
F
a
m
il
y
 I
m
m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
 P
o
li
cy
 
 
 
Family Immigrant Policy 
Pearson’s R: 0.3892 
 
The two indices are not very highly correlated with a Pearson’s R of 0.39. Further, there 
are cases where a country appears to be quite restrictive in one policy area and inclusive in the 
other. For example, Ireland appears to have very open family immigration policies (would 
achieve best practice if all migrants enjoyed the same favorable treatment, but very strict 
immigrant policy provisions (the worst in the sample). Conversely, France has very unfavorable 
family immigration policies (the conditions for entry are the worst in the sample), but is 
relatively liberal in their immigrant policy provisions. This paper seeks to address the distinct 
behavior across policy areas like those exhibited by Ireland and France.  
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The empirical models 
This chapter asserts that family immigration and immigrant policies are theoretically 
distinguishable. Immigration policies deal with “imaginary” migrants and the hypothetical nature 
of the immigrants allow more extreme motivations to dominate the policy making process. In 
particular, immigration policies are vulnerable to efforts to control flows of imaginary migrants. 
Economic, political, and demographic characteristics should be the best predictors of family 
immigration policy. Family immigrant policies are concerned with rights conferral for “real” 
migrants residing in a host country. Because these policies focus on granting political and social 
rights to visible migrants, the policies should be determined by public ideology and humanitarian 
concerns. In order to prove the hypotheses arguing certain determinants should only predict 
immigration policy, some describe both immigration and immigrant policy, and some should 
only determine immigrant policy, the following model containing all determinants is run on both 
policy indices:  
Family immigration/immigrant policy = ! + "1GDP + "2unemployment rate + "3social spending 
+ "4vote share of center right party + "5vote share of anti-immigrant party +"6vote share of left 
party + "7public support for immigration control + "8immigrant population + "9immigration 
flows + "10fertility rate + "11 respect for human rights + e  
 
GDP, unemployment, and social spending capture economic conditions in the host-state 
and the presence of a welfare state. The vote share won by the center right, the vote share of anti-
immigrant parties and the vote share won by parties on the left measure political and ideological 
pressures relating to political parties. An anti-immigrant party is identified through the party 
classification by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and by news sources detailing the party’s use of 
anti-immigrant or ethno-national slogans, advertisements, or leadership.i Table 4.6 exhibits the 
data for relevant anti-immigrant party vote shares. 
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Table 4.6 Anti-immigrant Parties Winning Vote Shares in Last National Legislative 
Elections, 2006 
Country Radical right party Vote share 
Austria 
Freedom Party of Austria, 
Alliance for the Future of Austria (2006) 
15.15 
Belgium Flemish Interest (2003) 11.6 
Denmark Danish People's Party (2005) 13.2 
Finland True Finns (2003) 1.6 
France National Front, Movement for France (2002) 12.1 
Greece Popular Orthodox Rally (2004) 2.2 
Italy National Alliance, Northern League (2006) 16.9 
Latvia For Fatherland and Freedom (2006) 6.94 
Luxembourg Alternative Democratic Reform Party (2004) 10 
Netherlands Pim Fortuyn List (2003) 5.9 
Norway Progress Party (2005) 22.1 
Poland Self Defense of the Polish Republic (2005) 11.4 
Slovakia Slovak National Party (2006) 11.73 
Switzerland Swiss People’s Party (2003) 26.7 
 
Public support for immigration control is a measure of public anti-immigration sentiment and is 
used as a rough measure for the popularity for immigration control. The size of the immigrant 
population, immigration flows and fertility rates illustrate demographic characteristics of the host 
state.  
There are several indicators capturing national sympathy for humanitarian ideals 
expressed through humanitarian behavior at the individual and state level. The percentage of a 
state’s World Values Survey population that are members of human rights organizations 
measures the public support for humanitarianism. Indicators of national humanitarian donations, 
and the size of the refugee population demonstrate governmental levels of humanitarianism.  
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Table 4.7 reports the sample characteristics of the independent variables necessary for the 
implementation of the model specified above. Where possible, measures of the independent 
variables have been lagged one year to allow the effect of the determinant to filter through the 
policymaking process and influence the outcome, though the lag does not have a noticeable 
effect on the results. The Pearson’s R coefficients of the correlations between the independent 
variables are reported in appendix N. 
Table 4.7 Independent Variable Sources and Summary Statistics 
Variable Source and definition 
Obs. 
(year) 
Mean S.D. Range 
GDP Eurostat 
27 
(2005) 
105.03 43.62 48.6 – 254.1 
Unemployment Eurostat 
26 
(2005) 
3.51 2.61 0.8 – 11.7 
Social Spending Eurostat; % of GDP 
27 
(2005) 
23.25 5.81 12.4 - 35.5 
Vote share of center 
right party 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
27 
(2006) 
31.79 13.62 5.3 - 64 
Vote share of anti-
immigrant party 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
27 
(2006) 
6.20 7.82 0 – 26.7 
Vote share of left 
party 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
27 
(2006) 
36.31 13.93 7.04 – 59 
Public support for 
immigration control 
European values survey; % 
responding “strict limits” or 
“prohibit people from coming” 
26 
(1999) 
54.71 15.03 24 – 84.7 
Immigrant 
population  
Eurostat; foreign citizens per capita 
27 
(2005) 
0.07 0.09 0.001 - 0.385 
Immigration flows 
Eurostat; immigration flows per 
capita 
27 
(2005) 
0.009 0.008 0 – 0.033 
Fertility rate Eurostat 
27 
(2005) 
1.50 0.24 1.24 – 1.94 
Member of human 
rights organization 
European values survey; % of 
respondents w/ membership 
26 
(1999) 
5.13 8.02 0.1 – 33.3 
Humanitarian 
donations 
Financial Tracking Service; 
donations as % of GDP 
27 
(2005) 
13.85 19.65 0.14 – 75.66 
Refugees per capita UNHCR 
27 
(2005) 
3 3 0.005 – 9.3 
Acceptance rate of 
asylum seekers 
UNHCR; x1000 
27 
(2005) 
0.20 0.16 0 – 0.63 
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4.3 RESULTS 
 
Family immigration policy 
Table 4.8 provides the coefficient estimates with robust standard errors for the cross-
sectional OLS model testing the determinants of inclusive family migration requirements.ii The 
multiple models in table 4.8 contain different specifications of the models substituting in and out 
highly correlated variables (GDP immigrant population, immigration flows – see appendix N). 
 
Table 4.8 OLS Models of Family Immigration Policy with Robust Standard 
Errors 
DV: family immigration 
policy 
1 2 3 4 
GDP 
0.275** 
(0.121) 
  
0.062 
(0.051) 
Unemployment 
0.374 
(1.350) 
-0.037 
(1.401) 
0.194 
(1.386) 
0.487 
(1.397) 
Social spending 
-0.489 
(0.456) 
-0.375 
(0.530) 
-0.156 
(0.598) 
-0.103 
(0.572) 
Center right party vote 
share 
-0.063 
(0.200) 
-0.018 
(0.159) 
-0.012 
(0.226) 
-0.084 
(0.187) 
Vote share of anti-
immigrant party 
-1.176** 
(0.328) 
-0.897** 
(0.385) 
-0.983** 
(0.442) 
-1.146** 
(0.441) 
Liberal party vote share 
-0.240 
(0.181) 
-0.108 
(0.168) 
-0.107 
(0.189) 
-0.149 
(0.197) 
Public support for 
immigration control 
-0.289 
(0.234) 
-0.267 
(0.180) 
-0.249 
(0.230) 
-0.185 
(0195) 
Size of immigrant 
population 
-64.452** 
(27.721) 
-33.874 
(37.110) 
  
Immigration flows 
-816.679 
(734.114) 
 
-106.807 
(507.277) 
 
Fertility 
-21.623 
(14.083) 
-3.313 
(12.347) 
-3.170 
(14.325) 
-8.795 
(14.021) 
Human rights 
organization membership 
0.363 
(0.478) 
0.326 
(0.387) 
0.239 
(0.368) 
0.197 
(0.363) 
Constant 
127.479 
(26.814) 
110.028 
(26.252) 
101.941 
(27.075) 
102.353 
(25.040) 
Observations 26 26 26 26 
R2 0.577 0.463 0.431 0.445 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1  
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The only consistent result with high magnitude from table 4.8 is the negative relationship 
between vote share of the anti-immigrant parties and the outcome of inclusive family 
immigration policy. The size of anti-immigrant party explains policy variance, but how the size 
of the party translates into policy influence is less clear. The most obvious mechanism for how a 
party explains politics relates to whether the party enters a governing coalition. As previously 
mentioned, anti-immigrant parties rarely garner enough support to become necessary players in 
government (Rydgren, 2004).iii How do these parties influence policy? Michael Minkenberg 
(2001) illustrates far right influence on policy through interactions with established political 
parties and agenda setting, even when the radical right captures no legislative power. The results 
presented in table 4.8 confirm Minkenberg’s findings by suggesting support for radical right 
parties matters for policy, regardless of whether the party enters into legislative coalition.  
Interactions between mainstream and peripheral parties appear to be especially significant 
in determining peripheral party policy impact. In situations where mainstream parties maintain 
the pariah status of the anti-immigrant radical right and refuse to cooperate, the size of a radical 
right party will not influence policy (Downs, 2001). However, many European parties are 
weakening in resolve facing consistent pressure from the radical right and a crisis of the current 
party system (Downs, 2001; Minkenberg, 2001). For example, in Austria the radical right 
Freedom Party (FPÖ) achieved a place in the 2000 executive coalition, but the real effects of the 
party at the executive level were marginal. The FPÖ only started to influence policy after the 
breakup of centrist consensus within the twentieth legislative session, which resulted in the 
selective cooperation of the centrist ÖVP and the FPÖ on several issues (Minkenberg, 2001). 
The influence of the FPÖ did not depend on the formal coalition, but on the size of the party and 
whether it was needed to obtain a legislative majority. The Austrian case exhibits the largest 
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impact of the anti-immigrant radical right within the European sample. However, in other cases 
where the radical right has obtained sufficient power to be included in a governing coalition, 
their influence is consistently seen in the passage of policies dealing with “cultural change, a new 
Kulturkampf against the left, its allies and foreigners” (Minkenberg, 2001, p. 18). For example, 
the French case discussed in chapter two illustrates the way an anti-immigrant party can 
influence immigration policy without being included in government or even without a 
particularly large vote share (Minkenberg 2001, Messina 2007, Schain, 2002).  
Figure 4.2 presents the magnitude of the empirical relationship between the radical right 
and family immigration policies, illustrating predicted values of family immigration policies at 
different levels of support for anti-immigrant parties, holding every other independent variable at 
its mean.  
Figure 4.2 Predicted Impact of Anti-immigrant Right Vote Share on Inclusive 
Family Immigration Policy 
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In a country where anti-immigrant parties do not exist, the predicted family immigration 
policy score is 72.9 (see table 4.2). When the vote share of anti-immigrant parties is at the mean 
(6.2), the predicted policy score is slightly more restrictive at 68.7. Finally, when the vote share 
is at the maximum observed value of 26.7, the predicted policy score is 54.7. 
Looking at actual family immigration policy scores by country in table 4.2, the policy 
distance represented by a country with no anti-immigrant party and one with an anti-immigrant 
party vote share of approximately 27% is equal to the policy distance between Spain and Austria 
as they are described in the 2006 MIPEX report.iv Spain’s family migration policy profile is 66% 
of the way to best practice, defined as providing equal rights to nationals and foreigners. In 
Spain, migrants are eligible to sponsor relatives after a year of legal residence if the sponsor has 
a one-year residency permit. Relatives eligible for sponsorship include the spouse or registered 
partner, minor children, and dependent parents and grandparents. Applicants for a family visa do 
not have to pass an integration test or any other integration requirements, but the sponsors do 
meet conditions of sufficient income and accommodation for the family. In comparison, Austria 
is one of the most restrictive countries in the European sample, and their family migration policy 
profile is 34% of the way to best practice. In the EU sample Austria ranks second from the 
bottom for family migration policy inclusiveness, and allows legal residents to sponsor 
immediate family members only once the family members complete integration requirements, 
which can take up to five years. The integration conditions are the least favorable in the full 
sample. 
Table 4.8 illustrates the results for the full sample of 25 EU member states in 2006. 
However, pooling all EU member states into the same sample may be inappropriate due to the 
very different historical experiences with immigration across the EU sample. A Chow test 
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confirms the models in table 4.8 function differently in the reduced sample of the fifteen states 
admitted to the European Union before 2004 (see appendix S). Table 4.9 presents the coefficient 
estimates with robust standard errors for a reduced sample of the first fifteen EU member states, 
most which are historical countries of immigration. v The results serve as a robustness check, 
testing the possibility that any relationships in model one are a product of the unconventional 
sample including traditional countries of immigration alongside newer countries of immigration. 
 
Table 4.9 OLS Models of Family Immigration Policy with Robust Standard Errors, EU 
15 
DV: Family 
immigration policy 
5 6 7 8 9 
GDP 
0.417 
(0.251) 
  
0.221** 
(0.031) 
 
Unemployment 
3.510 
(1.688) 
2.081 
(1.213) 
2.795 
(1.484) 
3.329** 
(1.212) 
2.878 
(1.855) 
Social spending 
2.565** 
(0.642) 
3.042 
(0.613) 
2.766** 
(0.800) 
3.035** 
(0.502) 
1.286 
(1.117) 
Centrist conservative 
party vote share 
-0.626** 
(0.193) 
-0.748** 
(0.143) 
-0.697** 
(0.217) 
-0.717** 
(0.114) 
-0.430** 
(0.158) 
Vote share of anti-
immigrant party 
-2.843** 
(0.453) 
-3.160** 
(0.342) 
-2.670** 
(0.415) 
-3.026** 
(0.278) 
-1.961** 
(0.617) 
Liberal party vote share 
-1.927** 
(0.475) 
-2.354** 
(0.278) 
-1.938** 
(0.399) 
-2.138 
(0.195) 
-1.135** 
(0.310) 
Public support for 
immigration control 
-0.879** 
(0.159) 
-0.731** 
(0.137) 
-0.680** 
(0.191) 
-0.800 
(0.123) 
-0.786** 
(0.225) 
Size of immigrant 
population 
-52.350 
(94.491) 
87.350** 
(15.406) 
  
49.423 
(28.741) 
Immigration flows 
-626.942 
(705.755) 
 
889.864 
(620.928) 
  
Fertility 
-55.135** 
(8.315) 
-59.011** 
(8.876) 
-46.624** 
(17.184) 
-56.909** 
(5.632) 
 
Human rights 
organization membership 
0.084 
(0.277) 
0.436 
(0.210) 
0.547* 
(0.235) 
0.272 
(0.169) 
0.253 
(0.309) 
Constant 
196.142** 
(40.219) 
240.947** 
(20.329) 
199.833** 
(40.665) 
207.990** 
(14.637) 
130.945** 
(36.273) 
Observations 15 15 15 15 15 
R2 0.975 0.949 0.870 0.961 0.789 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1  
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Three models are included in table 4.9 because many of the independent variables are 
correlated. GDP, immigrant stock and immigration flows are all highly correlated (Pearson’s Rs 
above 0.8), and GDP is also correlated with unemployment (Pearson’s R -0.5). (Fertility is 
highly correlated with the unemployment rate (Pearson’s R = -0.5) and the vote share going to 
left-leaning parties (Pearson’s R = -0.6). Social spending and center right vote are also highly 
correlated (Pearson’s R = -0.54), but when either social spending or the center right vote is 
excluded from model six, the results do not change.  
Table 4.9 confirms the primary findings of table 4.8: the size of the anti-immigrant 
radical right influences family immigration policy in both the full and reduced sample. Figure 4.3 
illustrates the added variable plots of the relationship between the vote share of anti-immigrant 
parties and family immigration policy from table 4.8 model one, table 4.9 model two, and for the 
EU member states who joined after 2003. The figure illustrates the steeper and tighter 
relationship between the size of the anti-immigrant right and family migration policies in the 
sample of the original fifteen EU countries compared to that in the full sample. Amongst the 
newer EU countries admitted since 2003, the relationship is not significant.  
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Figure 4.3 Added Variable Plots – Vote Share of Anti-
immigrant Right 
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Table 4.9 exhibits additional significant relationships beyond those from table 4.8. The 
size of the vote share going to left-leaning parties exhibits a significant and negative relationship 
with immigration policy cross-nationally. This finding suggests that countries with strong left-
leaning parties are more likely to pass restrictive immigration policies. In these contexts, it is 
likely that parties on the left or the right will take advantage of an increased electoral mandate by 
increasing immigration requirements. This result affirms research suggesting party convergence 
on immigration restrictiveness since immigration has been politicized in recent years. Parties on 
both sides of the ideological spectrum use immigration and nationalism to draw in voters (Schain 
1990). In addition, public support for immigration control has a negative effect on family 
immigration policy. The European public has generally reacted negatively to the presence of new 
minorities, and immigration has become one of the hottest political topics.vi In countries where 
the political importance of immigration draws the attention of policy makers, it allows an anti-
immigrant public to impact migration policies. This effect remains even after public positions are 
controlled for with the ideological positions of the parties in government. Because centrist parties 
typically do not enter office with binding commitments on immigration, voters cannot align their 
votes with a desired policy agenda (Messina, 1989; Freeman, 1979; Katznelson, 1973). Once a 
party obtains office, it legislates with reference to public preference and the wishes of the 
governing coalition. Though all the findings of model two are not supported in the full sample, 
they do reinforce the finding that politics and party interactions are the primary drivers of family 
immigration policies.  
The results of tables 4.8 and 4.9 are tested for overly influential observations with Cook’s 
distance. In the models in table 4.8, two observations are overly influential: Luxembourg and 
Norway. Excluding Norway from the analysis does not alter the significance of any of the 
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variables included in the model. However, excluding Luxembourg from the analysis causes the 
size of the immigrant population to gain significance across the models. In the full model, the 
size of the immigrant population has a restrictive effect on immigration policy. This relationship 
accords with theoretical expectations predicting the size of the migrant population communicates 
the type of costs immigrants impose on the native population. In the models in table 4.9, three 
observations are particularly influential: Germany, Luxembourg, and Italy. When Luxembourg is 
excluded from the analysis, the center right vote share loses significance, suggesting that this 
relationship in the reduced sample is vulnerable to outliers and is therefore unreliable. 
The results in tables 4.8 and 4.9 and figures 4.2 and 4.3 suggest politics and party 
interactions best explain family immigration policy cross-nationally. This finding corresponds 
with the idea that policy makers are more vulnerable to fear mongering and broad generalizations 
when legislating on an absent or “imaginary” population. As an MP of the center-right Swedish 
Moderate Party explains: “the [radical right Swedish Democrats] expect that people are not 
knowledgeable, and they point at the unknown. it is the same thing that Hitler did with the Jews 
when he claimed that the Jews were responsible for every bad thing in the 1930s” (81, personal 
communication, 4/21/2009). When immigration policies are approached with fearful 
assumptions about the impact of imaginary immigrant populations, the issue is politicized on the 
fringes of the ideological spectrum, and control becomes the main policy prerogative.  
Family immigrant policies 
Family immigrant policies should be a product of ideological and humanitarian 
determinants because they deal with “real” migrants. Table 4.10 provides the OLS coefficient 
estimates with robust standard errors in the model intended to test the power of humanitarian 
explanations for policy against alternative explanations for policy change.  
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Table 4.10 OLS Models of Family Immigrant Policy with Robust Standard 
Errors 
DV: Family immigrant 
policy 
10 11 12  
GDP 
0.342** 
(0.077) 
  
-0.072 
(0.046) 
Unemployment 
0.217 
(1.162) 
-0.214 
(1.238) 
0.019 
(1.494) 
0.158 
(1.527) 
Social spending 
0.703** 
(0.333) 
0.854 
(0.530) 
0.659 
(0.644) 
0.952 
(0.674) 
Centrist conservative party 
vote share 
-0.096 
(0.079) 
-0.078 
(0.137) 
-0.327 
(0.228) 
-0.290 
(0.211) 
Vote share of anti-
immigrant party 
-0.493** 
(0.195) 
-0.191 
(0.389) 
-0.379 
(0.465) 
-0.389 
(0.546) 
Liberal party vote share 
-0.232* 
(0.134) 
-0.075 
(0.139) 
-0.120 
(0.184) 
-0.082 
(0.209) 
Public support for 
immigration control 
-0.678** 
(0.113) 
-0.612** 
(0.148) 
-0.391** 
(0.175) 
-0.380** 
(0.172) 
Size of immigrant 
population 
-36.369** 
(15.582) 
 
-50.159** 
(25.119) 
 
Immigration flows 
-2544.79** 
(460.659) 
-1337.679** 
(415.606) 
  
Fertility 
-22.886** 
(8.942) 
-1.042 
(12.239) 
-7.003** 
(17.723) 
-1.598 
(16.918) 
Human rights organization 
membership 
-0.046 
(0.136) 
-0.108 
(0.309) 
-0.101 
(0.368) 
-0.211 
(0.446) 
Constant 
132.383** 
(14.513) 
109.960 
(21.501) 
114.852** 
(24.238) 
100.697 
(25.506) 
Observations 26 26 26 26 
R2 0.838 0.667 0.499 0.446 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1  
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Contrary to expectations, humanitarianism does not have a significant effect on post 
migration policy (see Appendix U for models including three variants of humanitarianism). This 
finding is surprising. The focus on rights within the immigrant policy outcomes and the role of 
human rights law justifying and protecting family reunification should associate the policy with 
humanitarian explanations. The data does not support this hypothesis. 
Instead, ideological factors are significant immigrant policy determinants. Public support 
for immigration control shares a significant and negative relationship with the policy outcome. 
Unlike the results in table 4.9, public opinion is the only significant political variable in table 
4.10. In table 4.9, the mutual significance of public opinion and the anti-immigrant right suggests 
that xenophobia demonstrated by the public is institutionalized through political parties. In table 
4.10, the same xenophobic public sentiment is significant, but not together with party politics. 
This is probably because immigrant policies deal with “real” migrants. Parties will hesitate to 
adopt clear platforms violating the rights of a visible population for fear of upsetting civil society 
and the public. Therefore the public is the only legitimate political motivator for restrictive 
immigrant policies.  
In table 4.10, the size of the immigrant population demonstrates a significant relationship 
with post entry policy throughout all the models. However, this result is vulnerable to outliers. 
Cook’s distance reveals four countries to be especially influential in the model: Norway, the 
Slovak Republic, Ireland, and Austria. When Austria is removed from the analysis, the 
significance of the relationship between the size of the immigrant population and the outcome of 
family immigrant policies disappears. No other relationships are affected.  
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Table 4.10 also reveals the size of immigration flows to share a significant and negative 
relationship with family migrant policy. This relationship is not vulnerable to outliers and is 
illustrated in Figure 4.4.  
Figure 4.4 Added Variable Plots – Immigration flows 
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This finding suggests countries receiving a large share of immigrants in 2005 also tend to have 
more restrictive immigrant policies. This affirms the suspicion that post-entry immigrant policies 
are perhaps used as a tool of immigration control. Because human rights law strictly forbids 
overt controls on family migration, it is natural that immigrant policies would be the tool used to 
indirectly deter family immigration. 
A chow test examining whether the model explaining immigrant policies functions 
differently for the original fifteen EU member states than it does for the full sample is 
insignificant (See Appendix T). In sum, politics drive both family immigration and immigrant 
policies. However, while institutionalized party politics play the most important role determining 
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family immigration policies, mainstream politics of public opinion are most influential in driving 
immigrant policy.  
4.5. CONCLUSION  
This analysis examines family migration policies as two discrete policy areas where 
immigration policies function as a mechanism of immigration control and immigrant policies 
deal primarily with migrant rights. Politics explains policy variance in both scenarios. However, 
while radical party politics play the most important role determining family immigration 
policies, mainstream politics of public opinion are most influential in describing immigrant 
policy. Size of immigration flows also uniquely describes family immigrant policy. The 
distinction between the determinants of immigration and immigrant policies corresponds with 
the theoretical expectations based on “imaginary” and “real” immigrants. Where immigrants are 
imaginary, policy makers make themselves vulnerable to generalizations and exaggerations 
relating to the unknown immigrant population and endorse xenophobic messages in a party 
platform. Anti-immigrant radical right parties provide the mouthpiece for fear mongering about 
immigrants, giving the radical parties disproportionate policy influence. Alternatively, where 
“real” migrants are concerned, public preference for immigration control and the size of flows 
describes immigrant policy. I speculate party politics are not involved in immigrant policies due 
to the difficulty of convincing parties to adopt a consistently restrictive policy where policy 
targets “real” visible people with tangible needs. In order to pass restrictive immigrant policy, 
political parties need a strong electoral mandate communicated through public opinion to 
overcome the difficulty of withdrawing rights from a visible population. 
Where immigration family migration policies are concerned, policy determinants 
function differently based on the European sample. When all European countries are considered 
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together, only one policy determinant is significant: the size of the anti-immigrant right. 
However, when the sample is limited to the major countries of immigration (the original EU 
fifteen), other determinants become significant, most notably the size of left-leaning parties, and 
the strength of anti-immigrant public opinion. Even in the reduced sample, all the consistent 
policy determinants are political. The same distinction in sample is not evident when it comes to 
immigrant policy. This suggests that immigration policies are more politicized, especially within 
the major countries of immigration. 
In sum, the results partially affirm the hypotheses based on the distinctive nature of 
family immigration and immigrant policy. Though none of the domestic economic or 
demographic costs seem to play a role in describing policy variance, the imperative of 
immigration control represented by the radical right determines immigration policy. Likewise, 
while humanitarianism does not appear to matter for describing immigrant policy, the more 
mainstream ideological position of the public does.  
These findings have important implications for policy change. Because different 
determinants describe immigration and immigrant policies, the path to policy change must be 
adjusted to account for the type of policy. The radical right is the only variable associated with 
restrictive immigration policies. Therefore, changing immigration policy requires the 
neutralization of the radical right. Alternatively, immigration proponents can seek to overcome 
the negative impact of anti-immigrant sensationalism through publicity campaigns intended to 
humanize “imaginary” migrants. By convincing the public that immigrants are still people with 
relatable lifestyles and interests, perhaps they can move the “imaginary” immigrants closer to the 
conceptual category of “reality”. Public opinion is the only determinant consistently associated 
with immigrant policy. To affect a change in resident migrant rights, the general public must be 
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persuaded to favor pro-immigrant policies.  
The research adds to several bodies of literature. It focuses on family migration, which 
has not been sufficiently studied as a phenomenon separate from labor migration. The inclusion 
of family migration as a separate category of analysis is important since family migration is 
empirically distinct from all other forms of migration and constitutes the majority of migratory 
movement. Further, as the results here indicate, additional distinction between immigration and 
immigrant policies are necessary to achieve analytical clarity. A failure to consider immigration 
policy separately from immigrant policy results in the misspecification of the policy decision-
making process and misleading results. 
The research also provides further evidence for the well-established work on intergroup 
contact theory, but extends the theoretical framework to establish the physical presence of the 
outgroup as a necessary condition for the beneficial effects of contact. The work contributes to 
the growing body of literature on the politics of visible and ethnic minorities, which suggests the 
visibility of the immigrant population may be more politically important than the existence of 
immigrants generally. Most research on visible minorities defines “visible” as “ethnic”, and 
theorizes and exclusionary response to migrants that are distinguishable from the national group 
(i.e. Salucci 2009). This research extends the mechanism and to define visible as “real” or 
physically present and re-theorizes by suggesting that a known threat is less politically salient 
than an imagined one. This is not to say that ethnic difference does not matter when it comes to 
forming prejudices against a domestic immigrant population, but merely suggests that there are 
multiple levels of minority recognition.   
The results affirm the importance of politics for both family immigration and immigrant 
policies, reinforcing the general findings of chapters two and three. However, they add nuance 
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by suggesting the distinction between immigration and immigrant policies may explain some of 
the unexpected results, particularly the finding where labor and family migrant rights are not 
determined differently. The findings here suggest that the difference may exist, but only in 
immigration policy. Further investigation is needed once comparable data on labor immigration 
policy is accumulated.  
The most recent changes to family migration policies have occurred within the realm of 
immigration policy. “Integration from abroad” programs have taken integration out of the 
immigrant policy realm and have made integration a task accomplished in the pre-entry phase of 
immigration. The new attention to integration as an immigration requirement raises the question 
of whether these policies maintain a difference from other immigration policies, which makes 
them vulnerable to concerns over societal cohesion rather than impulses of immigration control. 
The next chapter considers immigration policies of integration as a distinct concept to investigate 
the nature of the integration policy determinants. 
                                                
i The fundamental ideology of an anti-immigrant party included in the sample ranges from pure 
immigrant antipathy to immigrants to hardcore nationalism and regionalism. I am aware that the 
measure condenses parties other academics have been at pains to analytically categorize (i.e. 
Kitschelt, 1995, Betz 2002, Morris 2005, Messina 2007). I do not suggest these categorizations 
are not important or useful, but for the purposes of this quantitative evaluation, a careful study of 
the categories is beyond the scope of the project and the data.  
 
ii As mentioned in chapter two, robust regression allows moderate outliers to violate the 
assumptions of OLS regression and be included in the analysis. With such a small number of 
cases, it is important to keep as many observations as possible. 
 
iii For example, in 1999, radical right parties were represented in the Austrian, Belgian, Danish, 
Italian, Norwegian, and Swiss parliaments, but only Italy and Austria included them in 
government coalitions. 
 
iv For country profiles see Niessen, et al., 2007. 
 
v The reduced sample includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK. Both models were 
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examined for the effects of multicollinearity, and where the correlation between two variables 
exceeds 0.5, one of the correlated pair was removed from the analysis. In the full sample, social 
spending and the left vote share, and fertility and unemployment and social spending were all 
highly correlated. In the reduced sample, high correlations exist between fertility and the left 
vote share, and between social spending and the center right vote and the change in immigrant 
population. No model variations correcting for multicollinearity resulted in a change in results. 
 
vi For example, in a 2007 Eurobarometer survey of the 27 member states fifteen percent of 
respondents listed immigration as the one of the two most important issues facing their country. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Know Before You Go: 
The politics of integration from abroad 
 
The previous chapters examine determinants of family migration policies. Previous 
chapters give all family migration policies equal attention and weight. However, not all the 
family migration policies receive the same attention within the political debate. Since the 2003 
EU directive on family reunification was implemented, most of the attention around family 
migration policy change focuses on a specific area:  integration policy. Historically, family 
migration is considered to promote the integration of resident migrant into host states. However, 
current debates over the alleged “failure of integration” have targeted the immigrant family as an 
obstacle to integration. This is because the migrant family is characterized as being a hotbed of 
paternalism, illiberal practices and traditions like forced or arranged marriage (Kofman, Rogoz 
and Lévy 2010).  In response, states are reconsidering their integration strategies as they relate to 
family migrants.  
Until recently, family immigrants in Europe may have had to demonstrate proficiency in 
the host country’s language or take a civic integration class before becoming a citizen of a 
European state. Naturalization is typically only an option after 3-5 years of residence, during 
which time resident immigrants are not required to provide proof of integration. Ultimately, an 
immigrant may choose not to naturalize, in which case the immigrant will have no external 
incentive to integrate into the host country. With foreign nationals representing around eight 
percent of the European population, waiting to integrate immigrants until they make the decision 
to naturalize is no longer a viable option (Rogers, Tillie and Vertovec 2001). In response, the 
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Dutch initiated a program designed to integrate family immigrants before they enter the country. 
France, Germany, and most recently the United Kingdom quickly followed the Dutch example. 
The new “civic integration” or “integration from abroad” policies focus on family migrants and 
require immigrants to demonstrate a pre-determined level of proficiency in the native language 
and take a course or test familiarizing migrants with the culture and politics of their destination 
country. 
The changing integration strategies are an understandable consequence of recent violent 
incidences attributed to poor immigrant integration: the riots in the suburbs of Paris, the 
discovery of homegrown terrorist cells in the UK, Spain and Germany, and a recent rise in 
violent nationalism across Europe. The stated purpose of the integration from abroad policies is 
to better integrate immigrants with an eye towards preventing violence or social unrest. Given 
the universal importance of integrating immigrant groups, why do some states choose to 
implement integration from abroad programs for family migrants while others do not?  
This chapter examines the source of variance in integration strategies for family migrants. 
It makes important contributions towards understanding of the politics of immigration. First, it 
makes a theoretical argument for why integration policy should be considered as a distinct realm 
of policy with unique determinants. Second, it empirically tests the power of competing 
determinants. Third, it identifies a fundamental shift from treating immigrant integration as a 
immigrant policy concern to inserting it as a immigration policy requirement. Finally, it 
discovers that integration policies are not explained by concrete evidence of poor immigrant 
integration, but are instead dominated by politics and ideology. Specifically, the political success 
of the anti-immigrant right and public support for assimilation explain cross-national variance in 
the implementation of integration from abroad programs. While additional research is needed to 
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definitively argue that the integrative performance of immigrants does not indirectly explain 
policy through public opinion, the results suggest ideology is the strongest explanation for 
variance in policies stipulating integration from abroad. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section derives hypotheses by 
distinguishing the politics of integration from the other immigration policies. The subsequent 
section describes the data and estimation procedure. The third section discusses results and 
examines the probability of implementing integration policies at different levels of political and 
ideological strength. The fourth section uses interview evidence to illustrate the debate 
surrounding the use of integration from abroad programs and analyze the implications of the 
findings. The final section concludes.  
5.2. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
Integration policy serves the obvious function of integrating immigrants. The best 
possible scenario for the host society and immigrant groups is for immigrants to become a fully 
functioning member of society. Where integration does not occur, the consequences can be 
severe. A failure to integrate could lead to poverty and discrimination as a consequence of 
unemployment or of the low-level work migrants are obliged to take without speaking the host 
language. Failed integration also condemns future generations of migrant groups, because when 
immigrant families do not speak the local language in the home, the children of immigrants have 
increased difficulty in school (Fertig 2003).  
For the host society, failed immigrant integration is equally serious. It could result in the 
development of a large and impoverished lower class, ghettoization, an increased crime rate, and 
violence. Many nation states have suffered these consequences, the most famous example being 
the 2005 Parisian riots, which drew attention to the ghettoization of immigrant groups in the 
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outskirts of Paris and the high levels of inequality and discrimination suffered by minority 
groups within France (The Economist 2005a). The Parisian riots are especially interesting in 
light of the French Republic’s heavy emphasis on assimilation where immigrants are expected to 
become French, indistinguishable from the native population.  
Homegrown terrorism is also attributed to poor immigrant integration, and the negative 
consequences of failed immigrant integration are used to explain the rise of the anti-immigrant 
radical right and the waves of violence connected to anti-immigrant sentiment. Policy makers try 
to confront the negative effects of poor immigrant integration and poverty in innovative ways. 
Integration from abroad is a possible solution to failed integration: if a state requires evidence of 
integration before a migrant enters the country, the chances for of immigrant success within the 
host society improve without the costs of a poorly integrated resident immigrant population. A 
French minister explains the reasons for adopting integration conditions: “The people arriving in 
France must be better integrated. To often, family reunification is carried out without the family 
having sufficient income or accommodation. Moreover, people who arrive here are often 
uneducated and need French lessons and an introduction to the rights and duties in France. This 
helps them to fully integrate into society and helps their children cope” (10, personal 
communication, 10/7/08). Because integration from abroad programs are implemented to combat 
social problems connected to immigrant integration, concrete indicators of poor immigrant 
integration should be correlated with the imposition of immigration policies requiring evidence 
of integration.  
Changing trends in the demographic structure of the domestic population reveals contexts 
where integration may be an important concern. Problematic demography includes a very large 
or rapidly growing immigrant population. If an immigrant population is large, the needs of the 
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population may overwhelm national resources, and especially those intended to help immigrants 
to integrate into society (i.e. education, health, welfare). Plus, a large population of third country 
nationals increases the visible effects on immigration on society, making the immigrant 
population more vulnerable to accusations of misconduct or political scapegoating. For example, 
when the riots broke out in the Parisian suburbs, the blame for civil unrest was quickly thrown at 
the large suburban population of predominantly Muslim immigrants as the then-interior minister 
Nicholas Sarkozy quickly made the jump from the riots to the need for a selective immigration 
policy (Moore 2005; Maddox 2005; BBC 2005). Even in 2008, ministry officials claim the 
“urban riots happened in part because of insufficient measures to ensure that families arriving in 
France are well-integrated” (10, personal communication, 10/7/08).  In fact, most of the rioters 
were French citizens, but the size and concentration of the immigrant population made them 
vulnerable to accusations of violence (The Economist 2005a). In turn, the association with 
violent behavior makes immigrant groups appear dysfunctional and poorly integrated.  
Of course, large immigrant populations might not matter for integration potential as much 
as the ethnic and religious makeup of an immigrant population. Some scholars have found 
connections between the presence of visible or ethnic minorities and discriminatory outcomes. 
For example, Lapo Salucci finds ethnic diversity has a negative impact on citizen satisfaction 
with local authorities (2009). The same mechanisms of public concern over ethnic heterogeneity 
also apply to integration strategy; if immigrants are distinguishable as “different”, concerns over 
immigrant ability to integrate into the host society should be more pronounced. Where there is a 
large population of non-white immigrants, family migration integration conditions will likely be 
more restrictive. 
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In light of concerns over Islam’s perceived intolerance of liberal democratic values, the 
religious make-up of the immigrant population (and particularly the size of the Islamic 
population) might motivate the degree and type of integration strategy. In particular, the 2006 
Pew survey of “how Westerners and Muslims view each other” reveals a striking integration 
deficit on the part of Muslims in some European societies. In Britain, Muslims stand out as being 
the most negatively disposed towards the native population in the European sample, and almost 
half of the British Muslims surveyed describe a “conflict between being a devout Muslim and 
living in modern society” (Pew 2006). The Pew findings are not isolated; other surveys have 
reached similar results suggesting the ideological chasm between Muslims and non-Muslims is 
deepening (Policy Exchange 2007). Further, increasing concern over incidences of homegrown 
terrorism in Europe leads to an extensive debate about the European failure to integrate their 
Muslim immigrants. As noted by Christian Joppke “this debate is conducted in terms of a 
presumed failure of states to integrate immigrants, with the reverse hope that, by means of 
revamped integration policies, states will eventually solve the problem” (2009, pp. 454-455, 
italics in original). Integration from abroad requirements are presented as a possible state-based 
solution to failed immigrant integration. The visibility and perceived cultural threat of Muslims 
living in Europe suggests family migration integration conditions will be more restrictive where 
there are large Muslim populations. 
While demographic shifts reveal contexts where the consequences of poor integration are 
more serious, states are also concerned with concrete examples of integration failure in the 
education, employment, and cultural sectors. German policy makers have been particularly 
struck by the findings of the 2004 OECD Programme for International Student Assessment, 
which suggest the German school system is failing immigrant children (40, personal 
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communication, 11/21/08). The report identifies Germany as the European country with the 
largest disparity between first and second-generation immigrants (first generation immigrants are 
generally immigrants born in a foreign country, and second generations immigrants are children 
of immigrants born in the host country), where second-generation students lag behind their 
native peers by one and a half proficiency levels (OECD 2004). In response, German policy 
makers suggest integration requirements could help guarantee future educational success by 
encouraging immigrant parents to speak German in the home and to interact with the education 
professionals. They also hope increased immigrant integration would discourage the 
development of immigrant enclaves associated with reduced educational and employment 
success and lower quality of life. As a member of Germany’s Integration Commission in Berlin 
explains: “We have schools were 100% of the children are of a migration background…which 
creates unintended ghettoization. These children sometimes don’t finish school, they achieve 
very low certificates, and they don’t speak good German, even if they have been in German 
schools for ten years... we have children who are born in Germany, they grew up here, and we 
don’t give them a chance to do well in school, to help them with their homework because their 
parents can’t do it because they don’t speak German” (40, personal communication, 11/2108). 
Based on experiences with the educational performance of second and third generation migrants, 
in contexts where the immigrant educational rate is low in comparison to the education rate for 
natives, family migration integration conditions will more likely be implemented. 
Inequality in employment can likewise signal a problem with immigrant incorporation. 
The problem is exacerbated by the perception that immigrants are competitors in the job market, 
and as an increasingly large number of immigrants are unemployed, there are correspondingly 
more and more immigrant laborers looking for work and often willing to take lower wages than 
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native workers (Smith & Edmonston 1997; Coppel, Dumond & Visco 2002). After the Parisian 
riots, one of the most cited pieces of evidence for poor integration was the doubled 
unemployment rate of minority groups living in the outskirts of the city (The Economist 2005b). 
In fact, the Economist identifies mass unemployment as the motivating factor in the riots: “It is 
here, not in esoteric disputes over different modes of assimilation, integration, or 
multiculturalism, that the biggest differences between France and countries such as America and 
Britain are to be found. Over the past decade the British and the American economies have 
generated impressive growth and plenty of new jobs; the French economy has failed on both 
counts” (The Economist 2005b). Where immigrants are unemployed at levels disproportionate to 
native workers, policy makers will consider civic integration programs to make immigrants more 
employable even before they enter the host state.  
Naturalization is heralded above other indicators as the symbol of complete integration 
into a host society because the immigrant aligns his interests, rights and responsibilities with 
those of the host society (Howard 2009). Naturalized immigrants are more likely to become 
socially and economically integrated than those who remain non-citizens (Hansen 1998). Though 
more research is needed to empirically link citizenship with improved integration, citizens are 
widely accepted as a member of society, have better command of the national language, feel 
more loyalty to country, and enjoy protections such as the right not to be deported. 
Naturalization rates can therefore be used as a rough measure of integration. Where 
naturalization rates are low, the success of integration is suspect, creating a need for revised 
integration strategy, perhaps through integration conditions. 
Finally, the dominant ideology of integration influences the degree and type of 
integration expected from immigrant groups. Assimilationist nations expect immigrant groups to 
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achieve an element of “similarity or likeness” to the host culture (Brubaker 2001). In the most 
aggressive form, assimilation requires immigrants to surrender their ethnic identity in favor of 
the national identity of the host nation. The objective of assimilation is the preservation of a 
culture and national identity, including a specific body of ideas defining a nation, its members, 
goals, core values, territory, and relations with other nations (Ravitch 1997). True assimilation is 
unidirectional, requiring outsiders to change while the native population does not change at all. 
The only responsibility of the native group in a purely assimilative society is the acceptance of 
the assimilating group (Teske and Nelson 1974). Assimilation is often associated with aggressive 
turn-of-century programs seeking to assimilate people against their will.
i
 However, assimilation 
can also be applied abstractly, requiring similarity only in some very important respects. Most 
modern European societies enforce some form of abstract assimilation, and are experiencing 
what Brubaker (2001) calls a “return to assimilation” through the implementation of integration-
focused policies. The integration from abroad programs certainly fall under the category of 
assimilation, since the obligation of cultural and linguistic adjustment completely falls on the 
shoulders of the immigrant before they enter the country. Where a public is more accustomed to 
or supportive of ideas of assimilation the policies will be more focused on integrating immigrants 
linguistically or culturally, even before their arrival in the host state.  
The integration literature leads to the following hypothesis: In contexts where the signs 
and symbols of immigrant integration are favorable, integration policies will more likely be 
implemented. However, it is possible that the policies might be the product of concerns beyond 
integration. Joppke suggests that by making integration a pre-entry prerogative, policy makers 
have “transmuted [integration policy] into a tool of migration control, helping states to restrict 
especially the entry of unskilled and non-adaptable family migrants” (Joppke 2007, p.5). If 
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controlling migration is the motive behind implementing integration from abroad programs, the 
policies could be determined by domestic economic, demographic, and political conditions. 
Chapters two and three discuss the conditions associated with controlling migration, and 
indicators of all the conditions associated with immigration control must be included in a model 
explaining integration policies as control variables. 
5.2 ESTIMATION 
Measuring integration policies 
The objective of this chapter is to explain the variance between countries in their 
implementation of integration from abroad policies, to determine whether integration policies are 
motivated by different concerns than other policies governing migrants before they enter a host 
state. Integration policies are measured with an index is made up of the 2006 MIPEX indicators 
measuring whether migrants must take an integration test, if an integration course is necessary 
for migration and the requirement and difficulty of a language assessment. Table 5.1 illustrates 
the coding of the index components. A country receives a score of three within each policy area 
if they impose a mandatory or difficult integration condition, a two if they impose a voluntary or 
simple integration condition, and a one if there is no integration condition required. The resulting 
index measures the presence and restrictiveness of integration requirements for a family migrant 
before entry into a host country.  
Table 5.1 Integration Policies for Family Migrants 
Score 3 2 1 
Passing of integration test Yes  No 
Imposition of integration 
course 
Conditional for 
status 
Voluntary None 
Language assessment 
Written and/or 
high level 
language test  
Simple, oral, 
multiple-choice 
interview or test 
None 
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The original index ranges in value from three to nine across European states, but has been 
recoded by subtracting three from the index score to create an ordinal measure of integration 
policies ranging from zero to six. Table 5.2 lists the integration policy scores for the European 
states.  
Table 5.2 Integration Policy Scores 
Austria 6 Greece 0 
Denmark 6 Hungary 0 
Norway 5 Ireland 0 
France 4 Italy 0 
Latvia 4 Lithuania 0 
Switzerland 4 Luxembourg 0 
Netherlands 3 Malta 0 
Finland 2 Poland 0 
Slovak Republic 2 Portugal 0 
Belgium 0 Slovenia 0 
Cyprus 0 Spain 0 
Czech Republic 0 Sweden 0 
Estonia 0 UK 0 
Germany 0   
Obs. Mean S.D. Range 
27 1.33 2.09 0 - 6 
 
To test whether the isolated integration policies are uniquely motivated, they are recoded 
into dichotomous dependent variables where one indicates the use of integration provision, and 
zero its absence. The dichotomous variables and their summary statistics are presented in table 
5.3. The imposition of an integration course is not considered as an individual policy because too 
few countries have implemented the policy at this point. 
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Table 5.3 Individual Integration Policies 
Variable Obs. (2006) Mean S.D. Range 
Integration test 27 0.333 0.480 0 - 1 
Language assessment 27 0.222 0.424 0 - 1 
 
The empirical model 
The primary dependent variable of this analysis is an index of integration policy 
indicators. The makeup of the index as a count of policy provisions means the index is a count 
variable measuring the number of discrete events (policy). As indicated in table 5.2, the most 
countries have no integration policies. This gives the data a skewed distribution towards zero, 
which means the variable measures a “rare event”. A normal distribution does not fit the 
distribution of a rare event well. Instead, the distribution of the data in table 5.2 is much closer to 
a Poisson distribution. A Poisson model fits a Poisson distribution, but it assumes that the 
variance in the number of events is equal to the mean (Hoffman 2004). The integration policy 
index violates this assumption. The integration index is “extra-dispersed”, because the variance 
of the integration variable (4.37) is greater than the mean (1.33). The extra dispersion means an 
ordinary Poisson model is not appropriate for the data, and suggests the use of an over-dispersed 
Poisson model or a negative binomial regression model. An over-dispersed Poisson model 
assumes that the events measured in the dependent variable occur independently. Because the 
policies making up the index are not independent and often occur together for reasons that are 
not included in the model of policy determinants (ex. a number of policy reforms might be 
passed at the same time for convenience sake), a negative binomial regression model is most 
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appropriate for predicting the number integration measures adopted for a country’s family 
migrants (Hoffman 2004). The literature on integration policy and policies of immigration 
control suggests negative binomial model with the following specification:  
Probability of implementing integration policy = f(immigrant population, immigration flows, 
non-white foreign population per capita, Muslim population per capita, education ratio, 
unemployment ratio, naturalization rate, public support of assimilation, GDP, unemployment, 
social spending, fertility, vote chare of center right, vote share of anti-immigrant right, public 
support for immigration control)  
 
The same indicators will be used to fit probit models predicting the probability of a country 
adopting a single integration policy represented by the dichotomous policy indicators.  
This model incorporates measures of the total non-white foreign population per capita 
and the percentage of Muslims present within the host population to indicate the visual 
integration capacity of a country’s immigrants. It includes measures of immigrant naturalizations 
per capita, the foreign/native unemployment ratio and the foreign/native education ratio to 
measure practical integration into the work force. Public support for assimilation is measured 
through aggregate agreement with the statement “For the greater good of society it is better if 
immigrants do not maintain their distinct customs and traditions but take over the customs of the 
country” among World Values Survey respondents (WVS, p. 345).  
Table 5.4 reports the sample characteristics of the independent variables measuring the 
context and reality of immigrant integration. The Pearson’s R coefficients of the correlations 
between the independent variables are reported in Appendix V. The sample characteristics of 
variables associated with a cost-benefit calculus of migration control are detailed in earlier 
chapters (see tables 2.3 or 4.7). 
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Table 5.4 Integration Independent Variable Sources and Summary Statistics 
Variable Source and definition 
Obs. 
(2005) 
Mean S.D. Range 
Non-white 
population per 
capita 
Eurostat 20 0.022 0.017 0.0003 – 0.0521 
Muslim 
percentage of 
population 
CIA Factbook 26 3.58 4.30 0.1 - 18 
Foreign vs. 
native education 
ratio 
OECD stat 21 0.906 0.353 0.537 - 2.120 
Foreign vs. 
native 
unemployment 
ratio 
OECD stat 21 1.70 0.68 0.21 – 3.14 
Naturalization 
rate 
Eurostat 26 0.002 0.002 0.0001 – 0.009 
Public support 
for assimilation 
World values survey; % 
responding 
“immigrants…take over 
the customs of the 
country” 
26 57.846 14.377 22.7 - 82.1 
 
5.3 RESULTS 
Predicting integration policy counts 
Table 5.5 provides the coefficient estimates with robust standard errors in the negative 
binomial model predicting the number of integration policies implemented by a country. Because 
the data is not complex enough for the full model, the number of explanatory variables 
considered simultaneously must be limited. In order to select variables to be included in the 
model, the policy determinants relating to immigration control are all included in a separate 
model, and F tests are used to determine which variables made a significant contribution to the 
descriptive power of the model. The only significant additions to the model predicting 
immigration control are the percentage of votes going to the center right, the percentage of votes 
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going to the anti-immigrant right, and the indicator of public support for immigration control 
(see Appendix U for the results of the negative binomial model testing only the indicators 
predicting immigration control, and for the F test statistics). Considering the findings of previous 
chapters, the survival of these three political indicators is unsurprising. Because the size of the 
immigrant population, immigration flows the unemployment ratio, and naturalization rates are 
highly correlated, they are considered in separate models.  
Table 5.5 Negative Binomial Models of Integration Policy Score 
DV: Integration policy 
index 
1 2 3 4 
GDP   
0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.013 
(0.025) 
Center right vote share 
-0.042 
(0.042) 
-0.031 
(0.037) 
-0.024 
(0.041) 
-0.058 
(0.036) 
Vote share of anti-
immigrant parties 
0.132** 
(0.045) 
0.140** 
(0.048) 
0.138** 
(0.062) 
0.192** 
(0.072) 
Public support for 
immigration control 
-0.011 
(0.026) 
-0.010 
(0.025) 
0.024 
(0.038) 
-0.104 
(0.084) 
Size of immigrant 
population 
-4.297 
(4.592) 
   
Immigration flows  
-45.341 
(54.034) 
  
Non-white population per 
capita 
2.840 
(27.313) 
8.181 
(24.580) 
 
27.710 
(55.145) 
Muslims percentage of 
population  
0.075 
(0.186) 
-0.014 
(0.119) 
0.070 
(0.081) 
-0.009 
(0.304) 
Immigrant/native education 
ratio 
-1.675 
(1.513) 
-1.440 
(1.531) 
0.261 
(0.012) 
-5.385 
(3.995) 
Immigrant/native 
unemployment ratio 
  
0.546 
(0.652) 
 
Naturalization rate    
-924.438 
(668.181) 
Public support for 
assimilation 
0.059** 
(0.015) 
0.070** 
(0.012) 
0.061** 
(0.011) 
0.106** 
(0.047) 
Constant 
-1.960 
(3.951) 
-3.056 
(3.702) 
-7.685 
(6.682) 
5.780 
(8.300) 
Observations 19 19 20 19 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1 
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  Table 5.5 reveals two consistently significant determinants of integration policies: the 
vote share won by anti-immigrant parties and public support for assimilation. The positive 
relationship between the vote share of the radical right and the imposition of integration policies 
suggests legislatures pass a greater number of integration policies as anti-immigrant parties win 
more votes. Figure 5.1 presents the expected policy score based on the vote share won by anti-
immigrant parties, while holding all other independent variables at their mean. 
Figure 5.1 Predicted Integration Policy Score Based on the Anti-immigrant 
Party Vote Share 
 
 
Clearly the effect of anti-immigrant right parties is dramatic. As the vote share increases 
from two to twelve percent, the expected count of integration policies increases from zero to six 
(the maximum possible value). According to this count estimate, countries with anti-immigrant 
parties capturing more than twelve percent of the vote share should exhibit the most 
comprehensive integration policies. Looking at the table of the vote shares won by European 
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anti-immigrant parties in table 5.6, we see that Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, and 
Switzerland all experience anti-immigrant parties winning more than twelve percent of the vote.  
Table 5.6 Anti-immigrant Parties Winning Vote Shares in Last National Legislative 
Elections, 2006 
Country Radical right party Vote share 
Austria 
Freedom Party of Austria, 
Alliance for the Future of Austria (2006) 
15.15 
Belgium Flemish Interest (2003) 11.6 
Denmark Danish People's Party (2005) 13.2 
Finland True Finns (2003) 1.6 
France National Front, Movement for France (2002) 12.1 
Greece Popular Orthodox Rally (2004) 2.2 
Italy National Alliance, Northern League (2006) 16.9 
Latvia For Fatherland and Freedom (2006) 6.94 
Luxembourg Alternative Democratic Reform Party (2004) 10 
Netherlands Pim Fortuyn List (2003) 5.9 
Norway Progress Party (2005) 22.1 
Poland Self Defense of the Polish Republic (2005) 11.4 
Slovakia Slovak National Party (2006) 11.73 
Switzerland Swiss People’s Party (2003) 26.7 
 
Looking back at table 5.2 we see that five of these countries fall within the top six 
countries with the most comprehensive integration policies. The only country where an anti-
immigrant party wins more than twelve percent but that doesn’t implement any of the integration 
policies is Italy. However, the lack of a relationship between the anti-immigrant right and 
integration policies in Italy is most likely due to the difficulties of coalition-building or winning 
a majority vote in a legislature with sixteen political groups active on the national stage. With a 
few notable exceptions, the anti-immigrant right is clearly associated with the imposition of 
integration requirements.  
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 Public support for assimilation also has the effect of increasing the number of integration 
policies implemented by a European state. The relationship is illustrated in figure 5.2. The 
relationship between support for assimilation and integration policies is irregular compared to the 
relationship between the vote share of anti-immigrant parties, and only exhibits a consistently 
positive effect once over sixty percent of the population expresses support for assimilation. In 
other words, once a super majority believes immigrants should give up their native cultures in 
favor of the culture in the host country, the number and difficulty of integration policies 
skyrocket.  
 
Figure 5.2 Predicted Integration Policy Score Based on Public 
Support for Assimilation 
 
 
According figure 5.2, countries with over seventy-two percent of the population 
supporting assimilation should also exhibit the most comprehensive integration policies. Table 
5.7 illustrates the percentage of survey respondents who agree that it is better if immigrants do 
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not maintain their distinct customs and traditions but take over the customs of the host country, 
and also lists the integration policy score for the same country. Austria, Germany, Denmark, and 
France all have populations where over seventy-two percent of respondents support assimilation. 
Austria, Denmark and France also implement large packages of integration policies. The only 
country with a very assimilative population and no integration policies is Germany. However, 
immediately after the policy data was collected in 2006, the German legislature decided to 
implement a language requirement and additional integration policies are being considered.  
Table 5.7 Support for Assimilation and Integration Policy Score 
Country 
Public support for 
assimilation 
Integration policy 
score 
Austria 82.1 6 
Germany 77.8 0 
Denmark 76.6 6 
France 73.7 4 
Belgium 71.9 0 
Netherlands 70.3 3 
Slovenia 69.2 0 
Czech Rep 68.9 0 
Finland 67.3 2 
Hungary 64.9 0 
Sweden 63.7 0 
Lithuania 60.6 0 
Slovak Rep 59.8 2 
Norway 55.1 5 
UK 55.1 0 
Poland 53 0 
Latvia 52.9 4 
Portugal 52.6 0 
Spain 48 0 
Estonia 47.5 0 
Malta 44.5 0 
Ireland 43.2 0 
Switzerland 42.1 4 
Italy 40.3 0 
Luxembourg 40.2 0 
Greece 22.7 0 
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Because the specification in Table 5.5 is necessarily limited, the models might fall victim 
to omitted variable bias. To test the sensitivity of all the consistent results presented above, other 
indicators for domestic costs and integration were swapped into the model to provide fullest 
specification possible. Appendix W reveals the results for the negative binomial model including 
only indicators associated with the cost-benefit analysis of migration. In this restricted model, 
only the political indicators describe variance in integration policies. These results echo the 
significant determinants of family immigration policy found in chapter four. However, the public 
opinion indicator never gains significance in the full model including indicators of integration.  
Appendix X presents the results for negative binomial models including only the 
indicators of integration. When the indicators of political conservativism are excluded from the 
model, other measures of integration do exhibit significant relationships with the dependent 
variable of integration policies. Most notably, the immigrant/native unemployment and education 
ratios are significant, though the education ratio loses its significance when both ratios are 
included in the same model. The relationships correspond with theoretical expectation, where a 
disproportionate unemployment rate among immigrants leads to the imposition of policies, while 
a disproportionate number of educated immigrants is associated with fewer policies. The results 
suggest that practical integration could be having an impact on the number of policies 
implemented, but once political conservativism is accounted for, the effect of immigrant 
integration is washed out in favor of ideological ones. 
Predicting the probability of individual integration policies 
The analysis in table 5.5 and figures 5.1 and 5.2 describe an index of integration policies, 
and don’t distinguish between particular policy integration policy agendas. However, all 
integration policies may not be driven by the same concerns. For example, policies requiring 
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immigrants to demonstrate language proficiency could be especially driven by a concern about 
immigrant ability to function in society since language forms the basis of human interaction. 
Alternatively, an integration test may be largely symbolic, making it more vulnerable to political 
or ideological considerations. Table 5.8 contains the results of the probit models examining 
determinants of the individual integration policies. Because there are so few countries with the 
individual integration policies, the specification of the models is very limited, and variables with 
missing data must be avoided.  
Table 5.8 Probit Models of Integration Policy 
DV:  
Integration 
test 
Integration 
test 
Language 
assessment 
Language 
assessment 
Center right vote share 
-0.063 
(0.044) 
-0.063 
(0.043) 
-0.019 
(0.039) 
-0024 
(0.052) 
Vote share of anti-immigrant 
right 
0.130** 
(0.045) 
0.127** 
(0.044) 
0.121** 
(0.058) 
0.132* 
(0.078) 
Public support for immigration 
control 
0.034 
(0.022) 
0.036* 
(0.019) 
0.049 
(0.039) 
0.061* 
(0.035) 
Size of immigrant population 
7.982 
(5.437) 
 
9.678 
(7.478) 
 
Muslims percentage of 
population  
0.016 
(0.147) 
0.025 
(0.154) 
0.105 
(0.145) 
0.193 
(0.213) 
Naturalization rate  
277.73** 
(126.15) 
 
509.405** 
(163.143) 
Public support for assimilation 
0.053 
(0.034) 
0.050 
(0.035) 
0.083** 
(0.033) 
0.095** 
(00.043) 
Constant 
-5.399** 
(2.209) 
-5.478** 
(2.343) 
-10.437** 
(4.358) 
-12.925** 
(5.224) 
Observations 25 24 25 24 
R
2
 0.58 0.60 0.50 0.63 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1 
note: Cyprus, Luxembourg and occasionally Malta are excluded from the analysis due to 
missing data. GDP and immigration flows are controlled for in further iterations of the 
model, and did not change the results. 
 
 Table 5.8 reveals interesting nuances to the results presented in table 5.5. The vote share 
won by the anti immigrant right significantly increases the probability of a country implementing 
both integration tests and language assessments. Figure 5.3 illustrates the predicated probabilities 
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that a country will implement either an integration test or a language assessment, based on the 
vote share received by the anti-immigrant right and holding all the other policy determinants at 
their means.  
Figure 5.3 Predicted Probabilities that a Country Will Implement an 
Integration Policy, Based on the Vote Share Received by the Anti-
immigrant Right 
 
 
The anti immigrant right has a stronger effect on the imposition of an integration course than it 
does on whether an immigrant’s language ability is evaluated before they can enter the host state. 
The average anti-immigrant party vote share among the country sample is 6.3. Looking at the 
figure, a country where the anti-immigrant wins 6.3 percent of the vote has a fifteen percent 
probability of implementing an integration course. That probability increases dramatically, 
however, when an anti-immigrant party wins between seven percent of the vote share and fifteen 
percent. Once an anti-immigrant party receives fifteen percent of the vote share, the probability 
of adopting an integration course increases from forty percent up to ninety-five percent when the 
anti-immigrant party receives 26.7 percent of the vote ( as in Switzerland). 
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 The relationship between the anti-immigrant right and the imposition of a language test is 
slightly less dramatic. The probability that a state will impose a language test exceeds ten percent 
only when the anti-immigrant right captures more than eleven percent of the vote. The 
probability of adopting a language requirement stays stable until the vote share won by the anti-
immigrant right exceeds fifteen percent, at which point it steadily climbs until there is a seventy-
five percent probability that a country will implement a language test when the support for the 
radical right exceeds twenty-five percent.  
Clearly the anti immigrant right exerts an important influence on the probability that 
integration policies are passed. The relationship can be explained through the simple dynamics of 
coalition building: the anti-immigrant right will always vote for any policy reducing the number 
of resident immigrants or preventing additional immigrants from migrating. As the vote share of 
the right increases, the radical right is better positioned to influence policy in coalition. At any 
rate, the radical right appears to be very important for implementing policies relating to 
immigrants. 
 The naturalization rate also increases the probability of imposing integration test and a 
language assessment. The positive relationship is surprising, considering the theoretical 
expectation that increased integration evidenced by naturalization would reduce the need for 
additional integration measures. In this case, the number of naturalizations per capita probably 
captures much of the effect of the size of the non-European immigrant population. While the 
immigrant population measures all resident individuals who are not citizens in the host country, 
the naturalization rate only captures those individuals who chose to become a citizen of the 
European nation. Most likely, EU citizens with the freedom of movement and the right to work 
within any EU state will not feel the need to naturalize in their host state. Therefore, the majority 
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of naturalizations will be of immigrants from outside the European Union, allowing the 
naturalization rate to serve as a proxy for the size of the extra-EU immigrant population. 
Immigration from outside the European Union is considered to be more costly to European 
nation states due to economic inequality and cultural differences between the sending and host 
state. This would explain the positive relationship between naturalization and the integration test 
or language assessment: naturalization is serving as a proxy for the number of resident 
immigrants from outside the EU, and as the size of the immigrant stock from outside the EU 
grows, integration policies will be more restrictive. 
 Finally, public support for assimilation is the only significant indicator that distinguishes 
between the integration course and the language requirement. As a population expresses 
increasing support for assimilation, the probability that a country will implement an language 
assessment increases. The connection between assimilation and language is natural, since the 
language forms the basis of most nationalistic movements (Barbour and Carmichael 2000) and 
language acquisition can safely be identified as the foundation of integration. Meanwhile, 
assimilation does not increase the probability that a state will require migrants to complete an 
integration course. This could be because the course does not necessarily require the immigrant 
to change himself (remember, unidirectional change by the migrant is a primary feature of 
assimilation) – he need only attend the course. Learning a language requires the direct 
participation of the migrant in a way that course attendance does not.  
Figure 5.4 illustrates the predicted probability that a country will implement a language 
requirement based on public support for assimilation.  
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Figure 5.4 Predicted Probability that a Country Will 
Implement a Language Requirement, Based on Public 
Support for Assimilation 
 
 
The figure illustrates how the majority of the population must support assimilation for the 
public preference to translate into policy. Before the idea of assimilation acquires the support of 
fifty percent of the population, there is no empirical link between support for assimilation and the 
implementation of a language test. However, once half of the population supports assimilation, 
the relationship between assimilationism and language policy grows quickly.  
In sum, the importance of the anti-immigrant right is a consistent policy motivator for all 
the integration policies considered here. Support for assimilation exerts a consistently significant 
effect on collective integration policies, but especially on the probability of a state adopting a 
language requirement. These results confirm the findings in previous chapters, and show that 
integration policies are also a product of politics. 
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5.4 THE POLITICS OF INTEGRATION POLICY 
 The relevance of politics for integration extends beyond the determinants of policy, as the 
integration conditions have been widely debated across the European countries. Debates over the 
merits of integration from abroad policies were in full swing during fieldwork conducted in 
France, Germany, and Sweden in 2008 and 2009. In France, a 2007 law had already 
implemented integration from abroad requirements. All family migrants between 16 and 64 years 
of age have to pass a language test that verifies their knowledge of French and migrants must 
sign an integration contract. Germany also implemented a language test in 2007. At the time of 
fieldwork, a bill requiring family immigrants to learn Swedish was being debated in the 
parliament (the bill has since been rejected). In all contexts, the imposition of integration 
requirements and especially the imposition of a language test is criticized as an underhanded 
restriction on the right to family migration, and therefore a violation of the human right to family 
life. In particular, the application of a language tests violates the principles of human rights 
through its discriminatory nature, the time commitment required, and costs imposed on achieving 
the right to live with one’s family. 
 The language tests are considered to be the “most socially selective condition” for family 
migrant entry (Kraler 2010). The tests favor more educated (and in some instances, computer 
literate) migrants, and the tests themselves are available only in a relatively small number of 
embassies. Applicants from countries without an embassy and from a lower socio-economic 
background are at an immediate disadvantage. Even immigrants in countries with embassies face 
substantial barriers to family migration. For example, if a female immigrant from Turkey is 
attempting to join her family in Germany, she is required to demonstrate basic proficiency in 
German before being issued a family visa. To do this, she must obtain certification from the 
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Goethe Institute. Turkey is a sizeable country of 300,000 square miles. In all that space, there are 
three Goethe institutes: one in Ankara, one in Istanbul, and one in Ismir (www.goethe.de). All 
three of these cities are in the northwestern quadrant of the country. Of course, not all Turkish 
immigrants to Germany come from these three cities, so fulfilling the language requirement 
involves a trip of potentially hundreds of miles. There is a fee to take the test or the course, the 
cost of lodging, the cost of taking time off work, and if the family is conservative, a young 
woman must have an escort. Costs are dramatically increased if the woman is responsible for 
children and must arrange short or long-term care. Clearly, individuals of low income will be 
unable to afford the language test. 
 There is also more explicit discrimination built into the language requirements due to 
exemptions for certain nationalities. As the head of the Human Rights Policy Department at the 
German Institute for Human Rights explains “The language requirement is discriminatory 
because there are exceptions for Americans, Japanese, or for other people coming from countries 
where their migration might be an economic gain for Germany. You also have exceptions for 
skilled workers and their families” (38, personal communication, 11/20/08). Similar exemptions 
apply in the French case. The selective application of the language requirement reinforces the 
socio-economic bias built into the policy agenda.  
 Fulfilling the integration requirements takes a significant amount of time. As a lawyer 
working for a German non-profit defending the right to family explains, “In our experience most 
[immigrants] need six months to learn the language and get their certificate…For others it takes 
much longer. In some countries you cannot learn German without having knowledge of other 
languages because of the Latin-based writing. One of the Goethe Institute’s terms is that it is 
better if you speak a little bit of English, then you can come to us and learn German. If you have 
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no education in your own language, or if you have only spent a few years in school, you are not 
literate in the alphabet. So, in Egypt for example, the Goethe Institute sent us a mailing saying 
‘Such a person must learn how to write in their own Arabic language, and then they have to learn 
a little bit of English, and then they can learn German’…After all this, then you have the 
certificate, and with the certificate you can ask for permission to go to Germany. Then the 
German authorities (the embassy and the foreign office here in Germany) look rather strictly at 
this person, their forms, documents, and so on. All this is after getting the certificate, and it takes 
an additional three to six months (43, personal communication, 12/2/08).  
Proponents of integration requirements counter that the benefits of immigrant integration 
for society outweigh any inconveniences to the individual migrant. In France, Germany, and 
Sweden, policy makers go beyond discussing the advantages of integration for society, and 
justify the difficult burden of the integration policies with humanitarian arguments. Policy 
makers are particularly concerned about forced marriage in the context of immigrant families. By 
increasing the costs of family migration, the states are discouraging forced marriage and are 
protecting women’s rights. Further, policy makers argue that requiring all family migrants to 
learn the language of the host-society will give at-risk immigrant women a voice, should they 
find themselves in a situation of forced marriage or abuse within the host country. In this way, 
they pit one human right (the right to family) against another (the rights of women), and insist 
that the rights of women in dire situations take precedence over the right to family, or they at 
least must be balanced. As an interview subject in the German Ministry of the Interior explains, 
“we have two reasons for this [integration] requirement. One is integration and the other is 
preventing forced marriages. Then you have the human right to decide about your own sexuality, 
to choose your marriage partner, and to be free of bodily harm. So you have these different 
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constitutional rights fighting with each other and we just put them in proportion. It’s not that we 
work towards a minimum standard, we just really try to make it so that it all works out.” (39, 
personal communication, 11/21/08).  
However, the claim to be protecting women does not convince the opponents of the 
integration requirements. As a representative of the EKD (the political branch of the Protestant 
Church) explains: “This raises the issue of proportionality and commensurability in Germany.  
Here every measure by the state must be both proportional and commensurable.  This has three 
levels 1) the measure must be by the smoothest means – there should not be a heavy burden 2) it 
must be a measure that addresses the goal – it must be suitable. 3) you must take account of the 
various rights affected.  We say, new policy might be suitable for forced marriages because of 
course if you make the person speak and they come and have certain amount of words to cry out 
for help, of course it helps them.  So, it’s suitable.  Also, perhaps they will stop bringing young 
girls because of these requirements.  It could have a preventative effect.  However, there are are 
other ways to do this.  For example, you could have an integration course with the aspects of 
women’s and family rights and this would enable people to cry out for help.  The third issue is 
that this affects all people who are happily married, and therefore it violates the third principle 
and is not proportional as a whole” (51, personal communication, 12/16/08). 
 Finally, there are debates over the effectiveness of the integration requirements, and 
whether they actually improve immigrant integration. In the course of fieldwork, nearly every 
organization opposing the language requirement brought up the lack of evidence illustrating that 
these measures will actually improve immigration, and emphasized the benefit of immersion for 
learning a language. For example, an expert in family reunification at the Red Cross in Sweden 
said “there is no research to prove that these [language] policies will be good for integration, but 
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our experience at the Red Cross shows that that there is research to prove that having one’s 
family with them is good for integration.” Clearly, further research on the outcomes of 
integration from abroad policies is required. 
 In sum, the importance of the political debate does not stop once policy is passed. 
Integration from abroad policies and especially the language requirements have generated 
extensive debate across European contexts. While proponents of the policy use a future of 
improved immigrant integration and a policy environment discouraging forced marriage to 
justify barriers to open family migration, opponents argue the integration requirements are 
discriminatory and that the temporal and monetary costs impose an illegal violation of the right 
to family life.  
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The objective of this chapter is to examine why some states have passed integration from 
abroad requirements and others haven’t. Based on assertions made by policy makers during 
fieldwork, the recently introduced integration policies are intended to help immigrants integrate 
and to rectify societal problems associated with poor immigrant integration. The objective of the 
polices lead to the expectation where countries with troubled integration experiences will be 
most likely to implement new integration strategies. In fact, no indicators of a problematic 
context for integration are consistently significant predictors of integration from abroad policies. 
Instead, ideological and political factors best explain integration policy variance. Specifically, 
public support for assimilation and the vote share received by the anti-immigrant radical right 
and are the most consistent predictors of integration policies. Public support for assimilation 
appears to play a particularly important role in predicting the probability that a state will 
implement a language requirement.  
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The relationship between assimilation and integration policy is not theoretically 
surprising. Assimilation expects immigrants to adapt and become like their host culture, and any 
policy encouraging adaptation would be encouraged by individuals having assimilationist 
preferences. However, the results here cannot tell us why the individuals favor assimilation. It’s 
possible that the hypothesis may be confirmed through an indirect relationship where poor 
immigrant integration makes the native population more assimilationist, and that public opinion 
influences policy. More research testing the individual-level determinants of support for 
assimilation will reveal whether the integration conditions indirectly influence integration policy 
or whether support for assimilation is an indicator of other preferences like immigration control 
or xenophobia. 
The relationship between the radical right and integration policies is less intuitive than 
the finding for assimilation. The agenda of anti-immigrant parties is to stop immigration 
altogether. Integrating immigrants is not usually a feature of the anti-immigrant party agenda. 
Most likely the support for anti-immigrant parties is capturing a general environment of anti-
immigrant sentiment. An anti-immigrant context will favor restrictive policies for immigrants, 
despite whether they are policies of entry, control, or integration. Ultimately, both significant 
variables emphasize the importance of politics for integration policies.  
Interviews conducted with individuals involved in the family migration policy debate 
reveal the continuing concern over integration requirements. The discriminatory nature of the 
policies orients them towards selective admission, while the costs imposed on immigrants is 
perceived as an indirect violation of the right to family life. The use of forced marriage to justify 
the restrictions on family migration is viewed as a political tool, and the lack of evidence 
suggesting the policies do anything to promote integration or discourage forced marriage makes 
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the effectiveness of the policy highly suspect. The opponents of the family migration policies 
agree with Christian Joppke (2007) when he argues “the shared feature of civic integration is that 
liberal goals are pursued with illiberal means, making it an instance of repressive liberalism” (p. 
1). In other words, policy opponents believe the integration requirements are merely an extension 
of a larger agenda of immigration control. The use of integration conditions allows control-
focused legislators get around the human rights law prohibiting overt control of family 
migration. The results of the statistical models support claims that integration policies are a 
mechanism of immigration control, since the radical right is exclusively control-focused. The 
motive of control suggests that integration polices are not distinguishable from other immigration 
policies, leading this chapter to confirm the general finding of this dissertation: politics and 
political maneuvering rule when it come to implementing family migration policies.  
                                                
i
 These kinds of policies were more common in the early 1900s, referring for example to the forced assimilation of 
Native Americans in the US. Such policies have been widely criticized as being morally and politically problematic, 
and have furthermore been shown to be relatively ineffective. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Conclusions 
 
The objective of this research is to explain variance in family migration policies. The 
dissertation is structured around a deductive logic, starting with a general research question and 
breaking the results down into more specific and nuanced questions in the following chapters. 
The first empirical chapter considers a large body of family migration policies with a 
comprehensive policy index. Chapter three compares labor and family migrant rights. Chapter 
four examines the difference between policies governing migrant entry into a host state and those 
granting rights after a migrant is already a resident. Chapter five examines a specific area of 
policy: policies of “integration from abroad”. The many different examinations of family 
migration policy come to a similar conclusion: family migration policy is exclusively driven by 
politics. The following chapter revisits the findings and presents the implication of the research 
for international and domestic politics. Academic implications are discussed as an assessment of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the research. 
6.1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 The human-rights foundation of family migration ought to make family reunification 
policies function differently than other forms of migration. However, in chapter two the link 
between humanitarianism and family migration policy is not supported in the cross-national data 
after controlling for outliers. Instead, politics overwhelm humanitarian considerations to serve as 
the primary explanation of family migration policies. More specifically, contexts with a far right 
party in the legislature results are far more likely to have more restrictive family migration 
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policies. Countries with high public support for immigration control are also more likely to have 
restrictive policies.  
 The low magnitude of humanitarianism in explaining variance in family migration policy 
provokes the question of whether family migration is different from other forms of migration. 
Conservative politics are the only consistent explanation for policy variance. Conservative 
politics should have a restrictive influence on all migration policies because the prioritization of 
nationalism, citizenship, and cultural conservativism within conservative parties all results in a 
restrictive immigration policy preference regardless of whether the migrant comes for reasons of 
family or labor. Chapter three uses data on immigrant rights to explore whether variance in 
family immigrant policy is determined differently than variance in labor immigrant policy. It 
finds very little to distinguish the determinants of labor and family migrant rights. Public support 
for immigration control is the only consistent explanation for both types of policy. However, it is 
too soon to conclude all labor and family migration policies fall prey to the same concerns 
because the dependent variable for labor immigrant policy only measures rights. Policies 
governing immigrants after they enter the country (immigrant policies) may be explained by 
different politics and domestic determinants than policies governing immigrant entry 
(immigration policies).   
 Chapter four picks up the investigation of the difference between immigration and 
immigrant policies. Immigration policies govern immigrants who have not yet arrived in the host 
country, and all the costs and benefits associated with the group are unknown to the native 
population. The imagined nature of the immigrant groups should subject them to generalizations 
and exaggerations, making them more vulnerable to mechanisms of immigration control. 
Immigrant policies relate more to rights and privileges of immigrant groups already resident in 
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the country. These immigrants are easily identified and are real to the native population. 
Therefore, policies governing them should be most vulnerable to ideological concerns relating to 
how a country interprets their obligations to third-country nationals or to human beings in 
general. The results suggest that variance in pre and post entry policies are both primarily 
explained by political considerations, but in different ways. Politics of the anti-immigrant right 
dominate immigration policies, because politicians are susceptible to fear mongering and 
generalizations from the anti-immigrant right and public opinion when dealing with an imaginary 
population. Family immigrant policies are described by public opinion alone. Most likely, 
domestic constraints imposed by legislating on a real and identifiable population restricts the 
range of responses from policy makers, and therefore makes immigrant policies vulnerable to 
general public concerns.  
However, not all immigration policies are politicized in the same way. In recent years, 
policies of “integration from abroad” for family migrants have been the most publicly debated 
family migration policies. Chapter five explores variance in the application of integration 
policies to try and understand why some states implement the policies while other do not. 
Because the policies are aimed at improving immigrant integration, they should be more likely to 
be implemented in contexts where immigrant groups are poorly integrated. Instead, the results of 
statistical analysis and interview evidence suggest that variance in pre-entry integration policies 
are better explained by radical politics and ideology, and function much like the other 
immigration policies.  
In sum, the results of all chapters suggest politics overwhelm explanations of domestic 
conditions or humanitarianism in describing variance in family migration. The findings are 
especially interesting as the small number of cases in the statistical analyses predisposes the 
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models against results. Given the limitations in the data, any finding reveals a relationship of 
high magnitude. Nevertheless, the relationship between restrictive family migration policy and 
conservative politics in the form of radical right parties and public opinion holds across all 
chapters and through hundreds of iterations of the statistical models.  
Based on interview evidence, individuals working within European governments are 
hesitant to acknowledge the influence of radical parties or potentially xenophobic public opinion. 
This reticence is natural, since the radical right and xenophobia are illiberal and anti-democratic. 
However, hesitancy to acknowledge the importance of the radical right does not make its policy 
effect any less real. Further, the importance of public opinion does not mean other considerations 
are not playing a role in national immigration policy formation. Within each country and over 
time, political parties and public opinion should interact with a host of political actors and 
domestic considerations before resulting in a final policy package. This project cannot comment 
on domestic rigors of policy making, but only concerns itself with explanations of policy 
variance from a cross-national comparative perspective. In Europe, conservative politics is the 
most significant determinant of rights-based migration policy. 
6.2. IMPLICATIONS 
 The results of this dissertation offer several important implications for international and 
domestic politics. The implications come from the main findings of the research, but also relate 
to the non-findings.  
The radical right 
 The demonstrated importance of politics for explaining variance in family migration 
policy is a major coup for the growing European anti-immigrant right. The results suggest the 
radical anti-immigrant right is very successful in influencing family migration policies. This 
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result contributes to the growing body of literature suggesting fringe parties can have legislative 
influence even without achieving a sizeable vote share in national elections. Countries with 
proportional representation are particularly susceptible to the radical rights because of the rigors 
of achieving consensus and coalition building (Kitschelt 1995).   
The dissertation results validate the existence of radical right parties as political actors. 
However, radical right parties present a dilemma to many modern democracies because they 
often endorse undemocratic ideologies. The parties are publicly treated as ‘pariahs’ by the 
traditional party establishment, largely due to their rejection of the principles of human equality 
based on criteria like nationality, race, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic, or personal attributes. 
The clear violation of equality makes the rejection of the radical right a “democratic 
responsibility” (Downs 2001; Bale 2003). 
Despite the ‘pariah’ branding, mainstream parties have adopted strategies for dealing 
with radical parties, varying from complete isolation to legislative cooperation (Downs 2001; 
Bale 2003). Even with variance in strategies for dealing with the radical right, the objective of 
the centrist parties is the same: neutralize the far right. This objective is the result of two 
motivations. The first simply keeps votes away from the radical right to ensure the survival of 
the centrist party. The second eliminates anti-democratic elements from the elected body. For 
those who want to protect democratic society from undemocratic elements, the results of this 
project present a warning: cooperation and co-optation is not working. The radical right is not 
watered down, and instead it is achieving great success in explaining incidents of restrictive 
policy 
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Public opinion  
Public support for immigration control is a consistently significant predictor of restrictive 
family migration policies. This finding provides evidence that the democratic relationship 
between the people and policy is in good working order, and policies tend to correspond with 
public sentiment. However, the democratic nature of the finding is challenged by why the public 
supports immigration control. A person might favor immigration control for a number of rational 
reasons. For example, an individual feeling economically threatened by the presence of 
immigrants would support controlling immigration flows. However, once the actual economic 
threat is controlled for, the public support for immigration control should likewise lose 
significance. This is not the case in the models controlling for economic conditions in the host 
country. Further, economic threat should not extend into post-entry policies, which do not 
concern employment or supply and demand. The consistent relationship between support for 
control and every immigration policy area suggests something more abiding than a logical cost-
benefit analysis of migration is driving the preference for control. Immigrant antipathy is a good 
candidate, because a xenophobic individual will usually support any policy that stops 
immigration or reduces advantages given to immigrant groups.  Preliminary individual-level 
research on the public opinion indicators suggests xenophobia does consistently and strongly 
contribute to a preference for immigration control. If xenophobia is the most consistent predictor 
of restrictive immigration and immigrant policy does not convey a hopeful message about the 
effects of democracy or the progress of human society. Xenophobia can only be overcome with 
long-term socialization and re-education. 
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Economics? 
 Perhaps the most surprising finding is the lack of a relationship between economics and 
family migration policy. One of the most common arguments against immigration relates to the 
assertion that immigrants negatively affect the economy. One would therefore expect struggling 
economies or countries with vulnerable economic institutions to have the most restrictive 
policies. However, none of the data support a consistent relationship between economics and 
immigration policy outcomes in comparative perspective. Policy makers are not passing 
restrictive policies in the economic contexts where restriction makes the most economic sense. 
Nevertheless, case study reveals continued use of economic arguments by politicians in 
relatively healthy economies. Opponents of immigration probably use economic arguments all 
the time, regardless of whether their country’s economy is more or less vulnerable than those of 
neighboring countries. Using an economic argument to encourage immigration control can 
provide a rational excuse for a xenophobic reaction against immigrants, which would explain the 
continued use of economic slogans like “British jobs for British workers” while public opinion 
and radical parties remain the most significant policy motivator. 
The implication of the non-relationship between the economy and immigration policy 
suggests economic changes will not alter the climate around family migration and labor and 
family migrant rights. Therefore, there is no point in waiting for the economic situation to 
change before pushing for immigration policy changes; proponents of inclusive policy should not 
be cowed by economic arguments. Those desiring more inclusive family migration policies 
should devote their attention to changing public perception, and once they do, they should push 
for policy change without delay or concern for economic costs. 
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International law? 
Family immigration policy is set apart from other policies of migration, because family 
reunification is recognized in multiple international conventions and national constitutions as a 
human right. Logically, countries illustrating high levels of respect for human rights should more 
readily accept the sanctity of the family. However, the link between humanitarianism and family 
immigration policy is not supported in the data. Similarly, humanitarianism does not predict the 
implementation of immigrant rights for labor and family migrants. Instead, politics overwhelm 
humanitarianism. This is not great news for idealists who argue human rights law should 
override national law without reference to domestic conditions. There is a silver lining for these 
idealists, however. Because family migration policies respond to public opinion, human rights 
advocates should focus their attention on the local culture. Continued reference to logic and law 
will not make the same policy impact as convincing the public that human rights are important. 
If public opinion can be swayed in favor of human rights, international law and humanitarianism 
may have a chance at survival. Without it, democratic nation states will ignore human rights 
whenever the political survival of the politicians or political parties is at stake. 
The dissertation findings also present an opportunity to legally enforce human rights law. 
The results identify the radical right and public opinion as the best explanations for family 
migration policy, and both political factors appeal to an underlying logic of immigration control: 
The platform of anti-immigrant parties is oriented around a policy preference for reducing the 
flow of foreigners into national territory, and the indicator of public opinion expresses an 
overwhelming preference for severely restricted or stopped immigration flows. In sum, 
restrictive family migration policy is motivated by a desire to control immigration flows, making 
these policies purposefully indirect mechanisms of family migration control. The focus on 
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immigration control offers hope for the eventual enforcement of international law. In both 
Germany and France, the constitutional courts overturned immigration policies attempting to 
stop family migration because they went against constitutional protections of the right to family 
life. Logically then, the current policies should fall under previous precedent declaring attempts 
to control family migration flows as illegal. Based on this logic, the current policies and 
especially the family immigration policies should be legally invalidated. This research provides 
the empirical basis for opening a legal argument against restrictive family migration policies. 
6.3. ASSESSMENT 
Strengths 
This dissertation provides robust findings and serious implications for domestic and 
international politics, it also contributes to the existing literature in four ways: 1) it examines 
family migration, which has not been widely distinguished as a unique subject of study, 2) it 
groups existing theories of immigration policy into an evaluative framework of humanitarian, 
economic, political, and demographic policy motivators, 3) it uses multivariate analysis to 
examine general trends across cases (a relatively unique approach compared to the heavy 
reliance on case analysis and narrative in the immigration policy literature), and 4) it uses fresh 
data to examine policy provisions in quantitative models. Until recently, there were no sources of 
comparative policy data relating to family migration policy. The Migration Research Group and 
British Council have taken the first steps towards implementing a regular survey for policy 
evaluation with MIPEX, and this study is one of the first academic works to empirically test the 
validity of the index and make use of the index.  
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Weaknesses  
Though the findings reveal important cross-national European trends when it comes to 
family migration policy formation, two caveats are in order. The first caveat relates to the cross-
sectional nature of the models and the relatively small number of cases, which focus on a 
snapshot of time from 2005-2006 within the European Union. Though the independent variables 
are lagged in an effort to allow policy pressures to filter through the policy system, the data do 
not allow the statistical models to illustrate the important determinants of policy formation over 
time. Issue framing, timing, elections, or crisis points might be particularly important in policy 
making, especially as politics are shown to be the most important explanation for cross-national 
variance in family migration policy. The insignificant determinants in cross-sectional models of 
2006 policy might become significant in a study of policy development taking temporal factors 
into account. Study over time might also reveal further nuance in the political mechanisms of 
family migration policy making.  
This dissertation lays the groundwork for focused case study over time because it 
illustrates the most important factors in policy making and identifies the desirable characteristics 
for case selection in a quasi-experimental design. Up to this point, research on immigration has 
been dominated by case studies selected with personal or political bias. This research quantifies 
the research inquiry and makes it less vulnerable to bias by pointing out important but perhaps 
unexpected contexts for inquiry. For example, Poland and Switzerland should be used to better 
demonstrate the causal story of how labor and family migrant policy agendas differ because 
these cases are important outliers: In Poland, labor migrant rights are restrictive and family 
migrant rights are inclusive, and in Switzerland family migrant rights are restrictive while labor 
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migrant rights are more inclusive (see Figure 3.1). Similarly, France and Ireland are outliers in 
the examination of the difference between family immigration and immigrant policy (see Figure 
4.1). Both cases should be examined through qualitative case study to illustrate the mechanisms 
of why and how family immigration and immigrant policy differ. Within each of these cases, the 
statistical models suggest particular focus on the political environment surrounding the politics 
of immigration. Without the statistical analysis, the importance of these cases would be 
unrecognized, and the case study would not have the appropriate direction.  
 A second caveat concerns the national level of analysis. Many important policy dynamics 
occur at a sub-national level, and especially within cities (Garbaye, 2005; Ireland, 2008; Rogers, 
Tillie & Vertovec 2001). The policy importance of many demographic variables might depend 
on the immediate environment where immigrant or Muslim populations are disproportionately 
large. For example, certain districts in Berlin, Germany are completely populated by third 
country nationals, and in France, immigrants are especially concentrated in the suburban rings 
around Paris. The concentration of minorities in these areas leads to policy initiatives at the 
municipal level to confront problems associated with integration, ghettoization, etc. At the 
national level, these important factors are washed out. The findings presented here do not suggest 
the alternative theories are incorrect, but merely assert that in a cross national sample, political 
characteristics pull the most weight in describing family migration policy outcomes.  
This dissertation focuses on Europe. However, the results and implications extend to 
other developed democratic nation states. In Europe, immigration and immigrant integration are 
politically salient issues. In other contexts where the topic of legal immigration is not widely 
debated, the relationship between fringe parties, public opinion and an immigration policy 
outcome might not show up. However, the same mechanisms leading from political parties and 
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public opinion to policy should apply with any similarly important political issue. If a special 
topic is important enough to threaten the established party system through the rise of a fringe 
party or through massive public discontent, policy co-optation by the centrist parties should 
occur, resulting in some surprising policy outcomes. In sum, in contexts where an issue reaches 
the same level of political saliency as immigration has in Europe and where the institutions allow 
radical elements to gain an electoral foothold, political extremism and public opinion should 
exert similarly restrictive policy effects.  
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Appendix A Size of foreign population in select European countries, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000-2008 (thousands)  
  1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria .. .. 677.061 701.768 728.769 745.19 752.676 772.88 795.169 802.682 832.331 867.837 
% of total 
population 
.. .. 8.41% 8.65% 9.06% 9.22% 9.27% 9.46% 9.67% 9.71% 10.03% 10.41% 
Belgium 846.482 904.528 909.769 861.685 846.734 850.077 860.287 870.862 900.473 932.161 971.448 .. 
% of total 
population 
8.59% 9.07% 8.97% 8.41% 8.23% 8.23% 8.29% 8.36% 8.59 8.84 9.14 .. 
Czech 
Republic 
.. .. 158.617 200.951 210.794 231.608 240.421 254.294 278.312 321.456 392.315 437.565 
% of total 
population 
.. .. 1.54% 1.96% 2.06% 2.27% 2.36% 2.49% 2.72% 3.13% 3.80% 4.20% 
Denmark 116.951 160.641 222.746 258.629 266.729 265.424 271.211 267.604 270.051 278.096 298.49 320.188 
% of total 
population 
2.29% 3.12% 4.26% 4.84% 4.98% 4.94% 5.03% 4.95% 4.99% 5.12% 5.47% 5.83 
Finland 17.034 26.6 68.566 91.074 98.577 103.682 107.003 108.346 113.852 121.739 132.708 143.256 
% of total 
population 
0.35% 0.53% 1.34% 1.76% 1.90% 1.99% 2.05% 2.07% 2.17% 2.31% 2.51% 2.70% 
France .. 3596.602 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3541.82 .. .. 
% of total 
population 
.. 6.34% .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.75% .. .. 
Germany 4378.9 5342.532 7173.9 7296.8 7318.628 7335.593 7334.753 6738.681 6755.821 6755.811 6744.879 6727.619 
% of total 
population 
7.18% 8.45% 8.78% 8.88% 8.90% 8.90% 8.89% 8.17% 8.19% 8.20% 8.20% 8.19% 
Source: OECD.Stat, stats.oecd.org 
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Appendix A Size of foreign population in select European countries, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000-2008 (thousands) continued 
  1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Greece .. .. .. 304.617 355.758 436.781 472.835 533.36 553.061 570.57 643.066 733.598 
% of total 
population 
.. .. .. 2.79% 3.25% 3.98% 4.29% 4.82% 4.98% 5.12% 5.75% .. 
Hungary .. .. 139.887 110.028 116.429 115.888 130.109 142.153 154.43 166.03 174.697 184.358 
% of total 
population 
.. .. 1.35% 1.08% 1.14% 1.14% 1.28% 1.41% 1.53% 1.65% 1.74% .. 
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 219.296 .. .. .. 413.223 .. .. 
% of total 
population 
.. .. .. .. .. 5.60% .. .. .. 9.76% .. .. 
Italy 423.004 781.138 729.159 1379.749 1448.392 1549.373 1990.159 2402.157 2670.514 2938.922 3432.651 3891.295 
% of total 
population 
0.75% 1.38% 1.28% 2.41% 2.52% 2.70% 3.46% 4.17% 4.59% 5.03% 5.83% 6.56% 
Luxembourg 97.9 113.05 138.05 164.7 166.72 170.7 177.759 183.705 191.328 198.259 205.889 215.509 
% of total 
population 
26.70% 29.41% 33.44% 37.75% 37.76% 38.26% 39.50% 40.37% 41.48% 42.26% 43.24% 44.55% 
Netherlands 552.5 692.4 725.4 667.802 690.393 699.954 702.185 699.351 691.357 681.932 688.375 719.494 
% of total 
population 
3.81% 4.63% 4.69% 4.19% 4.30% 4.33% 4.33% 4.30% 4.24% 4.17% 4.20% 4.37% 
Norway 101.5 143.299 160.837 184.337 185.863 197.668 204.731 213.303 222.277 238.305 266.26 302.977 
% of total 
population 
2.44% 3.38% 3.69% 4.10% 4.12% 4.36% 4.49% 4.65% 4.81% 5.11% 5.65% 6.35% 
Source: OECD.Stat, stats.oecd.org 
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Appendix A Size of foreign population in select European countries, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000-2008 (thousands)  
  1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Poland .. .. .. .. .. 49.221 .. .. .. 54.883 57.548 60.431 
% of total 
population 
.. .. .. .. .. 0.13% .. .. .. 0.14% 0.15% 0.15% 
Portugal .. 107.767 168.316 207.607 360.815 423.788 444.641 469.138 432.022 437.124 446.333 443.102 
% of total 
population 
.. 1.09% 1.71% 2.03% 3.50% 4.08% 4.26% 4.46% 4.09% 4.13% 4.21% 4.17% 
Slovak 
Republic 
.. .. 21.873 28.801 29.418 29.491 29.196 22.251 25.563 32.13 40.904 52.545 
% of total 
population 
.. .. 0.41% 0.53% 0.55% 0.55% 0.54% 0.41% 0.47% 0.60% 0.76% 0.97% 
Spain .. .. .. 1370.657 1977.946 2664.168 3034.326 3730.61 4144.166 4519.554 5268.762 5598.691 
% of total 
population 
.. .. .. 3.40% 4.86% 6.45% 7.22% 8.74% 9.55% 10.26% 11.74% 12.28% 
Sweden 388.641 483.704 531.797 472.35 471.344 469.801 452.76 457.771 457.494 485.946 518.249 555.385 
% of total 
population 
4.65% 5.65% 6.02% 5.32% 5.30% 5.26% 5.05% 5.09% 5.07% 5.35% 5.67% 6.02% 
Switzerland 939.7 1100.262 1330.574 1384.382 1419.095 1447.312 1471.033 1495.008 1511.937 1523.586 1570.965 1638.949 
% of total 
population 
14.52% 16.39% 18.90% 19.27% 19.64% 19.87% 20.04% 20.23% 20.33% 20.36% 20.80% 21.43% 
United 
Kingdom 
1731 1723 1948 2342 2587 2584 2742 2857 3035 3392 3824 4196 
% of total 
population 
3.06% 3.01% 3.36% 3.98% 4.38% 4.36% 4.60% 4.77% 5.04% 5.60% 6.27% 6.83% 
Source: OECD.Stat, stats.oecd.org 
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Appendix B. Interview directory 
Interview 
No. 
Country Position Organization/Institution Date 
1 France expert 
Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifique 
9/3/08 
2 France civil society 
GISTI - Groupe d'information et de 
soutien des immigres 
9/9/08 
3 France expert 
Centre Nationale de la Recherche 
Scientifique  
9/11/08 
4 France expert Science Po 9/16/08 
5 France government 
Institut National d'Etudes 
Demographiques 
9/22/08 
6 France government 
ASSFAM - Association Service 
Social Familial Migrants 
9/30/08 
7 France government Ministère de l'interieur 10/1/08 
8 France policy expert Siences Po 10/2/08 
9 France government 
Direction de la Recherche, des 
Etudes, de l’Evaluation et de la 
Statistique, Min of Health 
10/6/08 
10 France government 
Ministère de l'immigration, de 
l'intégration, de l'identité nationale et 
du développement solidaire 
10/7/08 
11 France government 
l'ascé:  L'agence nationale pour la 
cohesion social et l'egalite des chance 
10/8/08 
12 France government 
l'ascé:  l'agence nationale pour la 
cohesion social et l'egalite des chance 
10/8/08 
13 France civil society Femmes de la Terre 10/8/08 
14 France civil society CIMADE  10/9/08 
15 France policy expert 
Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifique 
10/10/08 
16 France civil society 
SSAE - Soutien, Solidarite et Action 
en faveur des immigres 
10/13/08 
17 France civil society Secour Catholique 10/14/08 
18 France civil society 
LICRA:Ligue Internationale Contre le 
Racisme et l'Antisémitisme 
10/20/08 
19 France civil society 
CNAFAL: Conseil National des 
Associations Familiales Laïques 
10/21/08 
20 France government 
ANAEM: L’Agence Nationale de 
l’Accueil des Etrangers et des 
Migrations 
10/21/08 
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Appendix B. Interview directory, continued 
Interview 
No. 
Country Position Organization/Institution Date 
21 France expert La Sorbonne 10/21/08 
22 France government 
Ministère du travail, des relations 
sociales, de la famille, et de la 
solidatire 
10/22/08 
23 France government 
Ministère de l'immigration, de 
l'intégration, de l'identité nationale 
et du développement solidaire 
10/22/08 
24 France policy expert The American Uniersity of Paris 10/22/08 
25 France civil society 
GISTI - Groupe d'information et de 
soutien des immigres 
10/28/08 
26 France government 
Commission des Recours des 
Réfugiés 
10/30/08 
27 France civil society 
ATMF: Association des 
Travailleurs mahgrebins de France 
10/30/08 
28 France government 
l'ascé:  l'agence nationale pour la 
cohesion social et l'egalite des 
chance 
10/30/08 
29 France government 
Ministère de l'immigration, de 
l'intégration, de l'identité nationale 
et du développement solidaire 
10/31/08 
30 France civil society 
DIEM:  Droit Immigration 
Magrehb Europe 
10/31/08 
31 France civil society SOS Racisme  10/31/08 
32 France civil society 
ACORT: L'Assemblée Citoyenne 
des Originaires de Turquie 
11/3/08 
33 Germany civil society Caritas 11/5/08 
34 Germany civil society Pro Köln 11/9/08 
35 Germany expert 
WZB: Social Science Research 
Center Berlin 
11/10/08 
36 Germany expert Osnabrück University 11/17/08 
37 Germany expert Institut für Politikwissenschaft 11/19/08 
38 Germany civil society 
The German Institute for Human 
Rights 
11/20/08 
39 Germany government 
Ministry of the interior - MI3 
foreigners law division 
11/21/08 
40 Germany government Integration Commission 11/21/08 
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Appendix B. Interview directory, continued 
Interview 
No. 
Country Position Organization/Institution Date 
41 Germany civil society ARiC Berlin 11/21/08 
42 Germany government 
Hamburg Ministry of Social and 
Family Affairs, Health and Consumers 
Protection 
11/24/08 
43 Germany civil society 
IAF: Der Verband binationaler 
Familien und Partnerschaften, Verein 
für bi-nationale Paare 
12/2/08 
44 Germany government 
Federal Institute for Population 
Research - Min of Interior 
12/3/08 
45 Germany government Stabsabteilung für Integrationspolitik  12/4/08 
46 Germany civil society German-Turkish Forum 12/5/08 
47 Germany civil society 
Öffentlichkeit Gegen Gewalt (Köln) 
E.V. 
12/9/08 
48 Germany government 
Institut für Arbeitsmarkt-und 
Berufsforschung 
12/10/08 
49 Germany government 
Federal Ministry for Migration and 
Refugees 
12/10/08 
50 Germany civil society Papatya 12/15/08 
51 Germany civil society EKD: Evangelical Church in Germany 12/16/08 
52 Germany expert 
German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs 
12/17/08 
53 Germany civil society Diakonie 12/17/08 
54 Germany government Green party 12/18/08 
55 Germany expert 
WZB: Social Science Research Center 
Berlin 
2/18/09 
56 Germany expert 
Institute for Migration Research and 
Intercultural Studies 
2/19/09 
57 Germany government Commission on Migration to Germany 2/24/09 
58 Germany government Green Party 2/27/09 
59 Sweden civil society 
The Raoul Wallenberg Institute of 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law  
3/17/09 
60 Sweden expert University of Lund 3/18/09 
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Appendix B. Interview directory, continued 
Interview 
No. 
Country Position Organization/Institution Date 
61 Sweden government 
Minister for Migration and Asylum 
Policy, Ministry of Justice 
3/25/09 
62 Sweden civil society Immigrant-institutet 3/23/09 
63 Sweden government Ministry of Justice 3/25/09 
64 Sweden civil society FARR 25-Mar 
65 Sweden government Swedish Migration Board 3/30/09 
66 Sweden government Ministry of Justice 3/31/09 
67 Sweden government Ministry of Justice 3/31/09 
68 Sweden government Ministry of Justice 3/31/09 
69 Sweden expert Växjö universitet 4/2/09 
70 Sweden civil society Social Mission 4/6/09 
71 Sweden civil society 
Global Migration and Gender 
Network 
4/7/09 
72 Sweden expert Stockholm University 4/8/09 
73 Sweden civil society Svenska kyrkan 4/10/09 
74 Sweden civil society Temaasyl 4/10/09 
75 Sweden civil society 
LO: Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation 
4/15/09 
76 Sweden government Green party 4/16/09 
77 Sweden civil society Caritas 4/17/09 
78 Sweden civil society Red Cross, Sweden 4/18/09 
79 Sweden civil society Mångkulturellt centrum 4/19/09 
80 Sweden government Left party 4/20/09 
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Appendix B. Interview directory, continued 
Interview 
No. 
Country Position Organization/Institution Date 
81 Sweden government Conservative moderate party 4/21/09 
82 UK expert King's College 5/5/09 
83 UK expert 
London School of Economics, 
migration advisory committee 
5/5/09 
84 UK civil society Institute for Race Relations 5/6/09 
85 UK expert University of Sheffield 5/12/09 
86 UK civil society Institute for Race Relations 5/13/09 
87 UK expert University of Edinburgh 5/21/09 
88 UK expert 
The Centre on Migration, Policy and 
Society 
5/21/09 
89 UK civil society Equal Rights Trust 6/2/09 
90 UK government Home Office 6/3/09 
91 UK government Home Office 6/10/09 
92 EU government European Parliament, France 3/3/09 
93 EU government European Parliament, Germany 3/3/09 
94 EU expert Institute of European Studies 3/6/09 
95 EU 
EU 
government 
Immigration Unit, European 
Commission 
3/9/09 
96 EU expert University of Kent at Brussels,  3/10/09 
97 EU expert Migration Policy Group 3/10/09 
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Appendix C. Family migration policies for third country nationals 
Score 1 2 3 
Eligibility 
Eligibility for sponsor/legal resident  ! 2 years of legal residence and/or holding a 
permit for ! 2 years  
> 1 year of legal residence and/or 
holding a permit for > 1 year  
" 1 year of legal residence and/or 
holding a residence permit for " 1 
year  
Eligibility for the sponsor’s spouse and 
registered partner 
Age limits (minimum or maximum age) and/or 
integration or other conditions apply  
Spouse only Both. No conditions apply 
Eligibility for minor children Application must be lodged before the age of 15 
of minor or other conditions apply 
Children must be unmarried  No conditions apply 
Eligibility for dependent relatives in 
the ascending line  
Not allowed Certain conditions (other than 
dependency) apply  
Allowed  
Eligibility for dependent adult children Not allowed Certain conditions (other than 
dependency) apply 
Allowed 
Conditions for Acquisition of status 
Integration Measures 
Passing of integration test Yes   
Imposition of integration course Conditional for status Voluntary None 
Language assessment Written and/or high level language test (ex. A2, 
B1, B2, C1, C2) 
Simple, oral, multiple-choice interview 
or test (takes into account abilities of 
individual TCN) 
None 
Content of integration assessment With cultural aspects (culture, customs, traditions) With social aspects (knowledge of 
legal/political system, citizenship rights, 
basic norms/values) 
None 
Other conditions 
Accommodation requirement Further requirements Appropriate accommodation meeting 
health and safety standards 
None 
Economic resources requirement Stable and sufficient resources for sponsor and 
dependents 
Employment related criteria None 
Length of application procedure > 9 months or no regulation on maximum length > 6 " 9 months " 6 months  
Costs of application and/or issue of 
permit or renewal 
Any higher costs or prerequisites at high indirect 
costs (for ex. Medical records, degrees and their 
translation) 
Administrative fee as charged for issue 
of identity card 
None 
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Appendix C. Family migration policies for third country nationals (continued) 
Score 1 2 3 
Security of status 
Duration of validity of permit < 1 year renewable permit or new application 
necessary 
! 1 year renewable permit but not equal to 
sponsor’s 
Equal to sponsor’s residence permit 
and renewable 
Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or 
refusing to renew status:  
 
Grounds include: a. Public policy or security 
major threat.b. Proven fraud in the 
acquisition of permit (inexistent relationship 
or misleading information). c. Break-up of 
family relationship (before three years) 
Grounds include the break-up of a family 
relationship (before three years) 
No other than a. Public policy or 
security major threat or b. Proven 
fraud in the acquisition of permit 
(inexistent relationship or misleading 
information). 
 
Before refusal or withdrawal, due 
account is taken of (regulated by law) :     
No elements Any but not all of the following: a. Solidity 
of sponsor’s family relationship 
b. Duration of sponsor’s residence 
c. Existing links with MS and (non-existing 
links with country of origin) 
All of the following: a. Solidity of 
sponsor’s family relationship b. 
Duration of sponsor’s residence 
c. Existing links with MS and (non-
existing links with country of origin) 
Legal guarantees and redress in case of 
refusal or withdrawal 
 
One or both reasoned decision and right to 
appeal are not guaranteed 
At least reasoned decision and right to appeal Status confers a reasoned decision, a 
right to appeal and representation 
before an independent administrative 
authority and/or court 
Rights associated with status 
Right to autonomous residence permit 
for partners and children reaching age 
of majority 
After " 3 years After > 3 " 5 years After > 5 years or upon certain 
conditions 
Right to autonomous residence permit 
for other family members having 
joined the sponsor 
After " 3 years  After > 3 years or upon certain conditions  None 
Access to education and training for 
adult family members 
In the same way as the sponsor Other conditions apply None 
Access to employment and self-
employment 
In the same way as the sponsor Other conditions apply None 
Access to social security and social 
assistance, healthcare and housing 
In the same way as the sponsor Other conditions apply None 
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Appendix D. Correlation table of MIPEX components 
 
Eligibility for 
status 
Conditions for 
acquisition of 
status 
Security of 
Status 
Rights 
associated with 
status 
Eligibility for 
status 
1    
Conditions for 
acquisition of 
status 
0.5014 1   
Security of 
Status 
0.3106 0.1800 1  
Rights 
associated with 
status 
0.4124 0.1110 0.3151 1 
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Appendix E. Factor analysis of dependent variable index components 
Factor Eigenvalue Factor Eigenvalue   
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
4.84103 
2.87560 
1.69117 
1.45833 
5 
6 
7 
8 
1.39306 
1.17188 
0.83452 
0.63082 
  
Factor (eigenvalue) Factor 1 
(4.841) 
Factor 2 
(2.876) 
Factor 3 
(1.691) 
Factor 4 
(1.458) 
Eligibility of sponsor/legal resident -0.0107 0.4773 0.1293 0.2201 
Eligibility of spouse/partner 0.3681 -0.1317 0.3129 0.1451 
Eligibility of minor children 0.4303 -0.1043 -0.1237 0.2862 
Eligibility of dependent relations in 
ascending line 
0.8150 -0.1269 0.2100 0.3005 
E
li
g
ib
il
it
y
 f
o
r 
st
a
tu
s 
Eligibility of adult children 0.7856 0.1756 0.0474 0.1787 
Passing integration test 0.7110 0.2384 0.2955 0.3015 
Imposition of integration course 0.6693 -0.1956 -0.2075 -0.3975 
Language assessment 0.7135 -0.2313 -0.4136 -0.1137 
Accommodation requirement 0.4351 0.0564 0.1209 0.3117 
Economic resources requirement 0.2702 0.2697 -0.1923 0.0479 
Length of application procedure 0.3811 -0.3810 0.5263 -0.0251 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
fo
r 
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
 
o
f 
st
a
tu
s 
Cost of application -0.0343 -0.3611 0.4777 -0.2232 
Duration of validity of permit 0.6430 -0.0726 -0.2381 -0.0924 
Ground for withdrawing, rejecting, 
refusing to renew status 
0.4941 -0.2914the  0.2680 -0.2281 
Before refusal, due account given 
to family circumstance (by law) 
-0.1620 0.6100 -0.1931 -0.2154 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 o
f 
S
ta
tu
s 
Legal guarantees or redress in 
instance of refusal or withdrawal 
0.2320 0.2906 -0.4399 0.4503 
Right to autonomous residence for 
spouse/partner and children 
0.5333 0.6237 0.1511 -0.0292 
Right to autonomous residence for 
other relatives 
0.5405 0.4741 0.2357 0.0629 
Access to education and training 
for adult family members 
0.1412 0.6285 -0.0449 -0.5800 
Access to employment and self-
employment 
0.1619 0.3396 0.3098 -0.3403 
R
ig
h
ts
 a
ss
o
ci
a
te
d
 w
it
h
 s
ta
tu
s 
Access to social security, social 
assistance, healthcare, and housing 0.0857 0.6339 0.3471 0.0788 
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Appendix F. Factor analysis of dependent variable index components by theoretical 
grouping 
Factor loadings  Principal factor and 
eigenvalues 1 2 
Eligibility of sponsor/legal 
resident 
-0.0115 0.2987 
Eligibility of spouse/partner 0.3200 0.4493 
Eligibility of minor children 0.5150 -0.2936 
Eligibility of dependent relations 
in ascending line 
0.8581 0.0314 
E
li
g
ib
il
it
y
 f
o
r 
st
a
tu
s 
Eligibility of adult children 
Factor1        1.67616  
Factor2        0.37879 
Factor3       -0.00584 
Factor4       -0.10893 
Factor5       -0.25153 
0.7563 -0.0212 
Passing integration test 0.8010 -0.0389 
Imposition of integration course 0.7825 0.0013 
Language assessment 0.7933 -0.0032 
Accommodation requirement 0.2939 -0.0142 
Economic resources requirement 0.2261 -0.2833 
Length of application procedure 0.2884 0.2980 C
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
fo
r 
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
 o
f 
st
a
tu
s 
Cost of application 
Factor1        2.11468 
Factor2        0.37804 
Factor3        0.25393 
Factor4        0.03086 
Factor5       -0.00405 
Factor6       -0.16637 
Factor7       -0.29442 -0.1041 0.4552 
Duration of validity of permit 0.5718 0.0388 
Ground for withdrawing, 
rejecting, refusing to renew 
status 
0.5234 -0.1711 
Before refusal, due account 
given to family circumstance (by 
law) 
-0.0150 0.4005 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 o
f 
S
ta
tu
s 
Legal guarantees or redress in 
instance of refusal or withdrawal 
Factor1        0.63611 
Factor2        0.34516 
Factor3       -0.17399 
Factor4       -0.26508 
0.1870 0.3924 
Right to autonomous residence 
for spouse/partner and children 
0.8663 -0.1994 
Right to autonomous residence 
for other relatives 
0.7821 -0.4005 
Access to education and training 
for adult family members 
0.5180 0.3890 
Access to employment and self-
employment 
0.4725 0.2505 
R
ig
h
ts
 a
ss
o
ci
a
te
d
 w
it
h
 s
ta
tu
s 
Access to social security, social 
assistance, healthcare, and 
housing 
Factor1        2.06708 
Factor2        0.54367 
Factor3        0.22151 
Factor4       -0.13255 
Factor5       -0.21673 
0.4619 0.3597 
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Appendix G. Chow Test for difference between family immigration and immigrant 
policies  
DV: Family migration policy 1 
Human rights organization membership 
0.356 
(0.473) 
Unemployment 
0.542 
(1.226) 
Social spending 
0.545 
(0.511) 
Fertility 
-7.735 
(12.636) 
Immigrant population 
-37.489 
(32.462) 
Center right party vote share 
-0.337 
(0.179) 
Legislative presence of anti-immigrant party  
-6.728 
(5.830) 
Public support for immigration control 
-0.341 
(0.167) 
Family immigration policy 
-14.019 
(36.230) 
Human rights organization membership* Family 
immigration policy 
0.411 
(0.668) 
Unemployment* Family immigration policy 
0.472 
(1.734) 
Social spending* Family immigration policy 
-0.908 
(0.722) 
Fertility* Family immigration policy 
7.426 
(17.870) 
Immigrant population* Family immigration policy 
30.636 
(45.908) 
Center right party vote share* Family immigration policy 
0.240 
(0.236) 
Legislative presence of anti-immigrant party* Family 
immigration policy   
-12.096 
(8.245) 
Public support for immigration control* Family 
immigration  policy 
0.190 
(0.236) 
Constant 
108.876 
(25.619) 
Observations 50 
F-test, Prob. > F 0.11 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1 
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Appendix H. Pearson’s R Correlation Coefficients for Independent Variables in Chapter 2 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1.  Human rights organization 
membership 
1            
2.  Humanitarian donations per 
capita 
0.435 1           
3. Refugees per capita 0.500 0.657 1          
4. GDP 0.430 0.830 0.561 1         
5. Unemployment -0.273 -0.504 -0.505 -0.588 1        
6. Social spending 0.458 0.206 0.564 0.446 -0.382 1       
7. Fertility 0.283 0.509 0.517 0.587 -0.567 0.484 1      
8. Immigrant population 0.323 0.487 0.103 0.544 -0.234 -0.093 0.080 1     
9. Immigration flows 0.348 0.580 0.244 0.815 -0.456 0.230 0.264 0.581 1    
10. Center right party vote share -0.249 -0.107 -0.200 -0.009 -0.061 -0.304 -0.221 0.025 0.227 1   
11. Legislative presence of anti-
immigrant party 
0.333 0.241 0.108 0.294 0.157 0.280 0.209 0.250 0.075 -0.457 1  
12. Public support for 
immigration control 
-0.300 -0.229 -0.029 -0.389 0.349 -0.236 -0.102 -0.280 -0.544 0.053 0.133 1 
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Appendix I. Humanitarian variants on OLS models of family migration policies 
DV: Family migration policy 2 
Human rights organization membership 
0.604*  
(0.329) 
Religiosity 
0.121  
(0.098) 
Unemployment 
0.670  
(1.264) 
Social spending 
0.108  
(0.289) 
Fertility 
-3.122  
(10.613) 
Size of the immigrant population 
-10.505 
(20.652) 
Center right party vote share 
-0.251* 
(0.134) 
Legislative presence of anti-immigrant party  
-15.215** 
(5.419) 
Public support for immigration control 
-0.195 
(0.136) 
Constant 
94.036 
(18.790) 
Observations 25 
R-squared 0.61 
Note: Cyprus and Switzerland are excluded from the model due to missing religiosity data 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1  
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Appendix J. Economic variants on OLS models of family migration policies 
DV: Family migration policy 1 2 3 
Human rights organization membership 
0.597* 
(0.290) 
0.453 
(0.300) 
0.608 
(0.355) 
Unemployment 
0.977 
(1.336) 
  
Social spending 
-0.068 
(0.320) 
 
-0.101 
(0.429) 
GDP growth  
-0.617 
(0.681) 
 
Industrial productivity 
-0.068 
(0.411) 
0.151 
(0.487) 
-0.059 
(0.502) 
Public opinion: negative perception of 
national economy  
  
5.085 
(20.935) 
Fertility 
.183 
(12.038) 
-9.448 
(9.130) 
-5.569 
(12.914) 
Immigrant population 
-22.283 
(21.674) 
-15.888 
(16.17) 
-24.790 
(22.439) 
Center right party vote share 
-0.179 
(0.157) 
-0.210 
(0.157) 
-0.212 
(0.167) 
Legislative presence of anti-immigrant party  
-13.390** 
(5.147) 
-12.219** 
(3.895) 
-12.552** 
(4.987) 
Public support for immigration control 
-0.276* 
(0.146) 
-0.208 
(0.141) 
-0.230 
(0.150) 
Constant 
103.872 
(52.923) 
98.885 
(51.822) 
114.86 
(61.010) 
Observations 23 23 22 
R-squared 0.61 0.59 0.59 
Note: Models one, two and three exclude Ireland, Malta, Switzerland, and Cyprus due to 
missing data, and model three also excludes Norway. 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1  
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Appendix K. Political variants on OLS models of family migration policies  
DV: Family migration policy 1 2 
Human rights organization membership 
0.088 
(0.340) 
0.165 
(0.260) 
Unemployment 
0.522 
(1.347) 
0.122 
(1.245) 
Social spending 
0.042 
(0.408) 
-0.103 
(0.355) 
Fertility 
0.674 
(13.043) 
-2.480 
(10.031) 
Immigrant population 
-29.719 
(27.673) 
-41.199* 
(23.804) 
Center right party vote share 
-0.196 
(0.133) 
-0.134 
(0.118) 
Legislative presence of anti-immigrant party  
-12.460** 
(5.414) 
 
Anti-immigrant party vote share  
-0.637* 
(0.371) 
Left party vote share 
-0.053 
(0.143) 
 
Public support for immigration control 
-0.260* 
(0.134) 
-0.317 
(0.126) 
Constant 
100.169** 
(23.314) 
106.904 
(17.683) 
Observations 26 26 
R-squared 0.527 0.481 
 1
9
6
 
 
Appendix L. Rights for Labor Migrants 
Score 1 2 3 
Immigrants able to accept employment After one year or less legal employment After more than one year, but less than 
or equal to three years of legal 
employment 
No, or after more than three years legal 
employment 
Immigrants able to take up self-employment Only considers viability of business plan Other limiting conditions (like 
linguistic ability) 
Certain sectors and activities solely for 
nationals/EU nationals 
Recognition of qualifications Same procedures for EEA nationals Different procedure than for EEA 
nationals 
No recognition of titles or possible down-
grading of qualifications 
Measures taken to integrate immigrants into 
labor market 
National policy targets to reduce 
unemployment of third country nationals 
and policy targets to promote vocational 
training 
Either measures (or others) but not all No elements 
State facilitation of recognition of extra-EU 
skills and qualifications 
National guidelines on fair procedures, 
timelines, and fees for assessments by 
professional, governmental and non-
governmental organizations and existence 
of state agencies/information centers that 
promote the recognition of skills and 
qualificatios or provision of information 
on conversion courses and on procedures 
for assessment of skills and qualifications 
Existence of state agencies/information 
centers that promote the recognition of 
skills and qualificatios or provision of 
information on conversion courses and 
on procedures for assessment of skills 
and qualifications 
none 
Equality of access to vocational training and 
study grants 
No distinction made between EU and 
non-EU nationals in terms of education, 
vocational training, and study grants 
Equal treatment only after more than 
one but less than three years of legal 
employment 
Third country nationals do not have equal 
access, have equal access only after three 
years, or other limiting conditions exist. 
Renewal of work permits Possible for all permits (except seasonal 
permits) 
Certain permits are not renewable (in 
addition to seasonal permits) 
Work permits are in principle not 
renewable 
Termination of work permit leads to 
revocation of work/residence permit 
Not necessarily. After more than three 
years of employment further elements are 
considered (like length of residence, 
workers social security, etc) or more 
flexible criteria 
Not necessarily. After more than five 
years of legal employment further 
elements are considered  
In all cases 
Right to become and member and 
participate in unions and work-related 
bodies 
Equal access with nationals Restricted access to elected positions Other restrictions apply 
Changes in working status/permit Allowed after less than one year of legal 
employment 
Allowed after more than one or less 
than three years of legal employment 
Not allowed of allowed after more than 
three years legal employment 
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Appendix M. Family immigrant policy scores 
Score 1 2 3 
Security of status 
Duration of validity of 
permit 
< 1 year renewable 
permit or new 
application necessary 
! 1 year renewable permit 
but not equal to sponsor’s 
Equal to sponsor’s 
residence permit and 
renewable 
Grounds for rejecting, 
withdrawing or refusing 
to renew status:  
 
Grounds include: a. 
Public policy or security 
major threat. 
b. Proven fraud in the 
acquisition of permit 
(inexistent relationship 
or misleading 
information). 
c. Break-up of family 
relationship (before three 
years) 
Grounds include the break-
up of a family relationship 
(before three years) 
No other than a. Public 
policy or security major 
threat or b. Proven fraud 
in the acquisition of 
permit (inexistent 
relationship or 
misleading information). 
 
Before refusal or 
withdrawal, due account 
is taken of (regulated by 
law) :  
No elements 
Any but not all of the 
following: a. Solidity of 
sponsor’s family 
relationship 
b. Duration of sponsor’s 
residence 
c. Existing links with MS 
and (non-existing links 
with country of origin) 
All of the following: a. 
Solidity of sponsor’s 
family relationship 
b. Duration of sponsor’s 
residence 
c. Existing links with 
MS and (non-existing 
links with country of 
origin) 
Legal guarantees and 
redress in case of refusal 
or withdrawal 
 
One or both reasoned 
decision and right to 
appeal are not 
guaranteed 
At least reasoned decision 
and right to appeal 
Status confers a reasoned 
decision, a right to 
appeal and 
representation before an 
independent 
administrative authority 
and/or court 
Rights associated with status 
Right to autonomous 
residence permit for 
partners and children 
reaching age of majority 
After " 3 years After > 3 " 5 years 
After > 5 years or upon 
certain conditions 
Right to autonomous 
residence permit for other 
family members having 
joined the sponsor 
After " 3 years  
After > 3 years or upon 
certain conditions  
None 
Access to education and 
training for adult family 
members 
In the same way as the 
sponsor 
Other conditions apply None 
Access to employment 
and self-employment 
In the same way as the 
sponsor 
Other conditions apply None 
Access to social security 
and social assistance, 
healthcare and housing 
In the same way as the 
sponsor 
Other conditions apply None 
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Appendix N. Pearson’s R Correlation Coefficients for Independent Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. GDP 1                
2. Native higher education 0.04 1               
3. Unemployment -0.63 0.26 1              
4. GDP growth 0.03 0.42 0.23 1             
5. Social spending 0.17 -0.22 -0.46 -0.78 1            
6. Construction labor 0.12 0.16 -0.18 0.07 0.14 1           
7. Industry labor 0.12 -0.02 -0.42 -0.26 0.45 -0.06 1          
8. Immigrant education -0.25 0.82 0.47 0.48 -0.39 -0.002 -0.27 1         
9. Center right party vote 
share 
0.05 0.07 -0.04 0.48 -0.42 0.02 0.25 0.17 1        
10. Vote share of anti-
immigrant right 
0.26 0.34 0.09 -0.17 0.13 -0.39 -0.02 0.14 -0.32 1       
11. Public support for 
immigration control 
-0.35 0.50 0.36 0.14 -0.12 0.02 0.43 0.34 0.02 0.12 1      
12. Human rights 
organization membership 
0.42 -0.06 -0.38 -0.14 0.38 0.12 0.18 -0.18 -0.19 0.01 -0.22 1     
13. Humanitarian 
donations per capita 
0.87 0.21 -0.52 0.18 0.05 0.08 0.002 -0.03 -0.13 0.29 -0.23 0.42 1    
14. Refugees per capita 0.51 0.23 -0.53 -0.29 0.53 0.31 0.39 -0.03 -0.22 0.16 0.01 0.47 0.60 1   
15. Immigrant population 0.82 0.04 -0.32 0.13 0.01 0.18 -0.04 -0.10 0.17 0.10 -0.34 0.23 0.64 0.15 1  
16. Immigration flows 0.79 -0.11 -0.48 0.31 -0.16 0.18 -0.07 -0.22 0.38 -0.04 -0.50 0.16 0.59 0.13 0.81 1 
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Appendix O. Chow Test for difference between labor and family migrant rights 
DV: Policy scores (family and labor rights indices) 1 
Unemployment 1.127 (1.976) 
Social spending -0.729 (1.321) 
GDP growth -2.925 (2.906) 
Construction labor -0.275 (0.538) 
Industry labor 2.550 (2.310) 
Fertility -4.044 (19.122) 
Size of the immigrant population -30.080 (44.651) 
Center right vote share -0.434 (0.264) 
Anti-immigrant party vote share -0.385 (0.564) 
Left vote share -0.041 (0.313) 
Public support for immigration control -0.564 (0.327) 
Human rights organization membership 0.270 (0.635) 
Labor rights index 496.892 (336.135) 
Unemployment* Labor rights index -3.827 (2.794) 
Social spending* Labor rights index -2.075 (1.868) 
GDP growth* Labor rights index 0.917 (4.110) 
Construction labor* Labor rights index -0.488 (0.760) 
Industry labor* Labor rights index -3.955 (3.267) 
Fertility* Labor rights index 0.347 (27.042) 
Size of the immigrant population* Labor rights index -73.111 (63.146) 
Center right vote share* Labor rights index 0.037 (0.372) 
Anti-immigrant party vote share* Labor rights index 0.210 (0.798) 
Left vote share* Labor rights index -0.029 (0.443) 
Public support for immigration control* Labor rights index -0.123 (0.463) 
Human rights organization membership* Labor rights 
index 
1.579 (0.897) 
Constant -73.188 (237.683) 
Observations 50 
F-test, Prob. > F 1.75, 0.1128 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1 
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Appendix P. Family immigration policy scores 
Score 1 2 3 
Eligibility 
Eligibility for sponsor/legal 
resident 
! 2 years of legal 
residence and/or holding 
a permit for ! 2 years 
> 1 year of legal residence 
and/or holding a permit for 
> 1 year 
" 1 year of legal residence 
and/or holding a residence 
permit for " 1 year 
Eligibility for the sponsor’s 
spouse and registered 
partner 
Age limits and/or 
integration or other 
conditions apply 
Spouse only Both. No conditions apply 
Eligibility for minor 
children 
Application must be 
lodged before the age of 
15 of minor or other 
conditions apply 
Children must be 
unmarried 
No conditions apply 
Eligibility for dependent 
relatives in the ascending 
line 
Not allowed 
Certain conditions (other 
than dependency) apply 
Allowed 
Eligibility for dependent 
adult children 
Not allowed 
Certain conditions (other 
than dependency) apply 
Allowed 
Conditions for Acquisition of status 
Passing of integration test Yes  No 
Imposition of integration 
course 
Conditional for status Voluntary None 
Language assessment 
Written and/or high level 
language test 
Simple, oral, multiple 
choice interview or test 
None 
Content of integration 
assessment 
With cultural aspects  
With social/political 
aspects 
None 
Accommodation 
requirement 
Further requirements 
Appropriate 
accommodation meeting 
health and safety standards 
None 
Economic resources 
requirement 
Stable and sufficient 
resources for sponsor and 
dependents 
Employment related 
criteria 
None 
Length of application 
procedure 
> 9 months or no 
regulation on maximum 
length 
> 6 " 9 months " 6 months  
Costs of application and/or 
issue of permit or renewal 
Any higher costs or 
prerequisites at high 
indirect costs  
Administrative fee as 
charged for issue of 
identity card 
None 
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Appendix Q. Family immigrant policy scores 
Score 1 2 3 
Security of status 
Duration of validity of 
permit 
< 1 year renewable 
permit or new 
application necessary 
! 1 year renewable permit 
but not equal to sponsor’s 
Equal to sponsor’s 
residence permit and 
renewable 
Grounds for rejecting, 
withdrawing or refusing 
to renew status:  
 
Grounds include: a. 
Public policy or security 
major threat. 
b. Proven fraud in the 
acquisition of permit 
(inexistent relationship 
or misleading 
information). 
c. Break-up of family 
relationship (before three 
years) 
Grounds include the break-
up of a family relationship 
(before three years) 
No other than a. Public 
policy or security major 
threat or b. Proven fraud 
in the acquisition of 
permit (inexistent 
relationship or 
misleading information). 
 
Before refusal or 
withdrawal, due account 
is taken of (regulated by 
law) :  
No elements 
Any but not all of the 
following: a. Solidity of 
sponsor’s family 
relationship 
b. Duration of sponsor’s 
residence 
c. Existing links with MS 
and (non-existing links 
with country of origin) 
All of the following: a. 
Solidity of sponsor’s 
family relationship 
b. Duration of sponsor’s 
residence 
c. Existing links with 
MS and (non-existing 
links with country of 
origin) 
Legal guarantees and 
redress in case of refusal 
or withdrawal 
 
One or both reasoned 
decision and right to 
appeal are not 
guaranteed 
At least reasoned decision 
and right to appeal 
Status confers a reasoned 
decision, a right to 
appeal and 
representation before an 
independent 
administrative authority 
and/or court 
Rights associated with status 
Right to autonomous 
residence permit for 
partners and children 
reaching age of majority 
After " 3 years After > 3 " 5 years 
After > 5 years or upon 
certain conditions 
Right to autonomous 
residence permit for other 
family members having 
joined the sponsor 
After " 3 years  
After > 3 years or upon 
certain conditions  
None 
Access to education and 
training for adult family 
members 
In the same way as the 
sponsor 
Other conditions apply None 
Access to employment 
and self-employment 
In the same way as the 
sponsor 
Other conditions apply None 
Access to social security 
and social assistance, 
healthcare and housing 
In the same way as the 
sponsor 
Other conditions apply None 
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Appendix R. OLS Models of Family Immigration Policy with Variants of 
Humanitarianism, Robust Standard Errors 
DV: family immigration 
policy 
1 2 3 4 
Unemployment 
-0.046 
(1.422) 
0.702 
(1.276) 
0.261 
(1.465) 
0.784 
(1.494) 
Social spending 
-0.372 
(0.537) 
0.200 
(0.418) 
-0.362 
(0.522) 
-0.053 
(0.665) 
Center right party vote 
share 
-0.016 
(0.163) 
-0.062 
(0.162) 
-0.028 
(0.163) 
0.041 
(0.182) 
Vote share of anti-
immigrant party 
-0.877** 
(0.417) 
-1.259** 
(0.349) 
-0.935** 
(0.407) 
-1.025* 
(0.537) 
Liberal party vote share 
-0.113 
(0.172) 
-0.283 
(0.186) 
-0.150 
(0.184) 
-0.104 
(0.191) 
Public support for 
immigration control 
-0.266 
(0.184) 
-0.264 
(0.178) 
-0.323 
(0.212) 
-0.303 
(0.216) 
Size of immigrant 
population 
-33.664 
(36.937) 
-57.874** 
(18.362) 
-30.769 
(37.198) 
-29.186 
(30.853) 
Fertility 
-4.129 
(14.463) 
-17.580 
(13.409) 
-4.336 
(14.289) 
-1.784 
(15.082) 
Human rights 
organization membership 
0.376 
(0.602) 
   
Humanitarian donations 
per capita 
 
0.418** 
(0.121) 
  
Refugees per capita   
821.568 
(1055.32) 
135.862 
(17.700) 
Percentage of positive 
asylum decisions 
   
20.862 
(17.700) 
Percentage of positive 
asylum decisions 
*Refugees per capita 
   
937.087 
(6382.14) 
Constant 
111.041 
(28.031) 
122.79** 
(25.904) 
114.345 
(31.325) 
93.831 
(34.988) 
Observations 25 25 25 25 
R
2
 0.44 0.60 0.45 0.50 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1  
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Appendix S. Chow Test for difference in EU 15 with family immigration policies 
DV: Family immigration policies 1 
Human rights organization membership 
-27.676 
(21.032) 
Unemployment 
-7.648 
(5.289) 
Social spending 
0.085 
(1.744) 
Fertility 
61.201 
(39.182) 
Size of the immigrant population 
-192.894* 
(95.979) 
Center right vote share 
0.192 
(0.726) 
Electorally viable anti-immigrant party  
3.536 
(3.304) 
Left vote share 
-0.554 
(0.322) 
Public support for immigration control 
0.070 
(0.362) 
EU 15 
195.17** 
(51.640) 
Human rights organization membership* EU 15 
28.112 
(21.033) 
Unemployment* EU 15 
9.731 
(5.436) 
Social spending* EU 15 
2.958 
(1.913) 
Fertility* EU 15 
-120.212** 
(41.929) 
Size of the immigrant population* EU 15 
280.244** 
(99.059) 
Center right vote share* EU 15 
-0.941 
(0.742) 
Electorally viable anti-immigrant party* EU 15 
-6.696* 
(3.335) 
Left vote share*  EU 15 
-1.800** 
(0.503) 
Public support for immigration control* EU 15 
-0.801** 
(0.388) 
Constant 
45.773 
(40.253) 
Observations 25 
F-test, Prob. > F 0.0278 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1 
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Appendix T. Chow Test for difference in EU 15 with family immigrant policies 
DV: Family immigrant policies 1 
Human rights organization membership 
-68.473 
(40.396) 
Unemployment 
-16.414 
(10.158) 
Social spending 
0.610 
(3.351) 
Fertility 
140.489 
(75.258) 
Size of the immigrant population 
-323.876 
(184.350) 
Center right vote share 
-0.093 
(1.394) 
Electorally viable anti-immigrant party  
9.549 
(6.346) 
Left vote share 
-0.738 
(0.618) 
Public support for immigration control 
-1.140 
(0.695) 
EU 15 
63.113 
(99.186) 
Human rights organization membership* EU 15 
68.981 
(40.399) 
Unemployment* EU 15 
20.103 
(10.441) 
Social spending* EU 15 
2.024 
(3.675) 
Fertility* EU 15 
-176.227* 
(80.533) 
Size of the immigrant population* EU 15 
319.89 
(190.27) 
Center right vote share* EU 15 
-0.401 
(1.426) 
Electorally viable anti-immigrant party* EU 15 
-10.708 
(6.405) 
Left vote share* EU 15 
-0.238 
(0.967) 
Public support for immigration control* EU 15 
0.672 
(0.745) 
Constant 
75.530 
(77.315) 
Observations 25 
F-test, Prob. > F 0.4821 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1 
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 Appendix U. OLS Models of Family Immigrant Policy with Variants of 
Humanitarian, Robust Standard Errors 
DV: Family immigrant 
policy 
1 2 3 
Unemployment 
-0.214 
(1.238) 
0.185 
(1.536) 
0.320 
(1.607) 
Social spending 
0.854 
(0.530) 
0.687 
(0.532) 
0.515 
(0.630) 
Centrist conservative party 
vote share 
-0.078 
(0.137) 
-0.328 
(0.228) 
-0.319 
(0.222) 
Vote share of anti-
immigrant party 
-0.191 
(0.389) 
-0.470 
(0.437) 
-0.453 
(0.418) 
Liberal party vote share 
-0.075 
(0.139) 
-0.145 
(0.159) 
-0.143 
(0.165) 
Public support for 
immigration control 
-0.612** 
(0.148) 
-0.381** 
(0.172) 
-0.416** 
(0.163) 
Size of immigrant 
population 
-50.159** 
(25.119) 
-57.626* 
(30.178) 
-54.201** 
(25.969) 
Fertility 
-7.003** 
(17.723) 
-9.675 
(17.396) 
-8.539 
(17.421) 
Human rights organization 
membership 
-0.101 
(0.368) 
  
Humanitarian donations 
per capita 
 
0.075 
(0.154) 
 
Refugees per capita   
652.11 
(869.770) 
Constant 
114.852** 
(24.238) 
117.604** 
(25.354) 
119.840** 
(26.183) 
Observations 26 26 26 
R
2
 0.499 0.502 0.510 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1  
  
2
0
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Appendix V. Pearson’s R Correlation coefficients for Integration Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Center right vote 
share 
1          
2. Anti-immigrant right 
vote share 
-0.3257 1         
3. Support for 
immigration control 
0.0447 0.0558 1        
4. Immigrant 
population 
0.0476 0.4778 -0.4453 1       
5. Non-white 
population 
-0.2270 0.0411 0.2478 0.2881 1      
6. Muslim population 0.2289 0.1527 0.2478 0.1374 0.4493 1     
7. Naturalizations per 
capita 
-0.1532 0.4551 -0.2583 0.7027 0.4458 0.3491 1    
8. Immigrant/native 
education 
-0.0521 -0.4687 -0.5552 -0.1941 0.1365 -0.3508 -0.4869 1   
9. Immigrant/native 
unemployment 
-0.3316 0.4224 -0.4669 0.7012 0.5081 0.0920 0.7602 -0.2531 1  
10. Public support for 
assimilation 
-0.3200 0.0327 0.3674 -0.2358 0.1414 0.4050 0.3060 -0.4076 0.1377 1 
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Appendix W. Negative Binomial Model of integration policy score with indicators of 
control, including f tests 
DV: Integration policy 
index 
1 2 3 
GDP 
-0.021 
(0.013) 
  
Unemployment  
-0.123 
(0.140) 
-0.245 
(0.144) 
Social spending 
-0.033 
(0.118) 
-0.015 
(0.103) 
-0.017 
(0.152) 
Fertility 
2.841 
(1.977) 
0.290 
(2.132) 
-0.476 
(2.954) 
Center right vote share 
-0.028* 
(0.015) 
-0.038* 
(0.023) 
-0.036** 
(0.019) 
Vote share of anti-
immigrant right 
0.192** 
(0.068) 
0.152** 
(0.078) 
0.189* 
(0.107) 
Left vote share 
0.069 
(0.044) 
0.044 
(0.039) 
0.041 
(0.063) 
Public support for 
immigration control 
0.028 
(0.021) 
0.068** 
(0.026) 
0.047** 
(0.024) 
Size of immigrant 
population 
 
3.203 
(4.715) 
 
Immigration flows 
  
-101.651 
(80.180) 
Constant -6.437 
(2.909) 
-5.660 
(3.979) 
-2.111 
(4.710) 
Observations 26 26 26 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1 
F tests 
GDP = 0, Prob >chi2 = 0.1186 (model 1) 
Unemployment = 0, Prob >chi2 = 0.3802 (model 2) 
Social spending = 0, Prob>chi2 = 0.8840 (model 2) 
Fertility = 0, Prob>chi2 = 0.8917 (model 2) 
Center right vote share = 0, Prob>chi2 = 0.0948 (model 2) 
Vote share of anti-immigration right = 0, Prob>chi2 = 0.0500 (model 2) 
Left vote share = 0, Prob>chi2 = 0.2638 (model 2) 
Public support for immigration control = 0, Prob>chi2 = 0.0083 (model 2) 
Size of immigrant population = 0, Prob>chi2 = 0.4969 (model 2) 
Immigration flows = 0, Prob>chi2 = 0.2049 (model 3) 
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Appendix X. Negative binomial model of integration policy score, integration 
indicators 
 DV: Integration policy 
index 
1 2 3 
Size of immigrant 
population 
2.880 
(4.339) 
-0.033 
(0.094) 
28.317 
(19.277) 
Non-white population per 
capita 
28.915 
(20.729) 
  
Muslims percentage of 
population  
-0.189 
(0.114) 
 
-0.181* 
(0.108) 
Immigrant/native 
education ratio 
-7.085** 
(3.564) 
-5.295** 
(2.553) 
-7.687** 
(3.752) 
Immigrant/native 
unemployment ratio 
 
0.556 
(0.597) 
 
Naturalization rate 
  
40.772 
(179.86) 
Public support for 
assimilation 
0.066** 
(0.024) 
0.047 
(0.018) 
0.064** 
(0.025) 
Constant 1.392 
(2.368) 
0.521 
(3.160) 
2.075 
(2.190) 
Im
m
ig
ra
n
t 
in
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 
Observations 19 20 19 
**p<0.05,*p <0.1 
 
